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 Whether it is Egypt, Yemen, Iran, or Iraq, when it comes to threats facing the 
House of Saud, the popular media has focused almost exclusively on external factors.  
Yet, the greatest threat facing the House of Saud is not one of foreign aggression, but one 
of domestic opposition.   
 This thesis contends that the House of Saud has maintained control of Saudi 
Arabia by relying on three distinct pillars (or power facilitators): first, aligning itself with 
a strong and reliable outside power; second, preventing opposition groups from gaining a 
significant following, by controlling informal networks within Saudi Arabia; and third, 
creating a rentier state, whereby its citizens became dependent on the government 
largesse.  Furthermore, this thesis contends that the House of Saud will have increasing 
difficulties controlling its informal networks and that its rentier policies are utterly 
flawed and unsustainable. 
 The purpose of this thesis is to scrutinize Saudi Arabia in order to determine the 
future viability of the House of Saud in light of the numerous political, social, religious 
and economic challenges that it now faces.  Specifically,the House of Saud is analyzed 
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 In Saudi Arabia is some of the most valuable real estate in the world.  In addition 
to being both the world’s largest oil producer and “swing” producer, Saudi Arabia 
possesses over one quarter of the world’s proven oil reserves.  Because today’s global 
economy largely operates on Saudi oil, it is of paramount importance that nothing is 
permitted to obstruct this vital oil artery.  However, with Saudi Arabia’s relatively small 
population, its large size, and its central location in a very rough neighborhood, the 
House of Saud is charged with the impossible mission of defending the seven borders that 
it shares with its Arab neighbors (eight if one includes the causeway that connects the 
small island state of Bahrain to Saudi Arabia), as well as over 1500 miles of coastline on 
the Gulf and Red Sea.  Yet, despite the numerous external threats it faces, the greatest 
threat to the House of Saud comes from its own citizens. 
 While the external threats facing Saudi Arabia are real, the House of Saud has 
managed to marginalize them through alliances with strong Western allies – first Britain, 
and then the United States.  Unfettered from having to worry about potential external 
aggressors, the House of Saud has been able to focus on its real threats – domestic 
opposition. 
 The House of Saud has struggled to gain the universal support of its citizens ever 
since Ibn Saud conquered the territory and people of what is modern day Saudi Arabia.  
Saudi Arabia is a very pluralistic state, with numerous ethnic, sectarian, regional, and 
religious tensions.  The House of Saud used the sword to force its version of Islam and its 
rule on this fractured region, and continues to use the sword to remain in power.  Because 
it must rely on force to maintain its power, there remain elements within Saudi Arabia 
 xii 
that still resent the Saudi regime.  However, the House of Saud has used its oil wealth and 
its ability to control informal networks to keep potential rivals at bay.  Until recently this 
strategy has worked.  However, it is now showing signs of wear. 
 The House of Saud has maintained control of Saudi Arabia by relying on three 
distinct pillars (or power facilitators): 
• Aligning itself with a strong and reliable outside power,  
 
• Preventing opposition groups from gaining a significant popular following or 
developing a power base by eliminating or controlling informal networks 
within Saudi Arabia, and  
 
• Creating a rentier state in which its citizens are dependent on the government 
for everything from subsidized education and housing to comfortable jobs and 
guaranteed paychecks.   
 
As the United States’ involvement in the Persian Gulf War demonstrated, the first pillar 
remains strong.  Yet, since the end of the Persian Gulf War the second two pillars are 
continuing to weaken.  Ethnic, sectarian, regional, and religious tensions, questions 
regarding succession and regime legitimacy, urbanization, an increasingly educated 
population, technology and modernization, and globalization all potentially threaten the 
House of Saud’s ability to control the informal networks within its borders.  Furthermore, 
rising birth rates, an increasingly educated population, high unemployment, reliance on 
large numbers of foreign workers, the growth of the royal family, uncontrolled 
government spending, the cyclical nature of the oil economy, and a flawed social contract 
all potentially threaten the House of Saud’s rentier-based social contract.  Thus, the storm 
clouds appear to be gathering on the horizon. 
 In order to cope with the above stated problems the House of Saud has used a 
combination of six tools to insure domestic tranquility.  First, the Saudi government has a 
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very large, very strong, multi-dimensional, and multi-layered internal security force.  
Second, the Saudi regime routinely ferrets out and coopts potential dissidents before they 
can gain widespread support.  Third, the Saudi regime has elevated its divide-and-rule 
strategy to an art form, creating divisions within communities and fragmenting any 
political opposition.  Fourth, the House of Saud remains ideologically flexible, shifting 
between playing its Islamic or Arabic card as circumstances dictate.  Fifth, the House of 
Saud has allowed pseudo-participation in government in the form of the Consultative 
Council, which has alleviated much of the criticism over its refusal to grant its citizens a 
political voice.  Sixth, the House of Saud has used accommodative diplomacy to try to 
placate potential foreign adversaries with non-controversial foreign policies and generous 
aid.  However, in the final analysis many problems that potentially threaten the longevity 
of the House of Saud, remain unaddressed.  For example, Saudi Arabia’s rentier-based 
social contract remains solely at the mercy of the volatile oil market.  Thus, whenever oil 
prices drop (especially for an extended period of time), the House of Saud is forced to 
deplete its reserves, borrow money, or cut benefits to its citizens in order to fund its 
budget.  Even if one ignores Saudi Arabia’s roughly 30 percent unemployment rate, its 
nearly seven million foreign workers, and its bloated public sector, there still will come a 
point in the not too distant future when, no matter how high oil prices get, Saudi Arabia’s 
sky-rocketing population will outstrip the regime’s ability to support its end of the social 
contract.  As the Saudi Arabia’s standard of living erodes, its social contract will 
crumble.  What will this mean for the House of Saud?  If domestic opposition threatens 
the House of Saud will the United States get involved militarily?  If so, what would that 
 xiv 
do to the credibility of the Saudi regime?  If not, and the House of Saud gets toppled, 
what would that mean for the global economy? 
 As one of the world’s sole remaining absolute monarchies, the House of Saud 
makes decisions that affect every aspect of Saudi society.  Thus, it would be of 
tremendous value to United States policy makers to understand the House of Saud’s 
decision-making process.  The safest assumption about how the Saudi regime has 
functioned and will continue to function is to assume that the House of Saud is totally 
self-interested.  Much can be gleaned by examining how its current and previous kings 
have run Saudi Arabia.  Simply put, omnibalancing describes the proclivities of the 
House of Saud very accurately. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, omnibalancing agrees with much of balance-of-power 
theory; however, it differs in significant ways.  Whereas balance-of-power theory focuses 
on states’ balancing against their primary external threats in order to ensure the state’s 
survival, omnibalancing focuses on the efforts of Third World leaders to ensure their own 
political survival and includes internal as well as external threats to the leadership in 
explaining a leader’s decision-making process.  In other words, omnibalancing predicts 
that the Third World leadership will balance against the principal threats it faces (as in 
balance-of-power), but this decision will necessarily include the consideration of internal 
threats.  The key determinant of alignment will be the intensity of the threat to the 
leadership (with the leaders balancing against the principal threat), not whether the threat 
is internal or external.  Thus, omnibalancing views Third World leaders as pragmatic and 
self-interested, doing whatever is required to remain in power.   
 xv 
Therefore, if one applies omnibalancing to the formidable problems currently 
facing the House of Saud, what are the results?  Unlike the majority of Western 
academics who continue to rewrite the House of Saud’s obituary, it is more logical to 
conclude that the House of Saud, with the subtleness of a chameleon, will continue to 
make whatever adjustments are necessary to remain in power.  For some seventy years 
the House of Saud has focused on this goal with fierce tenacity.  Although the journey 
has frequently been tumultuous, the pragmatic and cunning House of Saud has always 
found a way to weather the storms.  Thus, while the current domestic threats facing the 
royal family have dumbfound even the most skilled advisors and are seemingly 
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OMNIBALANCING AND THE HOUSE OF SAUD 
 
Source: Helen Chapin Metz (ed.), Saudi Arabia: A Country Study, Washington, D. C.: 




Although most Middle East experts generally accept that there is a link between 
oil and political stability, in the case of the Persian Gulf oil states, the specifics of that 
link are difficult to ascertain.  These states’ social contracts rely on oil revenues.  Their 
oil revenues allow them to:  
  
• Sustain massive government bureaucracies that employ large numbers of 
citizens and monitor their political behavior, 
 
• Provide subsidized or free public services to citizens while requiring little 
or no taxes,   
 
• Spend huge sums of money on their militaries that link their security to the 
interests of important world powers, and 
 
• Sustain the power and influence of their own families. 
 
However, if deprived of oil revenues, these states’ social contracts would quickly 
crumble, and power struggles would likely ensue. 
At the same time, all of these regimes predate the discovery of oil in the Gulf.  
They have substantial ideological and historical resources – independent of oil – upon 
which they can draw to tie them to at least some of their citizens.  All have survived the 
political and security challenges presented by Nasser in the 1960’s, Khomeini in the 
1980’s, and Saddam Hussein in the 1990’s, as well as the spectacular downturns in oil 
                                                 
1 This Introduction draws heavily from a lecture given by Dr. F. Gregory Gause III (Assistant 
Professor, Department of Politics, University of Vermont, Burlington) at an academic Middle East 
conference south of London, 17 March 1997.  The outline of Dr. Gause’s lecture is contained in the 
following work by Anders Jerichow, The Saudi File: People, Power, Politics (New York: St. Martins 
Press, 1998), 260-261. 
2 
prices in the mid-1980’s.  Their stability is thus not directly threatened by every strategic 
development in the region or by fluctuations in the oil market.   
However, the challenge that all these governments now face is substantially 
different than those mentioned above, all of which emanated from outside their borders.  
With swelling populations, rising unemployment, and spasmodic shifts in oil prices, the 
Gulf regimes face the onerous task of radically reducing the ranks of their bloated public 
sector while concurrently maintaining order.  In other words, these regimes must renege 
on their end of the social contract.  How they navigate this delicate labyrinth, on both the 
economic and the political fronts, will define their politics for the next generation.  
A. THESIS 
The purpose of this thesis is to scrutinize Saudi Arabia in order to determine the 
future viability of the House of Saud2 in these changing times.  This thesis seeks to 
answer the following questions:  What means has the House of Saud historically used to 
maintain control of Saudi Arabia?  What considerations dominate the House of Saud’s 
decision-making process?  Have political, social, or economic changes in Saudi Arabia 
exposed the Saudi regime to any new threats?  Has the Saudi regime enacted reforms to 
deal with these new threats, and, if not, why not?  Is there any empirical evidence to 
suggest that these new influences could threaten the longevity of the House of Saud?   
This thesis contends that the House of Saud has maintained control of Saudi 
Arabia by relying on three distinct pillars (or power facilitators): 
                                                 
2 House of Saud refers to the Saudi royal family – descendents of Ibn Saud, the first Saudi King and 
founder of Saudi Arabia.  Because Saudi Arabia is an absolute monarchy and most of the major ministries 
and governorships are headed up by members of the royal family, in this thesis the term House of Saud is 
used interchangeably with the following: royal family, al-Saud, Saudi regime, Saudi government, and 
Riyadh (the capital city of Saudi Arabia).      
3 
• Aligning itself with a strong and reliable outside power,  
 
• Preventing opposition groups from gaining a significant popular following 
or developing a power base by eliminating or controlling informal 
networks within Saudi Arabia, and  
 
• Creating a rentier state in which its citizens are dependent on the 
government for everything from subsidized education and housing to 
comfortable jobs and assured paychecks.   
 
Furthermore, this thesis contends that the House of Saud will have increasing 
difficulties controlling its informal networks, and that its rentier policies are utterly 
flawed and unsustainable.  If this thesis is correct, then it begs many questions: Is the 
House of Saud shrewd enough to recognize the severity of this situation and flexible 
enough to respond to it?  Are Saudi Arabia’s problems too complex and difficult for the 
House of Saud to solve?  If so, what are the implications for the Middle East, the United 
States, and the World?  If not, what reforms will the House of Saud have to implement to 
ensure its survival?   
B. DILEMMAS FACING THE HOUSE OF SAUD 
The House of Saud faces many external and internal threats.  In recent years 
(since the Persian Gulf War) the popular media has almost exclusively focused on Saudi 
Arabia’s primary external threat, namely an aggressive Iraq.  Saudi Arabia is a large 
country with a relatively small population.3  This dichotomy has severe implications 
when it comes to national defense.  Ultimately, however, the House of Saud has always 
relied on an outside power to insulate it against external aggression.  Initially the House 
of Saud cultivated its relationship with Great Britain to facilitate its rise to power.  Then, 
                                                 
3 See Appendix E 
4 
following World War II the House of Saud became progressively more reliant on the 
United States to safeguard it against its stronger neighbors.  Thus, relieved from the 
worries of external aggressors, the House of Saud has long been able to focus on its many 
and varied internal threats. 
Therefore, the viability of the House of Saud ultimately depends on its ability to 
deal with its internal threats.  The House of Saud claims that it maintains control and the 
support of its citizens because it is the legitimate ruler of Saudi Arabia.  This legitimacy, 
it claims, has its roots in tribalism and Islam.4  However, historically the House of Saud 
has been a weak regime that has not enjoyed the universal consent of its citizens.  Saudi 
Arabia is a very pluralistic state with numerous ethnic, sectarian, regional and religious 
tensions.  The House of Saud used the sword to force its version of Islam and its rule on 
this fractured region, and continues to use the sword to remain in power.  Because it must 
rely on force to maintain its power, it has yet to win the legitimacy battle.5  The modern-
day House of Saud has used its oil wealth and its ability to control informal networks to 
keep potential rivals at bay.  Until recently, this strategy has worked; but it is now 
showing signs of wear.  Ethnic, sectarian, regional, and religious tensions, questions 
regarding succession and regime legitimacy, urbanization, an increasingly educated 
population, technology and modernization, and globalization all potentially threaten the 
House of Saud’s ability to control the informal networks within its borders.  Furthermore, 
rising birth rates, an increasingly educated population, high unemployment, reliance on 
large numbers of foreign workers, the growth of the royal family, uncontrolled 
government spending, the cyclical nature of the oil economy, and a flawed social contract 
                                                 
4 See Chapter II Section C on subduing Islam and tribalism.   
5 See Chapter II Section C and D and Chapter III Section C.   
5 
all potentially threaten the House of Saud’s rentier-based social contract.  With two of 
the House of Saud’s three pillars (power facilitators) under attack, the storm clouds 
appear to be gathering on the horizon.   
C. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology used in this thesis is drawn from Steven R. David’s Choosing 
Sides: Alignment and Realignment in the Third World, written in 1991.6  David coins the 
term “omnibalancing” for his argument, and bases it on a study of Third World nations’ 
political alignments during the Cold War.7  To date, the dominant explanation for why 
states align is realism, and more specifically, balance-of-power theory (a subset of realist 
theory).8  Omnibalancing supports the basis of balance-of-power theory – that Third 
World leaders (as elsewhere) will seek to resist the principal threats they face.9  However, 
due to the unstable, dangerous, and often fatal nature of the international and domestic 
political environment that characterizes Third World politics, modifications were needed 
to make balance-of-power theory applicable.  Omnibalancing accounts for the defects in 
balance-of-power by focusing on the efforts of the Third World leaders to ensure their 
                                                 
6 Steven R. David, Choosing Sides: Alignment and Realignment in the Third World (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1991). 
7 For greater context see David’s introduction, especially “Generalizing About The Third World” and 
“Why The Nature Of The Third World Supports A Theory Of Omnibalancing.”  
8 As described by David, “Balance-of-power theory argues that states align to protect themselves 
against the power of or threats from other states.  The key concern of states is to align in such a way as to 
prevent (by balancing) any other state or group of states from achieving preponderance.  States behave this 
way because they recognize that the emergence of hegemonic power will ultimately threaten their survival.  
Balance-of-power theory emphasizes that the determinants of alignment come overwhelmingly from the 
structure of the international system, particularly the actual and potential external threats that states face.  
Accordingly, the internal characteristics of the states are usually not relevant in influencing alignments. 
This view is reinforced by the formation of balances by states that share little in common except a threat.  
An example is the alliance of democratic France with czarist Russia against Germany prior to World War I.  
The apparent irrelevance of internal characteristics is bolstered by the fact that states with similar political 
systems, which might otherwise be expected to maintain an alignment, do not because of the absence of a 
common external threat.  The failure of the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China to remain 
aligned despite their common allegiance to Communism illustrates this phenomenon.”  David, 4. 
9 For the purposes of his book (published in 1991) This thesis accepts David’s definition of the Third 
World “as including all countries except the United States, the Soviet Union, Canada, Japan, Australia, 
New Zealand, South Africa, the European States, and the People’s Republic of China.  Ibid., 11.   
6 
own political survival (rather than focusing on efforts to ensure the state’s survival), and 
by including internal as well as external threats to the leadership (as opposed to external 
threats alone) in explaining decisions to align.10   In other words, omnibalancing asserts 
that the most powerful determinant of Third World alignment behavior is the rational 
calculation by Third World leaders as to which outside power is most likely to do what is 
necessary to keep them in power.11    
While omnibalancing agrees with balance-of-power that leaders will align in ways 
that better enable them to resist the threats they face, omnibalancing champions three 
additional points: 
• Rather than just balancing against threats or power, leaders of states will 
appease  secondary adversaries to focus their resources on primary 
adversaries. 
• Leaders will seek to appease secondary threats in order to counter more 
pressing threats.  But in the Third World, this often means appeasing other 
states (which often pose less pressing threats) in order to counter more 
immediate and dangerous domestic threats.  They seek to split the 
alignment against them and focus their energies on their most dangerous 
(domestic) opponents.  To do this they appease their domestic opponents’ 
international allies.  This superficially appears to be bandwagoning12 
(accommodation to threat), but is better classified as balancing (the 
                                                 
10 Ibid., x-ix. 
11 Ibid., 6. 
12 Two other theories of alignment, both of which are given far less prominence in international 
relations literature, are bandwagoning and Ideology.  David states that “according to bandwagoning, states 
align with the more powerful or threatening side instead of balancing against it.  According to 
bandwagoning theory, they do so to appease an adversary in the hopes of evading attack and/or to share in 
any gains the victorious side may acquire.  In international politics bandwagoning apparently jeopardizes a 
state’s survival by leaving it at the mercy of a stronger adversary.  Although this would seem to militate 
against bandwagoning behavior as a determinant of alignments, bandwagoning does appear to take place.  
The alignment of Finland with the Soviet Union after World War II and of Egypt with the United States 
after the October 1973 war are common examples of bandwagoning behavior.  On the other hand, 
proponents of Ideology argue that such factors as a common political outlook and political structure 
determine or at least facilitate alignment.  The focus on ideology differs from balancing and bandwagoning 
in that alignment is not seen as a response to a threat, and it considers the internal characteristics of states in 
the alignment decision.  The ideological argument is based on the assumption that leaders who hold strong 
political views would seek support from other leaders who share those views.  Support for this vies is 
evidenced in that virtually all of the democratic countries are aligned with the United States, and the great 
majority of Communist countries were historically aligned with the Soviet Union.”  Ibid., 4-5.     
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accommodation is made to conserve strength for the battle against the 
prime threat, so is part of a general policy of resistance).   
 
• Since the dominant goal of the Third World leaders is to thwart the threats 
arrayed against them, they will sometimes protect themselves at the 
expense of promoting the long-term security of the state and the general 
welfare of its inhabitants. 13 
 
Understanding why Third World states align, therefore, requires focusing on the interests 
of the leadership over those of the state.  This is balancing behavior, but it is not covered 
in balance-of-power theory.   
Thus, omnibalancing embraces both the desire to placate secondary adversaries 
and the necessity of leaders to balance against both internal and external threats in order 
to remain in power.  Furthermore, omnibalancing is contingent upon a regime’s being 
weak, and on the stakes for domestic politics being very high.14  This thesis argues that 
these contingencies are perfectly met in Saudi Arabia. 
D. ORGANIZATION 
This thesis consists of an introduction, five chapters, and a conclusion.  Chapter 1 
introduces the research and consists of the thesis statement, methodology, and 
organization.  Chapter II establishes the three pillars, or power facilitators, that the House 
of Saud has relied upon to maintain power in Saudi Arabia – reliance on a strong external 
power (initially for financial and military assistance and to deter potential external threats 
to Saudi Arabia, although financial assistance largely ceased following World War II), 
controlling informal networks within Saudi Arabia’s borders, and largesse resulting from 
oil profits.  Chapter III looks at Saudi history through the lens of omnibalancing.  This 
                                                 
13 Ibid., 6-7. 
14 Ibid., 7. 
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chapter demonstrates that the House of Saud operates under the constructs identified in 
this theory – the House of Saud strives to balance internal and external threats not 
necessarily to benefit the state, but instead to perpetuate its own success and survival.  
Chapter IV identifies the current and future threats to the House of Saud’s power 
facilitators.  Additionally, Chapter IV examines the growing dissent and frustration over 
the rhetoric coming from the House of Saud over and against actual actions taken to 
reform the social, political, and economic conditions in Saudi Arabia.  Chapter V looks at 
the House of Saud’s responses to the threats identified in Chapter IV by examining 
political and economic reform in Saudi Arabia.  The thesis concludes with a chapter 
discussing where the House of Saud might be headed and what the implications are for 
the Middle East, the United States, and the world.    
E. CONCLUSION 
This thesis draws the following conclusions: 
1) The House of Saud’s power derives from three pillars: 
 a) Maintaining a strong external ally, 
 b) Controlling informal networks within its borders, and  
 c) Leveraging its oil income to maintain control. 
2) The House of Saud’s greatest threat is internal, coming from is its own people, 
not from potential external aggressors. 
3) The House of Saud is pragmatic and self-interested, doing whatever is required 
to remain in power. 
9 
4) Due to recent changes within Saudi Arabia and around the world, there now 
exists credible threats to two of the Saudi regime’s three pillars (power 
facilitators) that could over time, if ignored, lead to the regime’s demise.   
5) The House of Saud will not implement any substantial political or economic 
reforms until a major crisis directly threatens the regime, unless the proposed 
reforms in some way significantly benefit the royal family. 
6) The House of Saud will very likely remain in control of Saudi Arabia for a long 
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II. POWER FACILITATORS IN THE HOUSE OF SAUD 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines the historic and contemporary power facilitators behind the 
House of Saud.  There are three presuppositions that are fundamental to this thesis.  The 
first is that the House of Saud’s power has always been closely linked to its alignment 
with a strong external power – first Britain, and then the United States.  Second, the 
House of Saud has historically asserted control over Saudi Arabia by maintaining a firm 
grip on its informal networks.15  Third, that since the discovery of oil, and more 
specifically, since the oil boom of the early 1970’s, the revenue derived from oil sales has 
become an increasingly important power facilitator behind the House of Saud.16  Also 
fundamental to this thesis is the belief that all of the above mentioned power facilitators 
also represent liabilities that can very easily work against the House of Saud too.            
B. SUPPORT FROM A STRONG ALLY 
The House of Saud’s first and most important power facilitator has been the 
quality and quantity of its external support.  It was not by chance that the rise of the 
                                                 
15 Informal network theory deals with groups of individuals linked to one another by highly personal, 
non-contractual bonds and loyalties.  In highly authoritarian states, like Saudi Arabia, political participation 
is severely restricted.  In this repressive milieu informal networks take on added significance.  Informal 
networks in Saudi Arabia are extensively monitors and severely restricted to ensure that they never gain 
enough strength to pose a threat to the House of Saud.  For a more in depth look at informal network theory 
see Guilain Denoeux, Urban Unrest In The Middle East: A Comparative Study Of Informal Networks In 
Egypt, Iran, And Lebanon (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993. 
16 Rentier states share the following three characteristics: 1) Their economies are highly reliant on 
external rent (i.e. revenue derived from the export of oil), 2) The external rent is generated by a small 
proportion (as opposed to the majority) of the population, and 3) The governments of rentier states are the 
principal entities to which these rents accrue.  Saudi Arabia is the quintessential rentier state.  Unlike the 
United States whose political system is founded on the notion of “No taxation without representation,” in 
rentier states citizens are not taxed and thus not allowed a political voice.  Citizens of rentier states develop 
rentier mentalities.  Unlike conventional economic behavior, rentier behavior embodies a break in the 
work-reward causation.  Reward – income or wealth – is not related to work and risk bearing, rather to 
chance or situation.  Thus, reward becomes a windfall gain, an isolated fact, situational or accidental as 
against the conventional outlook where reward is integrated in a process as the end result of a long, 
systematic and organized production circuit.  Hazem Beblawi, “The Rentier State in the Arab World,” 
Hazem Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani, (ed.), The Rentier State (New York: Croom Helm, 1987), 51-52. 
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House of Saud coincided with the backing of its powerful ally, Britain.  In fact, initially 
Abd al-Aziz ibn Abd al-Rahman Al Saud (1870-1953), the first king and founder of 
today’s Saudi Arabia (commonly known as “Ibn Saud”), was almost completely reliant 
on his external ally for financial support, military equipment, and political and military 
advice.  Additionally, the House of Saud was reliant upon foreign support to keep its 
more powerful and hostile neighbors at bay.     
1. British Support 
The Golden Rule, defined as, “He who has the gold, rules,” is particularly 
applicable when looking at state formation and state government.  The implications are 
obvious: it takes a great deal of money to effectively rule over a large geographic area or 
group of people.  For millennia this basic truth thwarted the efforts of various shaykhs 
who attempted to dominate the Arabian Peninsula for any length of time.  Before the 
discovery of oil, the inhabitants of the central Arabian Peninsula were among the poorest 
peoples on Earth.  While the coastal areas along the Persian Gulf, the Arabian Sea, and 
the Red Sea had some important ports, and the hajj17 drew pilgrims from around the 
Muslim World, the wealth of these areas was slight compared to many of its neighbors.  
The central areas of the Peninsula were especially inhospitable ecologically and deprived 
economically, with very limited agricultural and pastoral economies and a small but 
locally important caravan trade.  In fact, Gregory Gause notes that “The economic 
surplus [of Saudi Arabia] was so slight that, from the time of the Prophet Muhammad 
until the advent of the current Saudi state, no regime was able to unite most of the 
Peninsula under its rule for more than the lifespan of a charismatic leader.”  He goes on 
to point out that, “No European colonial power evidenced any interest in occupying the                                                  
17 The hajj is the annual pilgrimage to Mecca required of every Muslim at least once in his lifetime. 
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central areas of the Peninsula, recognizing the costs of such an occupation would far 
outweigh any benefits.”18 Thus, the Arabian Peninsula was seen as an unattractive 
wasteland by outsiders and did not possess the economic resources associated with 
developing a modern state.     
However, during the nineteenth-century foreign powers began to show an interest 
in the Arabian Peninsula.  Located on the western flank of India, the Arabian Peninsula 
was of strategic significance to Britain.  The British government in India thus became 
increasingly concerned about the trade with the Arab tribes on the Peninsula’s eastern 
coast.  Additionally, the British were anxious about potentially hostile Ottoman influence 
in an area so close to India and the planned Suez Canal.  Thus the British came into 
increasing contact with the House of Saud.19  However, no substantial contact was made 
until 1904, when according to the famed British Orientalist-agent Harry St. John Philby, 
“Ibn Saud became convinced of the value of an understanding with Great Britain.”20  The 
“value” of the understanding that Philby spoke of and which Ibn Saud sought was British 
financial support, military equipment, and political and military advice.  Intent on 
defeating his long-time tribal adversaries and dominating the Arabian Peninsula, Ibn 
Saud used British support to tip the scales in his favor.  From 1904 to 1911 Ibn Saud used 
British money to finance the expansion of his Ikhwan armies.21  From 1911 to 1914 the 
British supported Ibn Saud and his Ikhwan against Turkey and all of the other shaykhs’ 
                                                 
18 F. Gregory Gause III, Oil Monarchies (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1994), 44. 
19 Helen Chapin Metz, Saudi Arabia: A Country Study (Washington, D. C., U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1993), 21. 
20 Said K. Aburish, The Rise, Corruption and Coming Fall of the House of Saud (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1994), 18. 
21 Ikhwan refers to the brotherhood of fanatic Wahhabi warriors founded by Ibn Saud who were used 
to subdue the Arabian Peninsula.  Ibn Saud housed the Ikhwan in war villages, hijar, where they remained 
in constant combat readiness to aid the Saudi leader in his conquests. 
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and princes of eastern Arabia.  Later Sir Percy Cox, the British Resident in the Gulf, 
openly encouraged Ibn Saud to attack the Ibn Rashidi’s remaining territory to prevent 
him from helping Turkey.  In fact, Captain William Shakespeare (a political and military 
advisor to Ibn Saud) lost his life while dressed in a British uniform and directing artillery 
fire for Ibn Saud’s forces as they attacked the Rashidis at Jarab.22   
In addition to the finances, advisors, and arms provided by Britain, in 1915 
Britain signed the Darea Treaty, which among other things guaranteed and protected Ibn 
Saud’s domain.  With his power secured by British assurances, Ibn Saud bided his time 
until he received “permission” from the British to resume his conquests and take the 
Hijaz.23  By 1924, British-Hashemite tension had reached a boiling point.   In fact, many 
British officials agreed with the sentiments of Sir Arthur Hirtzel of the British India 
Office, who stated: “The feeling is growing that it would be good if Ibn Saud established 
himself in Mecca.”24  Thus, with British support for the Hashemites on the wane and in 
the absence of any explicit direction not to invade, the Ikhwan armies poured into the 
Hijaz and swiftly conquered the region.      
Therefore, the earliest power facilitator behind the rise of the House of Saud was 
unquestionably the support that Ibn Saud received from Britain.  The substantial 
financial, military, and advisory assistance that Britain afforded Ibn Saud enabled him to 
build his fanatical Ikhwan armies, destroy his tribal adversaries, expand the boundaries of 
his control, consolidate his power, establish himself as king, and ultimately to name the 
                                                 
22 David E. Long and Bernard Reich, The Government and Politics of the Middle East and North 
Africa (Oxford: Westview Press, 1995), 65.   
23 The British did not formally encourage him to take the Hajas and move into Mecca and Medina, but 
they also gave no indication that they would oppose him.  Knowing that the Ikhwan desired nothing more 
than to control the Hijas, Britain’s silence on the issue was tantamount to approval for the Ikhwah’s actions. 
24 Aburish, 20. 
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conquered Arab lands after himself.  Furthermore, through informal agreements and 
formal treaties, Britain guaranteed that it would protect the House of Saud against any 
outside aggressors.  In his work The Desert King, David Howarth astutely observed that 
“Not even Ibn Saud could say where he would have been without British help, protection, 
and advice.”25  From the time he completed his conquest of the Arabian Peninsula until 
the discovery of massive oil reserves in 1938, Ibn Saud relied on the British subsidy and 
revenues from the hajj for his support.  Then, suddenly, everything changed. 
2. American Support 
Always desperate for cash, for a few thousand pounds Ibn Saud granted the first 
oil concession to Britain’s Eastern General Syndicate in 1923.   They spent two years 
prospecting confirmed the existence of “some” oil, and then did nothing.  Then, in 1933, 
the depression hit.   Ibn Saud’s debts soared due to the drop off in income from the hajj.  
The oil concession was auctioned off to alleviate his mounting debt, and Standard Oil of 
California won it for $250,000.26 
The value and importance of Saudi oil became increasingly significant during the 
Second World War.  U.S. Secretary of the Interior, Harold Ickes, believed that ready 
access to Saudi Arabia’s huge oil reserves would be key to America’s growing oil needs.  
Throughout the 1940’s the U.S. Government, worried that poverty might endanger the 
stability of a country which held an important key to its future, purposefully made 
substantial direct and British-managed contributions27 and grants to Ibn Saud.  However, 
                                                 
25 Ibid., 23. 
26 Ibid., 35. 
27 President Roosevelt was able to funnel some $10 million dollars to Ibn Saud through Britain prior to 
congress signing a Lend-Lease Agreement in 1943.  Peter W. Wilson and Douglas F. Graham, Saudi 
Arabia: The Coming Storm (New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1994), 93.    
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but if the 1933 oil concession was the beginning of America’s invasion of the desert 
kingdom, then the payments made by the U.S. Government represented a transfer of 
Saudi Arabia from the British to the American sphere of influence.28    
Ibn Saud’s dependence on the United States was similar to his previous 
dependence on Britain in every respect except one.  While Ibn Saud sought military 
equipment, political and military advice, above all he coveted security guarantees against 
any potential aggressors that threatened his rule.  However, unlike the British who 
supported Ibn Saud financially, at the end of the war Saudi Arabia was producing 
300,000 barrels of oil a day and thus did not need direct financial assistance from the 
United States.  Ibn Saud was helped through a difficult period and the United States’ 
commitment to support him was consummated when he met with President Roosevelt in 
February 1945 in Egypt, the only Arab leader to be so honored.  At that meeting, 
Roosevelt in no uncertain terms stated that the Unites States was committed to Ibn Saud 
as the primary Arab leader and made remarks about safeguarding the territorial integrity 
of Saudi Arabia, something that was later confirmed and elaborated on by President 
Truman.29 
Furthermore, since World War II the United States has repeatedly reconfirmed its 
commitment to the House of Saud whenever it has been threatened by an outside power.  
In 1957, when Nasser’s Pan-Arabism movement threatened the unstable regime of King 
Saud, the United States responded with the Eisenhower Doctrine, which publicly 
articulated the previously secret United States guarantees to the House of Saud against 
                                                 
28 Ibid., 36. 
29 Ibid. 
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the expansionist designs of Nasser, communism, or both.30  Following the Iranian coup 
of 1979, in which the Islamic fundamentalist forces of the Ayatollah Khomeini ousted the 
pro-Western Shah, the House of Saud again felt vulnerable.  In order to prevent 
Khomeini from exporting his Islamic revolution to Saudi Arabia, the United Stated 
quickly agreed to support Iraqi aggression against Iran.  Thus, with Khomeini 
preoccupied with the Iran-Iraq war, the threat to the House of Saud was diminished. 
Again in 1991, when the House of Saud was threatened by approaching Iraqi tanks that 
had just overrun Kuwait, the United States was quick to respond.  The United States built 
a coalition force supported by dozens of countries and mobilized half-a-million of its own 
forces to liberate Kuwait; this also was to deter Saddam Hussein from encroaching on 
Saudi Arabia.  Furthermore, in addition to the equipping and training of the Saudi armed 
forces to protect their own borders with its newest and most sophisticated pieces of 
military hardware, the United States also supplied the Saudi regime with elaborate 
electronic monitoring systems to assist in protecting the House of Saud against any 
internal threats.  
Thus, the support of strong allies was and continues to be a major power 
facilitator for the House of Saud.  Britain can be largely credited with the House of 
Saud’s ascension to power during the first half of the twentieth-century, and the United 
States is largely responsible for their remaining in power to this day.  Furthermore, 
because Saudi Arabia has never truly had to worry about defending its borders against 
foreign invasion, the House of Saud has been able to focus on crushing internal dissent 
and controlling Saudi Arabia’s informal networks.  
                                                 
30 Ibid., 127. 
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C. CONTROL OF INFORMAL NETWORKS  
The second major power facilitator of the House of Saud has been its success in 
asserting control31 over Saudi Arabia’s informal networks.  Informal network theory, as 
espoused by Guilain Denoeux in his work Urban Unrest in the Middle East, deals with 
“groups of individuals linked to one another by highly personal, non-contractual bonds 
and loyalties.”32  In developing his theory, Denoeux specifically identifies four types of 
networks – religious, clientist (patron-client), occupational, and residential.  The first 
directly correlates with Saudi Arabia’s Islamic institutions and the latter three correlate 
nicely with the institution of tribalism.  From the days of Muhammad until the emergence 
of Saudi Arabia as a rentier state, the two most important institutions on the Arabian 
Peninsula were Islam and tribalism.      
Therefore, it follows that understanding Islamic and tribal institutions is 
fundamental to comprehending the origins of the House of Saud.  That is to say that state-
formation in Saudi Arabia depended very heavily on Ibn Saud’s ability to mobilize 
military and political support from Arabian tribes, and to use Wahhabism to link various 
tribes in a larger political movement.  However, it cannot be overstated that the House of 
Saud created an ideology of Islam and tribalism, based on its own interpretation of these 
concepts, to legitimize its rule domestically and internationally.  It also bears mentioning 
that the relationships between the institutions of Islam and tribalism and the House of 
Saud have changed over time, particularly since Saudi Arabia was transformed into a 
rentier state.33   
                                                 
31 “Control” as it is used here entails manipulation, repression, or destruction of informal networks.   
32 Denoeux, 3. 
33 Gause, 10-11. 
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It is perhaps ironic that the importance of Islamic and tribal rhetoric and 
symbology has progressively increased, while the actual institutions have lost much of 
their power to the House of Saud.  The transition of power from Islamic and tribal 
institutions to the House of Saud was a deliberate and well-orchestrated act on behalf of 
the royal family.  The House of Saud has labored to engulf the institutions of Islam – 
mosques, schools, courts, scholarly organizations, and awqaf (religious trusts) – into the 
state’s bureaucracy, in order to control and direct them.  Additionally, every Saudi King 
since Ibn Saud has worked to curtail the independent power of the tribes and to make 
tribal structures subordinate parts of their political systems.  The new versions of Islam 
and tribalism constructed by the Saudi regime have become important mechanisms of the 
state, providing institutional support and ideological legitimating to the House of Saud.  
Saudi citizens are permitted to organize socially and participate politically through these 
narrowly defined and closely monitored institutions.  The House of Saud finances these 
Islamic and tribal institutions and allows them the “freedom” to operate publicly.  
However, these same “freedoms” are ordinarily denied to other types of social and 
political organizations, such as the press and political parties for.34       
1. Subduing Islam 
With the possible exception of Iran, Saudi Arabia, more so than any other Gulf 
Monarchy, is reliant on Islam for its claim to legitimacy.  In 1745, Islam and politics 
were permanently and unabashedly fused together when Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, 
a scholar who championed a return to the purest interpretations of Islam, formed an 
alliance with Muhammad ibn Saud, ruler of the small oasis town of Diriyya.  The alliance 
was based on the House of Saud is accepting Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s religious                                                  
34 Ibid., 11. 
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interpretations (Wahhabism) in exchange for Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s acknowledgment of 
the House of Saud as the imams35 of his movement.  Prior to the discovery of oil, 
Wahhabism was chiefly responsible for holding together a polity that was financially 
weak and that was subject to the competing loyalties of tribal idiosyncrasies and regional 
identities.36  
 With the rise of Ibn Saud, the relationship between Islamic institutions and 
political authority remained close in Saudi Arabia.  Devoid of even the semblance of a 
state bureaucracy, Ibn Saud relied heavily on the ulama for advice and administrative 
support.37   Furthermore, Ibn Saud relied on the purest ideology of Wahhabism to recruit 
and organize his fanatical Ikhwan armies, which he effectively used to expand his sphere 
of influence.  By the late 1920’s, the Ikhwan had seized most of the Arabian Peninsula 
and were becoming increasingly insubordinate.  No longer needing their services and 
fearful that Ikhwan autonomy would alienate more moderate Muslims under his rule and, 
more importantly, disrupt his highly treasured relationship with Britain, in 1929 Ibn Saud 
decided to act.  After receiving a favorable fatwa38 from the ulama in Riyad, Ibn Saud 
recruited an army of loyal tribesmen and townspeople and defeated the Ikhwan, driving 
the survivors into Kuwait and then subsequently into Iraq.39     
 Destroying the Ikhwan was the first major victory for the House of Saud in its 
effort to assert control over the Islamic institutions in Saudi political life.  Later in the 
                                                 
35 An imam is the supreme religo-political leader of the Muslim community. 
36 Gause, 12. 
37 The word Ulama refers to the collective term used for the scholars or learned men of Islam. 
38 A fatwa is a religious judgment given by a mufti (an expert in Muslim Law who is qualified to give 
authoritative legal opinions). 
39 Joseph Kostiner, “Transforming Dualities: Tribe and State Formation in Saudi Arabia,” in Philip 
Khoury and Joseph Kostiner, (eds.), Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East (Berkley: University of 
California Press, 1990). 
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1950’s and 1960’s, as new state agencies were formed, the ulama – who were previously 
used as advisors and who filled high level administrative positions – became 
marginalized politically, as secularly educated Saudis staffed many of the new 
bureaucracies.40 
Although the subduing of religious institutions was a slow, incremental, and at 
times violent process, once the House of Saud’s supremacy was established, it sought to 
make Islamic institutions into agencies of the state.  Gregory Gause states that, 
“Including them [Islamic institutions] in the state apparatus helped the rulers, who had 
few resources at their disposal before oil wealth, to staff their governments while still 
maintaining their ultimate control over the men of religion.”41  In other words, the House 
of Saud co-opted the ulama by vesting them with positions of power and status while 
concurrently earning their loyalty, making them dependent on the state, and reducing the 
chances that they would rebel.  Moreover, the ulama, now employees of the state, played 
a curtail role in the state’s legitimating strategies by providing religious sanction to the 
House of Saud.42     
As the House of Saud oversaw the transition of Saudi Arabia into a rentier state, 
they used the almighty dollar to further their control over Islamic institutions both inside 
and outside Saudi Arabia.  Inside Saudi Arabia, most of the ulama became employees of 
the state.  As stated earlier, since the time of Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab the 
relationship between the highest religious leaders and the highest political leaders has 
been a close one.  However, petrol-dollars have enabled the House of Saud to monitor 
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42 Ibid., 14. 
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and control ulama at the lowest levels of Saudi society in a way previously never thought 
possible.  For example, just a few decades ago a preacher at a local mosque in a mid- to 
small-sized city in Saudi Arabia would have inherited his position from his father or other 
family member, or been chosen by the local notables.   Additionally, the local community 
would have supplied his salary and funded the mosque’s activities.  Today, that same 
local mosque is likely to have been built or refurbished with state funds, and the preacher 
would most likely be a state employee.43  While there are still a limited number of 
independent and privately funded mosques operating in Saudi Arabia, state authorities 
from both the religious and internal security ministries are likely to closely monitor their 
Friday sermons and the activities of the ulama associated with them.44   
Outside of Saudi Arabia, petro-dollars have enabled the House of Saud to 
promote its interpretations of Islamic doctrine on an international scale.  The House of 
Saud exerts its influence by financing a number of international Islamic organizations, as 
well as by funding the construction of mosques and Islamic institutes throughout the 
world.  Thus, the House of Saud has been successful at buying influence both inside and 
outside its boarders.45  
The judicial system in Saudi Arabia represents another area in which Islamic 
institutions have lost a great deal of power.  Not only does the House of Saud control the 
appointees to the religious courts, but they also have established parallel secular legal 
institutions with jurisdiction over Saudi business practices and the economy.  
Furthermore, in 1970 the House of Saud established a ministry of justice to supervise 
                                                 
43 James Bill, “Resurgent Islam in the Persian Gulf,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 63, no. 1, (Fall 1984): 116. 
44 Gause, 15.  
45 Ibid., 16-17. 
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both religious and secular courts, further extending its control over both.  Similarly, the 
state-appointed Directorate of Religious Research, Fatwas, Proselytization, and Guidance 
assumed the function of authoritative religious interpretation.46  Shaykh Abd al-Aziz bin 
Baz, who chairs this body and who also holds the title of Grand Mufti, is essentially the 
chief Islamic spin machine whose job consists of dispensing favorable fatwas to justify 
the actions of the House of Saud.47 
Yet another Islamic institution that the House of Saud leverages to its advantage 
is the Committee for Propagation of Virtue and Forbidding of Evil.  To ensure that the 
community of the faithful will ”enjoy what is right and forbid what is wrong,” morals 
enforcers, known as mutawaeen (literally, “those who volunteer or obey”), have been 
integral to the Wahhabi movement since its inception.48  Founded by Imam Faisal in 
1855 with 22 members, the mutawaeen now number more than 20,000.  Today, the 
House of Saud keeps the mutawaeen on a relatively short leash, and their powers are 
relegated to ensuring that shops and restaurants shut their doors during prayer calls and 
admonishing people they consider improperly dressed (such people may be swatted with 
a cane for their transgressions).  However, when the House of Saud needs to improve its 
Islamic credentials, the mutawaeen always seem to enjoy a surge in power.49  Thus the 
mutawaeen are used as a convenient and coercive arm of the House of Saud to bolster its 
legitimacy in times of trouble.    
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Consequently, the preponderance of evidence demonstrates that the House of 
Saud has actively perused policies not aimed at maintaining parity with Islamic 
institutions, but instead aimed at achieving total dominance over those institutions.  By 
providing the ulama with salaries, social status, positions of political importance, and 
opportunities to spread Wahhabism internationally, the House of Saud has successfully 
linked the ideological and political interests of the men of religion to the Saudi regime.  
The House of Saud effectively offered the ulama a win-win deal – power, security, and 
wealth in exchange for political loyalty and support – that was too good to pass up.50         
2. Subduing Tribalism 
The manner in which the House of Saud dealt with Islamic institutions in Saudi 
Arabia mirrors the way in which it dealt with the institution of tribalism.  Just as Ibn Saud 
relied heavily on Islamic institutions to assist him in building the Saudi state, he likewise 
relied on tribal political connections in order to come to power and to launch his conquest 
of the Arabian Peninsula.  The House of Saud Immigrated to central Arabia from the 
Unayza confederation in the 15th century.  However, it wasn’t until the House of Saud 
became a settled urban clan, in the early 1700’s, that it began to assert its rule.  Devoid of 
adequate resources, the House of Saud relied upon its ability to gather tribal support 
around the religious banner of Wahhabism to expand their influence.51   
Without tribal support it would have been impossible for the House of Saud to 
organize and amass the troops necessary to expand its domain.  In tribal societies, leaders 
have to negotiate with tribal shaykhs to recruit fighting forces.  Islamic institutions being 
an exception, tribal shaykhs possessed the only administrative vehicles in their societies.  
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These shaykhs’ reputations were built on their ability to negotiate between, navigate 
around, and flat out manipulate inter- and intra-tribal rivalries.  However, tribal support 
was frequently fleeting and erratic.  For example, it was not uncommon for tribal 
supporters to shift their allegiances to either a challenger from within the shaykh’s family 
or tribe, or to rival claimants.  Furthermore, tribal supporters were frequently 
insubordinate, oftentimes did not pay their taxes, and, when coerced, regularly withdrew 
their support and mobilized against their leaders, or simply moved to another region.52 
Ibn Saud was intimately familiar with the dynamics of tribal society and shrewdly 
used this knowledge to achieve his purposes.  However, the House of Saud also realized 
the instability inherent in tribal societies and thus, with longevity as a goal, plotted a 
course to reduce its dependence upon tribal loyalties.  Even though Ibn Saud is often 
portrayed as the desert king and a Bedouin himself, it was he, “perhaps more than anyone 
else, who set in motion the destruction of the traditional basis of their [the Bedouin] tribal 
life and began their incorporation into the Islamic-based Saudi state.”53  The most 
obvious example of Ibn Saud’s clever strategy was his dependence on tribalism to recruit 
his Ikhwan armies, who were responsible for most of his territorial gains.  However by 
1929 the Ikhwan proved to be more of a liability than an asset to Ibn Saud.  Thus, Ibn 
Saud moved to shift his base of support.  By appealing to the economic interests of the 
urban populations, Ibn Saud raised another army, and equipping them with modern 
British weapons, successfully defeated the Ikhwan.54       
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Another strategy used by the House of Saud to decouple its dependence on tribal 
support, was to increasingly rely on international actors for support.  As discussed earlier, 
in exchange for ceding control over its foreign and defense policies, Ibn Saud received 
British finances, arms, advisors, and protection.  It was this support that allowed Ibn Saud 
to consolidate his power, defeat his Ottoman-backed rivals (the Rashidis) during World 
War I, and to ride out the economic crisis of the 1930’s.55    
Ibn Saud used other tactics as well.  In 1925, he deprived the tribes of their 
exclusive use and management of grazing areas.  This radically decreased inter-tribal 
conflict as well as eliminated one of the primary functions of tribal governments: the 
distribution of resources.56 
Additionally, the House of Saud used marriage as a means to widen its familial57 
network in order to build consensus for its authority.  This tactic has been so successful 
that today the royal family is the largest and most cohesive group in the kingdom with 
over 5,000 members who are related to almost all the important tribes of Saudi Arabia 
through marriage.   
However, while the House of Saud used urban and foreign support to dilute their 
reliance upon the tribes, the most dramatic event that permanently shifted the balance of 
power away from tribal institutions and toward the state was the oil boom of the 1970’s.  
With the massive influx of oil revenues available to the state, the House of Saud no 
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Mamoun Fandy, in his work, Saudi Arabia and the Politics of Dissent, expounds on this concept.  He 
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longer relied on local populations – tribal or urban – for financial support.  Instead, the 
House of Saud used its newfound wealth to buy political loyalty and service.  Tribal 
shaykhs began receiving and quickly grew accustomed to lucrative subsidies from the 
state.  The shaykhs in turn became dependent upon the state instead of tribal resources.  
Thus, the shaykhs became employees of the state.58 
Furthermore, by providing free or highly subsidized goods and services and 
lucrative state jobs directly to its citizens, the House of Saud was able to bypass the 
mediating figure of the shaykh, thus shifting their political focus away from the tribe and 
toward the state.  Additionally, the House of Saud has used grants and jobs to draw 
tribesmen out of the desert and into an urban lifestyle.  Lucrative salaries lure tribesmen 
into the regular armed forces, eliminating the need for the House of Saud to go through 
the shaykhs to enlist tribal levies.  In fact, the Saudi National Guard is overwhelmingly 
comprised of Bedouins.  A 1968-1970 study showed not only that 80 percent of all Bedu 
had at least one family member in the National Guard, and that the guardsmen’s salary 
was essential to the support of the family.  Later studies showed that over one-third of the 
Bedu were government employees, while another one-third received some sort of 
government grant.59   
In addition, those tribesmen that the House of Saud could not draw into the cities, 
it strove to sedentize in rural areas.  In 1968, the House of Saud instituted a law allowing 
the Bedouin “squatters rights” to land that they farmed for three years, further eroding 
communal ownership and tribal solidarity.60 
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Possibly the most worrisome tribal problem faced early on by Ibn Saud has now 
all but disappeared – the prospect of armed, organized tribal opposition to the state.  
What was once the most important impediment to state building on the Arabian Peninsula 
is now only spoken of by historians, since the House of Saud forbids Saudi tribes from 
maintaining an independent military capability.61    
Thus over the past century, the House of Saud has actively pursued ways to 
bolster its authority, at the expense of its two preeminent informal networks – Islam and 
tribalism.  While Islamic and tribal institutions were at once critical power facilitators for 
the House of Saud, petro-dollars changed that dynamic forever.  Oil revenues were the 
deathblow that decisively shifted the balance of power away from Islamic and tribal 
institutions and toward the House of Saud.  
D. THE RENTIER STATE 
The third major power facilitator of the House of Saud has been its success in 
transforming Saudi Arabia into a rentier state.62   
1. How Rentier States Operate 
Unlike the production states of Europe, rentier states of the Middle East obtain 
their revenues in a highly anomalous fashion: the revenues go directly to those in charge 
of the state, thus eliminating the need for domestic extraction, or taxation.63  Since the 
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overwhelming share of the revenues in these states is derived from external rent rather 
than from internal rent, a productive domestic economy is unnecessary.  Additionally, the 
rent directly becomes revenue to the state and not to a combination of the state and 
private sector.  Thus, rentier states “can break the constraints of the iron triangle of state 
formation: neither taxation nor institutional development based on economic 
differentiation nor political accommodation must take place.”64  Because rulers of rentier 
states do not have to worry about expanding the income base in order to levy more taxes, 
there is little incentive to develop coherent economic policies.  Rather, these states 
increase revenue by increasing production of a commodity.  This action is not linked to 
the domestic economy and puts no demand on its citizens.  Thus, instead of showing 
interest in economic policies and taxation that would strengthen the purview of the state, 
rulers in rentier states focus on their distributive policies and use them to shape and 
constrain their economies.   
In production economies the principle of “no taxation without representation” 
greatly contributes to the state formation process.  In general, taxation usually requires an 
implicit acceptance by those surrendering their wealth, which links the process to 
legitimacy and, ultimately, to some form of political contestation.  This is not so in 
rentier states.  Political contestation is not allowed in these states because the ruling elite 
do not rely on taxation to operate their states; instead they rely on oil revenues.  Thus, 
since the citizens are not taxed, they do not get a voice in the political process.  In rentier 
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states, the citizens essentially accept welfare payments – in the form of government 
subsidies, free goods and services, and government jobs – from the government in 
exchange for their political acquiescence.  
Furthermore, the economic role of rentier states encourages the power-for-wealth 
tradeoff.  As long as external rents flow into the coffers of the ruling regime, there is no 
need for citizens to influence public agencies and shape public policy to their material 
advantage.  Vandewalle states it this way: “With the state in charge of licensing and 
regulating all economic activity, the normal division of labor that creates interdependence 
in productive economies ceases to exist.”65  Thus, individuals increasingly become 
accustomed to receiving rent for their political silence, and rulers continually encourage 
the tradeoff for the purpose of political manipulation.   
Rentier states, generally speaking, make few demands upon their citizens.  
Reciprocally, the constraints on rulers’ behavior are relatively few.  Because rulers can 
increase revenues simply by increasing production, they do not need to adopt coercive 
policies to extract taxes from their citizens.  The only constraints that they are faced with 
are those of the international market through its pricing mechanism, not those imposed 
over time by the citizens. 
Additionally, it is significant that in productive economies the creation and 
execution of a development strategy is subject to sociopolitical restrictions and to the 
confines of the state’s organizational capacities.  This is not so for the rentier state.  
Because oil revenues pour directly into state coffers, rentier regimes do not face the same 
sociopolitical tensions as those of production states.  Likewise, rentier regimes do not 
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rely on vast organizations and bureaucracies for taxation purposes.  With these 
constraints lessened, rentier states have far greater latitude both in the development goals 
they pursue and in the strategies upon which they rely.66  Rentier states, for example, can 
and have achieved high rates of growth without any structural adjustments in the 
domestic economy.  At the same time, rentier states can concurrently pursue both growth 
and equity, thus avoiding the problem of a widening gap between the “haves” and the 
“have nots.”67   
While the economic policies of rentier states do not benefit every citizen equally, 
the economic largesse realized by the average citizen is large enough to prevent the 
formation of political interests and the demand for changes in political and economic 
institutions in charge of distribution.  Additionally, because citizens do not contribute to 
the creation of wealth, they are hard-pressed to argue for a greater share of the state’s 
distributive largesse.  Likewise, over time a rentier mentality is perpetuated, and citizens 
become loyal to the rentier system rather than to the regime doling out the funds.   
Another important political characteristic of rentier states is that they adopt 
corporatist policies – in which certain segments of the population are co-opted while 
others are deliberately left depoliticized – in order to promote and maintain the state’s 
power.68  Thus, unlike the passive role often ascribed to the leadership of rentier states, 
these leaders aggressively promote their clients and actively pursue avenues to buy off 
other claimants to wealth and power.  
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Another political aspect of the leadership in rentier states is that the leaders can 
easily conceal the country’s revenues from public scrutiny.  Furthermore, in the absence 
of supervisory, information-gathering, and regulatory institutions, frequently the 
distinction between the state treasury and the personal accounts of the ruling regime is 
either blurred or nonexistent.  In other words, rentier leaders have the power of the purse, 
with little or no accountability. 
2. Saudi Arabia as a Rentier State   
The oil boom of the 1970’s profoundly affected Saudi Arabia’s politics.  While 
the Saudi regime remained the same, Saudi Arabia’s rentier transformation precipitated 
enormous changes in the structure of the state, in state-society relations, and in the 
political economy of Saudi Arabia.  Although the House of Saud remained the bases of 
its rule changed in significant ways.  The House of Saud and the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia both became more powerful.  Other social groups – merchants, tribes, ulama, and 
laborers – found themselves with less bargaining power vis-à-vis the state than they 
previously enjoyed.  Oil revenue’s flowing directly into state coffers, unmediated by the 
local economy; this resulted in the personal interests of many more people becoming 
vested directly in the House of Saud.  Oil revenues also enabled the House of Saud to 
build huge bureaucracies to distribute benefits to society and to control political behavior.  
Thus, in relation to its potential domestic competitors and constituencies, the rentier 
policies adopted by the House of Saud enabled the royal family, and hence the state, to 
become stronger than it had ever been in the past.69 
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III. OMNIBALANCING AND THE HOUSE OF SAUD: A 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter argues that omnibalancing, as espoused by Steven David, has best 
described the House of Saud’s propensities.  As stated previously (in Chapter 1), 
omnibalancing agrees with much of balance-of-power theory; however, it differs in 
significant ways.  Whereas balance-of-power theory focuses on states’ balancing against 
their primary external threats in order to ensure the state’s survival, omnibalancing 
focuses on the efforts of Third World leaders to ensure their own political survival and 
includes internal as well as external threats to the leadership in explaining a leader’s 
decision-making process.70  In other words, omnibalancing predicts that the Third World 
leadership will balance against the principal threats it faces (as in balance of power), but 
this decision will necessarily include the consideration of internal threats.  The key 
determinant of alignment will be the intensity of the threat to the leadership (with the 
leaders balancing against the principal threat), not whether the threat is internal or 
external.71  Thus, omnibalancing views Third World leaders as pragmatic and self-
interested, doing whatever is required to remain in power.   
David identifies two types of cases that are especially critical in demonstrating the 
persuasiveness of omnibalancing in the Third World.  The first involve Third World 
leaders who, “facing no major external threats, align based on internal threats alone.”72  
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An even stronger test of omnibalancing, according to David, “is the case in which 
external and internal threats both exist, and the Third World leadership aligns either 
based solely on the internal threats or on the role of the internal and external threats 
combined.”73  Additionally, David contends that omnibalancing is conditional on a 
regime’s being weak, and on the stakes for domestic politics being very high.”74  With 
respect to the House of Saud, all of these conditions are germane.    
B. OMNIBALANCING EXTERNAL THREATS: REAL THREATS THAT 
ARE NOT THREATENING 
1. Strategic Background, Concerns, And Vulnerabilities 
Historically, Saudi Arabia’s importance derived from its strategic location.  Saudi 
Arabia possessed the quickest land and sea routes between Britain and its prized jewel, 
India.  However, today Saudi Arabia’s importance is measured in barrels per day.  Saudi 
Arabia currently boasts over one quarter of the world’s proven oil reserves, with 257.8 
billion barrels.  In addition to being the world’s largest oil producer with an output of 
over 8 million barrels of oil per day, Saudi Arabia is the world’s largest “swing” 
producer.75  Saudi Arabia’s strategic dilemma is quite simple: it is very large, it has 
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tremendous oil reserves, and it is sparsely populated.  From an economic point of view, 
this is not particularly problematic.  However, from a security point of view, it is a 
nightmare.   
Saudi Arabia has the overwhelming task of defending the seven borders that it 
shares with its Arab neighbors76 (eight if one includes the causeway that connects the 
small island state of Bahrain to Saudi Arabia), as well as over 1500 miles of coastline on 
the Gulf and Red Sea.  A fighter taking off in Iran can be over Saudi’s oil rich Eastern 
Province in a mere five minutes.  Additionally, the heavily guarded “Southern No Fly 
Zone” is the only thing separating Iraqi and Saudi airspace.  Saudi Arabia’s west coast 
nearly spans the length of the Red Sea, and thus makes it a major Red Sea power, tying 
its politics and security position with that of Egypt, the Sudan, Ethiopia, and Djibouti.  
Saudi Arabia must guard against threats to maritime traffic in the Red Sea, as well as any 
spillover from the continued political turmoil in the Horn of Africa.77       
Additionally, although Saudi Arabia is a large country, its critical oil fields and 
many of its key population centers are concentrated along the upper Gulf coast – opposite 
rivals Iraq and Iran.  Furthermore, Saudi Arabia must deal with the fact that its population 
centers are not only dispersed, but also separated by long distances.  Thus it is vulnerable 
to attacks on its infrastructure.   Likewise, Saudi Arabia’s many high value targets (oil 
and gas facilities, ports, power grids) are difficult to defend, and thus vulnerable to attack.  
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Moreover, Saudi Arabia is heavily dependent on secure maritime and air traffic for its 
economic survival.78  
Thus, as Anthony Cordesman points out, “Saudi Arabia’s mix of wealth, 
geography, boundaries, coastlines, and vulnerabilities explains both its strategic 
importance, and many of its problems in developing and expanding its military forces.”  
Furthermore, he contends that “Saudi Arabia’s strategic position forces it to disperse its 
limited military resources to forward bases throughout the country, leaving it with limited 
forces on any given front.”79  With problems of this nature, it is no wonder that the House 
of Saud has always been a somewhat paranoid regime.  
2. Historical Setting 
Since 1902 when Ibn Saud attacked Riyadh and regained control of the region, 
those who mean it harm have surrounded the House of Saud.  For the three decades Ibn 
Saud has successfully reduced his external threats by using his 60,000 man Ikhwan80 to 
conquer bitter enemies such as the al-Rashid in Hail and Shareef Husain who ruled over 
the Hejaz.  After conquering an area roughly one-quarter the size of the United States 
(2,150,000 square kilometers), Ibn Saud had made many enemies, had border disputes 
with all of his neighbors,81 and trusted no other Arab leaders least – of all the Shareef 
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Hessian’s two sons who were by then ruling the newly created states of Iraq and 
Transjordan.  In fact, in the 1930’s a border dispute between Saudi Arabia and Yemen 
erupted into war, when the exasperated Imam of Yemen invaded Saudi Arabia.82    
3. Yemen 
Saudi Arabia and Yemen have a long history of strained relations which are 
predicated upon the 1934 Asir War (mentioned above) and the Yemeni civil war of the 
1960’s.  Ever since the House of Saud snatched the Asir and Najran Oasis from Yemen, 
Saudi Arabia has feared Yemeni retribution.  Saudi fears are largely justified, in that 
Yemen offers the only credible challenge to Saudi supremacy on the Arabian Peninsula.  
Not only does Yemen have the human resources – its population is more that one and a 
half times that of Saudi Arabia’s – but also due to its increased oil production in recent 
years, it also has growing financial independence.83     
Thus, with relations between the two countries still tense, the House of Saud 
considers Yemen a credible threat.  In fact, as recently as January 2000 these tensions 
resulted in a clash between Saudi and Yemeni border guards.  The House of Saud has 
taken steps to guard against the Yemeni threat.  The Saudis are planning on building 
another military city in the Asir to help guard against potential Yemeni aggression.  
Moreover, the Saudis take the Yemeni threat so seriously, that they recently considered 
spending $3 billion to divide the two countries with an 875-mile electronic fence.84     
                                                 82 In 1934, Saudi Arabia went to war with Yemen over the Jizan, Asir, and Najran.  The Treaty of Taif 
awarded Saudi Arabia territory in the Jizan, Asir, and Najran, but other gains were returned to the Yemenis.  
The latter also received special work and residency privileges in Saudi Arabia.      
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4. Egypt 
After the death of Ibn Saud in 1953, the Crown Prince Saud bin Abdulaziz came 
to power.  His coming to power coincided with the rise of Gamal Abdul Nasser of Egypt.  
That Nasser deposed the king of Egypt and was encouraging revolutionary attitudes in 
other Arab countries was bad enough but his notions of Arab unity struck terror in the 
hearts of the House of Saud.  However, Nasser’s threat was more internal than external, 
and therefore will be discussed later in this chapter. 
Although at one time Egypt posed a moderate threat to the House of Saud, today 
Egyptian-Saudi ties are especially close.  Egypt, the most populous Arab country and the 
intellectual center of the Arab world, acts as a counter-weight to both Iran and Iraq.  The 
two countries now share the same strategic concerns85 and have close economic links.86  
5. Iran 
In the past, time Iran and Iraq have proven to be the House of Saud’s principle 
external threats.  Until its recent “charm offensive,” Iran had been actively hostile to 
Saudi Arabia ever since the 1979 Iranian Revolution.  Iran is a natural rival of Saudi 
Arabia in terms of power and influence in the Persian Gulf.  Additionally, Iran and Saudi 
Arabia have disparate oil policies, which have also put the two countries at odds 
economically.  Iran has regularly attacked both the character and religious legitimacy of 
the House of Saud.  It has sponsored riots and unrest during the hajj, and has supported 
Shi’ite extremists in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province.87    
                                                 85 Both Saudi Arabia and Egypt have cooperated in fighting fundamentalism in their own countries, as 
well as fighting the fundamentalist regime in the Sudan. 
86 When hundreds of thousands of Yemeni workers were expelled from Saudi Arabia during the Gulf 
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Saudi-Iranian relations have always been tense but in the aftermath of the 1979 
Iranian Revolution tensions, escalated to an all time high.  The House of Saud was 
terrified by Khomeini’s efforts to export his Islamic revolutionary extremism throughout 
the Middle East.  While revolutionary Iran did pose an external threat to the House of 
Saud, the internal threat that the revolution sparked was much more alarming to the Saudi 
regime (discussed in greater detail in the next section).  As omnibalancing would predict, 
“Although the al-Saud distrusted Saddam Hussein and his designs, the Iranian threat was 
deemed the more serious,” and thus “the Kingdom supported Saddam’s war effort to the 
tune of approximately $26 billion.”88 
Until just recently, the House of Saud had infrequent communications with Iran 
and had treated Iran as a hostile power bent on dominating the Persian Gulf.  The House 
of Saud fears Iran’s drive to acquire weapons of mass destruction and other modern 
weapons, as well as Iran’s struggle to increase its ability to threaten tanker traffic in and 
out of the Straits of Hormuz.89     
For over two decades, neither side envisioned a day when relations between the 
two countries would warm.  Both Iran and Saudi Arabia vie for political influence in the 
region and over oil prices and quotas; however, with Iran’s recent “charm offensive,” 
things (at least superficially) are slowly changing.  To be sure, Saudi Arabia will continue 
to have to deal with an Iranian quest for hegemony in the Gulf; nevertheless, if Iran’s 
“charm offensive” persists over time, a modicum of trust may develop, where once 
nothing but enmity existed.90   Thus, while today Iran is still a threat to the House of Saud 
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and its main competitor in the region, the two rivals appear to be entering a period of 
détente.  
6. Iraq 
Iraq surpassed Iran as the House of Saud’s most serious threat when it invaded 
Kuwait in 1991.  Saudi-Iraqi relations were good throughout the 1970’s and 1980’s, with 
Saudi Arabia being Iraq’s biggest backer during the Iran-Iraq War.  However, that 
relationship had little impact on Iraq’s behavior when it massed its troops on the Iraqi-
Saudi border after its invasion of Kuwait.  Iraqi aggression drove panic into the House of 
Saud simply because on Saddam Hussein’s word, his forces could have easily continued 
through Kuwait and driven on to Riyadh.  Therefore, the House of Saud remains 
disturbed over Saddam’s efforts to rebuild his conventional capabilities, and even more 
concerned about his devotion to further develop weapons of mass destruction.91     
Unlike in the case of Iran, in which Saudi officials have recently sensed a 
glimmer of hope, the House of Saud sees few prospects for long-term reconciliation with 
Iraq.  Most Saudi officials agree that Saddam will not be content until Iraq is the regional 
hegemon.  Additionally, most believe that regardless of who comes to power after 
Saddam, it will take years of proven moderation to assuage Saudi fears.92 
As omnibalancing would expect, during the Gulf War the House of Saud 
pragmatically accepted support from “infidel” nations from around the world in order to 
preserve its rule.  However, once the external threat was contained, the primary threat to 
the Saud regime shifted back to an internal one in the form of domestic dissent from 




conservative Islamic groups, fundamentalist Islamic groups, and liberal Saudi 
businessmen and technocrats.  As the threat shifted, so did the focus of the royal family 
(discussed further in the sectioned dealing with omnibalancing internal threats).    
7. Conclusion: External Threats Marginalized 
There is a sense in which most of the countries surrounding Saudi Arabia threaten 
it if threaten is defined as “to make threats against, express ones intent of hurting, 
punishing, etc.”93  Despite the periodic veneer of solidarity among various Middle 
Eastern states and Saudi Arabia, the House of Saud has a sordid inter-Arab track record.  
Even before the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia came into being, the House of Saud had 
accrued a long list of enemies; and the list has not become smaller.  However, despite all 
of the bad blood between Saudi Arabia and its neighbors, its neighbors – including Iran, 
Iraq, and Yemen – neither threaten it today, nor have they posed it a threat for almost a 
century.   
That is not to say that Saudi Arabia is the strongest state in the Persian Gulf in 
terms of a quantitative force (see table 1).  Iran and Iraq each possess roughly twice as 
many total active troops as compared to Saudi Arabia.  Furthermore, Saudi Arabia does 
not have a reserve force, while Iran and Iraq boast a reserve force of 350,000 and 650,000 
respectively.  Additionally, Iran has more than twice as many naval personnel as 
compared to Saudi Arabia.  Cognizant of its quantitative inferiority, Saudi Arabia has 
attempted to balance the scale with modern and technologically superior military 
equipment.  In terms of military equipment, Saudi Arabia does have a vast qualitative 
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advantage over its neighbors.94  However, in the case of the Persian Gulf War, Saudi 
Arabia’s qualitative advantage was irrelevant.  Saudi Arabia does not have the manpower 
to utilize the weapons that they possess, nor do they have the tactical expertise to 
leverage their qualitative advantages.  Furthermore, few military analysts predict that the 
qualitative advantages of the Saudi armed forces will offset the quantitative advantages 
possessed by Iran and Iraq anytime in the near future.  In reality, the Saudi armed forces 
would probably have a difficult time defending against a determined Yemeni assault.  
Knowing this, the House of Saud has always slept with one eye open, watching its 
southern border.95        
However, ironically the House of Saud has never had to worry about its 
threatening neighbors in terms of a quantitative or qualitative advantage.  As discussed 
previously (in Chapter II), for almost 100 years Britain and the United States have 
guaranteed the territorial integrity of Saudi Arabia.  By definition, to be threatened is to 
have “an uncertain chance of continued survival.”96  With the signing of the Saudi-British 
Friendship Treaty of 1915, the British promised to protect the Saudi state against 
domestic and foreign foes.  One might argue that Ibn Saud was always distrustful of 
British intentions, as Britain moved to support the “Arab Revolt” of his archenemy, the 
Shareef Husain of Mecca.  One might site the Sykes-Picot Accord, the Balfour 
Declaration, or London’s decision to put the sons of Shareef Husain on the newly created 
thrones of Iraq and Transjordan as evidence that Britain’s support of the House of Saud 
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was at best half-hearted.  However, from World War II onward, the United States’ 
determination to protect the House of Saud against external aggression is indisputable.     
 From 1947, when the House of Saud felt threatened, they by the Hashemites, 
until today, a pattern has developed in Saudi Arabia – when truly threatened call on the 
United States.  Although the House of Saud has embraced various doctrines to render its 
foreign policy acceptable to the Arab and Islamic World, those policies have been 
conveniently jettisoned when the House of Saud has felt vulnerable.  This pattern 
repeated itself in 1963, when Faisal petitioned President Kennedy for assistance after 
Egyptian planes began bombing Saudi cities and installations in the south in support of 
Yemen.  Kennedy sent a very clear message to Nasser and the world by sending a 
squadron of United States jets to Saudi Arabia with the instructions to use force if 
provoked.97  In 1979, after the Iranian Revolution, the House of Saud was panic-stricken 
and quickly began backing Iraqi aggression towards Iran.  The United States moved 
quickly to alleviate Saudi fears.  Within days of the Iraqi invasion of Iran, at the Saudis’ 
request President Carter deployed four sophisticated airborne warning and control system 
(AWACS) aircraft and their crews to the Gulf to “monitor developments,” which when 
translated meant to feed Iraq intelligence data through the Saudis.  And most recently in 
the Persian Gulf War, in an unprecedented display of support for the House of Saud, the 
United Stated organized a massive coalition force and dispatched nearly half a million of 
its own troops to Saudi Arabia to protect it from Iraqi aggression.98    
Furthermore it is interesting to note that every president since the United States 
achieved its “superpower” status (following World War II) has pledged his support for 
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the House of Saud.  It began in 1943 with President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s declaration 
that the defense of Saudi Arabia was a vital interest of the United States.  President 
Truman followed suit by formally assuring Ibn Saud that support for Saudi Arabia’s 
territorial integrity and political independence was a primary objective of the United 
States.99  Another early example was President Eisenhower’s “Eisenhower Doctrine,” 
which committed the United States to protecting any country in the Middle East which 
was threatened by international communism.   
Thus, there are states in the Middle East that 1) are militarily stronger than Saudi 
Arabia, 2) have larger populations than Saudi Arabia, 3) have legitimate grievance with 
the House of Saud, and 4) mean the House of Saud harm.  However, the House of Saud 
has always successfully outmaneuvering its more powerful enemies by 1) recognizing its 
weaknesses – its inability to protect itself against its more powerful neighbors, 2) linking 
itself to strong external powers – first Britain and then the United States, and 3) 
extracting commitments from those allies – ensuring Saudi Arabia’s territorial integrity.  
C. THE HOUSE OF SAUD: A MILITARILY AND IDEOLOGICALLY 
WEAK REGIME 
Before looking at the House of Saud’s internal threats (Chapter 4) or looking at 
how the al-Saud has historically balanced against its internal threats (Chapter 3 section 
D), this section will examine why the House of Saud is considered to be a militarily and 
ideologically weak, regime.         
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1. Militarily Weak  
 That the House of Saud is a weak is an indisputable fact.  First, the 
Kingdom itself is militarily weak, impotent against both Iran and Iraq (and some analysts 
would add Yemen), and thus totally reliant on the United States to deter would-be 
aggressors (See Chapter II).  Second, and more indicting, is that with its external threats 
marginalized by the United States, defense and security expenditures are the single 
largest budget item in Saudi Arabia.100  While the official role of the Saudi armed 
forces101 is to protect the country against foreign attacks, in reality their mission is as 
much (or more) one of internal security.  In fact, the House of Saud’s weakness runs so 
deep that at times the regime borders on paranoia.  Because the Saudi Armed Forces have 
a long history of insurrection, the House of Saud takes as many precautions against it as it 
does against its external enemies.  This is evidenced, for example, by the divide-and-rule 
it uses to structure its armed and internal security forces.102  For example, each of the 
branches of the armed forces, by design, draws its recruits from different pools of 
manpower, making it difficult for any one group to spread its tentacles through several 
different services at one time.103  Additionally, army bases have been constructed far 
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101 The Saudi armed forces include the regular military (Army, Navy, and Air Force), the National 
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102 The Saudi Armed Forces has had a sordid history, with numerous revolts and coup attempts.  For 
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103 The Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF),  Royal Saudi Army (SALF), and Royal Saudi Navy (RSN) are 
dominated by townspeople, while Asiris are most numerous in the police and internal security forces. 
Tribesmen largely comprise the Royal Saudi National Guard (SANG).  Wilson, 165. 
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from population centers in order to discourage coups, while air bases are close to the 
cities so that Royal Saudi National Guard (RSNG)104 troops can be airlifted in to deal 
with revolts more easily.  Furthermore, communications between the services is kept to a 
minimum, making for a less efficient, but more easily controlled, force.  Likewise, by 
placing senior princes in command of each of the various military branches, and by 
having several hundred more junior princes serve in the armed forces where they can 
keep an eye on the rank and file, the House of Saud greatly diminishes the chances of a 
coup attempt.  The Saudi armed forces also contain special bureaus or sections to ferret 
out potential insurgences, with the coup-prone Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) having 
two.  The Ministry of Interior,105 besides the regular police force, operates a covert 
security force of over 40,000 undercover agents.106  Hence, Gause notes that  
It is comparatively easy to chart the growth of the regular armed forces.  It is 
harder to document from public sources the growth of local police forces and 
domestic intelligence services, the first line of defense for the state from 
domestic political opposition.  But it is clear, from anecdotal evidence and 
the testimony of citizens of these states [Gulf Cooperation Council States] 
that the specifically domestic parts of the coercive apparatus have grown in 
size, power, and sophistication over the last two decades.107     
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Frontier Force, the Coast Guard, the mubaheth, or secret police, and the mujahidoun.  The Royal guard 
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Therefore, it is not surprising that in 1997 more Saudi troops were assigned to protect 
Saudi Arabia against its own citizens (77,000 National Guard troops) than were assigned 
to protect it against external threats (70,000 Army troops).  Furthermore, the massive size 
of the National Guard speaks to the distrust that exists amongst the House of Saud, as the 
National Guard is used as a counterweight to the regular army and a balance to the 
Sudairy Brothers, who control the throne and the military establishment.108 
Thus, the facts speak for themselves.  A strong regime does not spend thirty 
percent of its budget (billions of dollars per year) on internal security.  Nor does a strong 
regime place such a great emphasis on compartmentalizing its armed forces so as to 
prevent an almost expected coup.  Additionally, a strong regime does not have to use 
high-handed tactics against its citizens hoping to avert uprisings by keeping them in 
constant fear.  Moreover, strong and legitimate regimes do not need a massive internal 
intelligence network to monitor the daily actions of all of its citizens.   
2. Ideologically Weak 
Even more problematic than its paranoia and military weakness, is the House of 
Saud’s ideological vulnerability.  The House of Saud has used ideological constructions 
based on its own interpretations of Islam and tribalism to legitimize its rule.  As stated in 
chapter II, the royal family has worked tirelessly for decades to subdue Islam and 
tribalism.  The House of Saud has concurrently appropriated Islamic and tribal 
institutions, symbology, and rhetoric for its own ideological purposes, namely to gain 
support for its rule – “employ[ing] a political language redolent with Islamic and tribal 
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overtones to convince their citizens of the legitimacy of their political system.”109   
Portraying their system as the fusion of the best parts of religion and tribal traditions, the 
House of Saud contends that obedience to it is a religious and cultural obligation.  Eric 
Davis suggests that the royal family uses these images and institutions to “forge emotive 
links with the populace over which [they] rule.”110       
Although the House of Saud has been largely successful in subduing Islamic and 
tribal institutions in Saudi Arabia, it has not been able to stomp these out in the political 
arena.  By asserting an Islamic justification for its rule, the House of Saud has 
unwittingly established a very strict standard to which it can be held.  Sunni radicals 
regularly criticize the House of Saud as un-Islamic.  These radicals resist the idea of 
secular authority and are zealous in their condemnation of any deviation from their view 
of the “true” faith.  Charges that the Saudi regime is corrupt, wasteful with state funds, an 
abuser of human rights, a puppet of the United States, and that the royal family is not 
providing for its citizens are common.111  Opposition leaders like Ehsan Ehsanullah 
argue that the al-Saud’s rule violates its own claim to uphold Muslim rule within the 
prescribed limits of the Shari’a, declaring that the House of Saud has attempted to 
establish a Mulk, a secular ruler’s estate, rather than an Islamic community (Umma).  
This accusation was brought home when Ehsanullah contended that “The Saudi 
rulers…had not transformed society into a rightful society (Umma Wasatan) 
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characterized by law-abiding members of a religious community, but rather kept 
inhabitants content by economic welfare.”112   
While it must be remembered that the majority of Saudi citizens do not hold all of 
these sentiments, most do disapprove of the al-Sauds’ un-Islamic lifestyles – 
characterized by drinking, gambling, debauchery, ostentation, and the use of their 
positions for dishonest gain – all of which are prohibited by the Koran.  Similarly, “there 
are some critics who idealize tribal and village life before the advent of oil wealth, 
criticizing the [House of Saud] for allowing and encouraging the social and cultural 
changes it has brought.”113  Thus, the very constructs that the House of Saud appeals to 
for its legitimacy – Islam and tribalism – can also be used to undermine and challenge the 
royal family. 
Moreover, as Saudi Arabia has undergone its transformation into a rentier state, 
the House of Saud has relied on oil revenue appease its citizens.  As stated previously, an 
unstated goal of the House of Saud has been to make every Saudi citizen in some way 
dependent on the royal family in order to “convince the citizenry that their own personal 
well-being is tied up with the existing political system.”114  The House of Saud knows 
that if actions speak louder than words, even actions are no match for money.  Therefore, 
as the Saudi standard of living began to increase, the voices of the malcontents, who 
accused the regime of being illegitimate, faded.  In the oil era regime largesse and 
legitimacy have become linked (in a directly proportional manner) and now dictate Saudi 
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Arabia’s social contract (see Chapter II Section D).   However, this link is politically and 
economically problematic and extremely volatile.  In short, it is a recipe for disaster.  
With a population that is expected to double (from 20 million to 40 million) by the year 
2020, and a constantly fluctuating oil market, the House of Saud is stuck with a social 
contract woven in the boom years of the 1970’s, but that has recently begun to unravel.  
When oil prices drop, especially when they drop quickly and for long periods of time, it 
forces the House of Saud to renege on its end of the contract.  As the Saudi standard of 
living begins to plummet, the voices of opposition spring up – and their rhetoric always 
includes challenges to the royal family’s legitimacy.   
D. OMNIBALANCING INTERNAL THREATS: REAL THREATS THAT 
ARE THREATENING 
Because the House of Saud is a weak regime, it is highly distrustful of its 
neighbors – but more so of its own citizens.  As demonstrated previously, Saudi Arabia 
has successfully used its foreign alliances to balance against its external enemies, and 
thus has never truly been threatened by an external force.  However today, while the 
United States can assist the House of Saud with certain aspects of its internal security, it 
cannot fully protect it against what most threatens it – the Saudi people.   
Internal dissent has long plagued the House of Saud.  Initially the threat came 
from the Ikhwan, rival tribes to the al-Saud, and adherents to other forms of Islam 
(besides Wahhabism).  However, those challenges were relatively easy to identify and 
crush.  On the other hand, ideological movements that captured the imaginations of large 
segments of the Saudi population gravely threatened the House of Saud and proved much 
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more difficult to contend with.115  The two most dangerous movements of this nature 
were Nasser’s pan-Arabism and Khomeini’s Islamic fundamentalist movement.   
1. Nasser’s Pan-Arabist Movement 
It is an irony of history that a strong and mesmerizing leader – Nasser – came to 
power in Egypt shortly after the dull and incompetent Saud succeeded his very 
charismatic father – Ibn Saud – as Saudi Arabia’s new leader.  To make matters worse, 
Saud did not prove to be a leader equal to the challenges of his time.  Saud came to power 
during a time when Nasser’s Arab nationalism was sweeping the Middle East.  As the 
prophet of pan-Arabism, Nasser electrified the Arab world when he overthrew the corrupt 
Egyptian monarchy and proclaimed a new political ideology.  Pan-Arabist doctrine 
proclaimed that there was only one Arab world, which had been divided and manipulated 
by the West.  Nasser’s demands were clear.  He called for the unification of the Arab 
people, the nationalization of all Western holdings, and political reform.116  Saud’s 
inability to deal with the charismatic Nasser exposed the vulnerability of the royal family 
and its absolute rule, and generated among its ranks a genuine fear of being toppled.117  
Unlike his father, Saud was very permissive in dealing with the Saudi people and 
certainly showed no inclination toward crushing his political enemies.  Saud’s lenience 
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lead to the emergence of political groups such as the Young Nejd, the Peninsula 
Liberation Front, and even a small communist party.  While this caused the royal family 
great concern, the reception that Nasser received when he arrived in Dhahran in 
September 1956 for a meeting with King Saud and President Kuwatly chilled the House 
of Saud to the bone.  Just two months prior to his visit, Nasser had nationalized the Suez 
Canal and humiliated the West.  This act served to arouse Arab pride and turn Nasser into 
the idol of the Arab masses.  Therefore according to Mordechai Abir,  
He was met in Al-Hasa by huge crowds who manifested their admiration 
for him with great emotion.  Saud was not only ignored but, according to 
one source, “stones were thrown at the royal entourage and slogans 
denouncing the House of Saud displayed by some of the demonstrators.”  
Shortly afterwards, when Nasser arrived in Riyadh, the whole population 
turned out to accord him a hero’s welcome.118   
 
Said Aburish explains that “Eventually, the family became genuinely alarmed when 
ordinary people expressed admiration for Nasser and began thinking about politics.”119  
That was the last straw for the royal family.  As pan-Arabism spread throughout Saudi 
Arabia, the royal family moved against Saud to protect and preserve the continuance of 
the House of Saud.  Thus, as the House of Saud acted to eliminate one threat to its 
existence – Saud’s refusal to wield the sword and crack down on emerging threats – they 
were still threatened by Nasser-incited Saudi pan-Arabism. 
Faisal, who was seen as more capable of continuing the ways of Ibn Saud and the 
family while giving them an aura of respectability, replaced Saud in 1964.  During his 
reign Faisal established the machinery of a police state.  Totally intolerant of dissent, he 
had no compunction about locking up and torturing his enemies.  In fact, in large-scale 
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sweeps organized by Faisal’s Interior Minister Fahd bin Abdulaziz, the current king of 
Saudi Arabia, hundreds of domestic opponents of the regime – Arab nationalists, 
Nasserites, and communists – were imprisoned.120     
On the one hand, as Faisal aggressively strove to carve out the cancer of pan-
Arabism in Saudi Arabia by crushing domestic dissent, he knew that he needed 
something just as powerful as pan-Arabism if he wished to gain the upper hand.  Pan-
Islamism was his answer:  “Faisal’s pan-Islamic policy was a masterstroke that served 
two purposes.  Besides bolstering the al-Saud’s political legitimacy at home, it also 
strengthened the Kingdom’s standing in the Islamic world.”121  Furthermore, in order to 
counteract Nasser’s pan-Arabist message, Faisal condemned Nasser as an apostle of 
socialism and secularism who was beholden to godless communists, the Russians.  Thus, 
in a pragmatic move to defeat the threat of pan-Arabism and diminish Nasser’s popularity 
among the Saudi people, Faisal pushed Saudi Arabia towards an Islamic identity at the 
expense of its Arabness.122   
Faisal used his stand against Nasser and other progressive Arab movements to 
garner more Western support and to create a Saudi-led, Islam-based conservative camp.  
However, this all changed with the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War.  Fearing Arab 
pressure and a nationalist uprising in his own country, Faisal championed shutting off all 
oil exports to the West in a pragmatic move to restore his Arab credentials.  This very 
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calculated move enhanced Faisal’s Arab standing.  However, he rescinded the decision as 
quickly as politically possible in order to contain the damage to his relations with the 
West.  In fact, speaking about the 1973 oil embargo, Aburish accurately suggests that 
“despite this tactical shut-off of oil, he [Faisal] saw his fate and that of his country 
irrevocably linked to America.”123  In 1975, Faisal himself confirmed this sentiment to 
Time correspondent Wilton Wynn, saying, “U.S. relations are a pillar of Saudi policy.”124           
Thus, the weak and permissive leadership of Saud, coupled with Nasser’s 
electrifying pan-Arabist teachings, nearly spelled the demise of the House of Saud.  It 
was not until Faisal ascended to power and Nasser’s humiliating defeat at the hands of 
the Israelis, that the pan-Arabist threat in the Kingdom began to wane.  With Egypt’s 
military forces utterly destroyed, Nasser and his pan-Arabist teachings began to lose their 
popular appeal.  However, Faisal’s brutal elimination of all internal opposition, his highly 
publicized support of conservative Islamic movements, and his restored Arab credentials 
proved to be the right medicine at the right time to ensure the continuance of the House 
of Saud.  In other words, unlike Saud, “Faisal was a champion of absolutism who ensured 
that Saudi Arabia belonged to the House of Saud lock, stock, and barrel.”125    
2. Khomeini’s Islamic Fundamentalist Movement 
The unrest that emerged during the late 1970’s were partially the result of the 
socio-cultural ramifications of rapid modernization (as Saudi Arabia transitioned into a 
rentier state) and the growing tension within the royal family related to the Arab radicals’ 
consolidation of their power following the Camp David talks.  The unrest was also 
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greatly facilitated by developments in Iran in 1978, the collapse of the Shah’s regime, and 
the decline of American credibility in the Middle East.  Khomeini’s successful 
revolution, despite his being a Shi’ite, fanned neo-Ikhwan sentiments among elements of 
the Kingdom’s Sunni population.  Moreover, it instilled a renewed sense of pride in the 
Shi’ites, and, by 1979, the Organization of the Islamic Revolution for the Liberation of 
the Arabian Peninsula, popularly known as Al-Thawra al-Islamiyya – The Islamic 
Revolution (IRO) – began to operate in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia.126   
The Ayatollah Khomeini’s successful bid to oust the Shah sent shock waves 
throughout the world; but due to Iran’s proximity to Saudi Arabia, it was especially 
disturbing for the House of Saud.  Unlike in the case with Nasser, who the House of Saud 
condemned as championing the un-Islamic secular and socialist doctrines of pan-
Arabism, the same charges could not be leveled against Khomeini.  In fact, the danger of 
Khomeini was in his accusation that the House of Saud was ignoring the tenants of the 
Koran, was beholden to the infidel regimes of the West, and (therefore) ruled unlawfully.  
Furthermore, Khomeini called for the overthrow of the Saudi regime and backed 
numerous dissident movements to that accord.   
a. The 1979 Grand Mosque Uprising  
It is a common myth that all Saudi citizens gladly embraced Saudi 
Arabia’s transition to a rentier state.  Even before the 1979 uprising, many Saudis were 
concerned about the impact on their society of rapid modernization and westernization, 
which even led members of the House of Saud to pay lip-service to the need to “protect 
the Saudi way of life from the corrupt western culture with its materialistic values and 
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permissiveness.”127  The rebels that rallied around these constructions reserved special 
contempt for the House of Saud, who had fostered Saudi Arabia’s current state of moral 
decline.  As the moral decay of the country continued, exemplified by the well-known 
un-Islamic proclivities128 of some of the princes, a group of dissidents believed it their 
duty to clean out corruption just as Mohammed al-Wahhab had done in the eighteenth-
century.129    
The leader of the dissidents was Juhaiman al-Utaibi,130 born in 1936.  Al-
Utaibi was from one of the foremost families of the Nejd.  However, his privileged 
position did not prevent him from following in the footsteps of his grandfather, who was 
one of the original Ikhwan that had fought alongside Ibn Saud only to be killed at the 
Battle of Sabillah.  Al-Utabi’s life exemplifies how the Saudi Islamic educational system 
has created fundamentalists.  A member of the Saudi National Guard for eighteen years, 
al-Utaibi resigned in 1973 and enrolled at the Islamic University of Medina’s Department 
of Religious Studies, becoming an understudy of the blind cleric Abdulaziz bin Baz.  
While bin Baz preached a return to pure Islam, al-Utaibi went even further and accused 
the House of Saud of abandoning the tenants of Unitarianism.131   Additionally, he was 
even more critical of the ulama than he was of the Saudi regime because he believed that 
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the ulama had betrayed the Ikhwan and were now merely the mouthpiece of the royal 
family.132  
On November 20, 1979, al-Utaibi and his followers seized control of the 
Grand Mosque, interrupting the morning prayer.  Al-Utaibi justified his actions by stating 
that “the Al Saud had lost its legitimacy through corruption, ostentation, and mindless 
imitation of the West – virtually an echo of his grandfather’s charge in 1921 against Abd 
al Aziz.”133   Al-Utaibi urged those present to join him and his followers in opposing the 
House of Saud.  Additionally, he made a special plea to the ulama to reconsider their 
support of the royal family.  Although no ulama stepped forward, “it appears that al-
Utaibi and his followers were at least tacitly supported by some members of the body 
[ulama] who were also opposed to the moral decay they saw, and the al-Saud’s 
modernization programs.”134  
The House of Saud was initially stunned by the takeover.  It was 
inconceivable to the Saudi regime that a well-armed and hostile force could elude Saudi 
Arabia’s elaborate internal security force, let alone seize control of the Grand Mosque.  
Even more troubling to the Saudi regime was the fact that the rebels seemed to have 
supporters within the National Guard and the Hejaz.   
Retaking the mosque proved to be a highly sensitive issue for four 
reasons: 1) the Grand Mosque surrounds the Kaaba, the symbol of the oneness of God, 2) 
the Mosque’s courtyard is one of the sites where the hajj, the fifth pillar of Islam, is 
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enacted, 3) no non-Muslim may enter the city of Mecca, let alone the Mosque’s 
courtyard, and 4) to shed blood in the Mosque is strictly forbidden, as is defacing or 
polluting it in any way.135  Thus, the House of Saud needed the ulama to issue a fatwa 
authorizing the use of force.136  When all was said and done, it took Saudi forces and 
French paratroopers two weeks to dislodge the dissidents at a cost of 244 people killed137 
(127 government troops and 117 rebels) and 461 wounded.138  These numbers do not 
include the 63 rebels that were distributed to cities throughout the kingdom and publicly 
beheaded, without trial.   
In the aftermath of the uprising, and having realized the extent of its 
vulnerability, the House of Saud went on a public relations offensive, which included 
delineating the content of the Friday sermons (the ulama and imams were to extol the 
House of Saud’s religiosity, denounce the destructive nature of uprisings, emphasize that 
Islam was a religion of moderation, and reiterate that material well-being and Islam were 
not incompatible).  Additionally, many high-ranking governmental employees lost their 
positions, including members of the House of Saud.  For example, the governor of 
Mecca, Prince Fawwaz bin Abdulaziz, who had been especially criticized by al-Utaibi for 
his unabashed drinking, gambling, and corruption, was replaced, as were three other 
governors.  Furthermore, two generals were “allowed to retire,” and the director of public 
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security, Fayyaad Mohammed al-Awfi, was replaced.  The House of Saud also raised the 
ulama’s salaries and advised expatriates to abide by the Kingdom’s Unitarian teachings.   
Additionally, the House of Saud dusted off its old promise of a 
Consultative Assembly for the Kingdom and alluded to adopting other political reforms.  
Although nothing ever came of the reform promises the lessons of the al-Utaibi revolt 
were not lost.  In addition to an increase in police surveillance, the mutawaeen were 
given free rein in the cities, rights of women were curtailed, and there was a Kingdom-
wide crackdown on Western influences.139  All of these actions were targeted at 
improving the House of Saud’s Islamic credentials, for even Khalid noted that “if al-
Utaibi and his cohorts had targeted palaces rather than the Grand Mosque, the results of 
the uprising might have been very different.”140   
b. The 1979 Shi’ite Riots 
 After the successful Islamic Revolution in Iran, tensions in Saudi Arabia 
skyrocketed.  The House of Saud viewed the rise of radical Shi’ism as a direct threat to 
the heart of the Saudi economy, and thus to the Saudi regime.  While the Shi’ites only 
comprised some 10 percent of Saudi Arabia’s population in 1979, they made up one-third 
and possibly up to one-half of the population of Al-Sharqiyya, Saudi Arabia’s oil-rich 
Eastern Province.141        
Sunni-Shi’ite relations in Saudi Arabia have always been a source of 
considerable angst for the House of Saud.  The Najdi establishment has always despised, 
discriminated against, and persecuted Saudi Arabia’s Shi’ite minority.  In 1980, a young 
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Shi’ite told a foreign correspondent that “there are Sunni, below them are Christians and 
below them are Jews; we are below the Jews.”142   Thus it is not surprising that the Al-
Sharqiyya Shi’ite community had a history of rebellious behavior; nor was it surprising 
that the House of Saud viewed them as a credible threat, especially under the 
circumstances. 
Shortly after the al-Utaibi revolt was put down, inflamed by the 
Khomeini’s calls to arms and with Iranian financial backing, the Kingdom’s Shi’ites 
sought to assert their rights.  The mujahids143 of Qatif and the nearby Shi’ite villages 
announced their determination to hold the Ashura144 processions in defiance of the 
government’s prohibition.  When the police tried to disperse the large crowds who 
participated in the Ashura procession, the Shi’ite crowds began to riot.  The rioting, 
which lasted three days, quickly spread to Sayhat and other Shi’ite settlements in the 
region.  Many demonstrators carried pictures of Khomeini and placards denouncing the 
House of Saud and the American imperialists.  Roughly 20,000 Saudi National Guard 
troops brutally suppressed the demonstrators, arresting hundreds and killing or wounding 
many others.145    
In the wake of the riots, the Saudi regime sent Prince Ahmad, the Deputy 
Minister of the Interior, to the region to evaluate the impact of the Iranian Revolution and 
the Shi’ite dissention on the security of its oil industry.  Prince Ahmad wisely confessed 
that the Saudi government had neglected the Eastern Province and had actively 
                                                 
142 New York Times, 3 January 1980, A2., as cited in Abir, 154. 
143 A mujtahid is a person qualified to exercise ijtihad and give authoritative opinions on Islamic Law.  
Ijtihad is “exerting oneself” in Islamic Law. 
144 Ashura is the Shi’ite holiday commemorating the martyrdom of Husayn. 
145 Metz, 40-41. 
61 
discriminated against its Shi’ite population.  He also announced the beginning of a new 
era in which he promised massive investments in the development of Al-Hasa’s 
economic infrastructure, educational system, and other services.  However, this good 
news was balanced with the threat that if the Shi’ites continued to undermine law and 
order in the region, then they would be severely punished.146  
Between 1980 and 1982 a dual policy was followed in the Al-Hassa.  On 
the one hand roads were paved, schools built, sewage systems constructed, and hospitals 
opened.  A naval base was opened in Jubayl, and one billion dollars in public service 
projects was announced.  Additionally, all those who were arrested in the 1979 and 1980 
riots were pardoned, and a general amnesty enabled political refugees to return to their 
homes.  On the other hand, the Saudi government substantially increased its military 
presence in the Eastern Province following the eruption of the Iran-Iraq War.  The Shi’ite 
community in Al-Hassa, constantly incited by Khomeini’s revolutionary regime, were 
closely watched, if not harassed by the authorities.147    
The Shi’ite riots in the Eastern Province again reminded the House of 
Saud that the continuance of its regime was threatened more by popular uprisings from its 
own citizens, than by external enemies.  While the House of Saud’s pragmatic carrot-and-
stick policy successfully brought the turbulent region under control, it had come only at a 
huge monetary expense.  Essentially, the House of Saud was again able to buy itself out 
of a tough situation.  However, it is critical to note that dolling out money does not buy 
legitimacy, just time.       
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E. CONCLUSION 
Stephen David’s omnibalancing thus very accurately describes the House of Saud.  
As omnibalancing contends, the House of Saud is a militarily and ideologically weak 
regime.  Both of these points were dramatically exposed during the Gulf War, when the 
House of Saud implored the infidels (in the United States) to protect Saudi Arabia from 
its Arab brothers (in Iraq).  Additionally, omnibalancing states that both internal and 
external factors are important in the decision-making process of Third World leaders.  
This is obviously the case with the House of Saud.  The Saudi regime has taken great 
pains to gain security agreements from powerful Western allies (first Britain and then the 
United States) to protect Saudi Arabia’s borders from external attack.  Likewise, the 
House of Saud works feverishly on a daily basis to monitor and suppress all forms of 
internal opposition.  Furthermore, as omnibalancing suggests, the stakes for domestic 
politics are very high.  Whoever controls Saudi Arabia controls one quarter of the world’s 
proven oil reserves.  Thus, every opposition group in the country is just one step away 
from being the wealthiest regime on earth.  Finally, as the House of Saud has exemplified 
time and time again, omnibalancing predicts that Third World leadership will balance 
against the principal threat it faces regardless of the consequences.  By following this 
pragmatic policy, the House of Saud has managed to survive thus far.  However, this 
policy has been shortsighted and very dangerous, as was seen when the House of Saud 
played its “Islamic Card” to help defend it against Nasser’s pan-Arabism, which then in 
turn played directly into Khomeini’s hand after the Iranian Revolution.  This extreme 
Saudi move could have proved fatal to the House of Saud had Khomeini not been 
engaged in a decade-long struggle against Iraq.  Likewise, King Khalid’s words still ring 
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hauntingly true today, “if al-Utaibi and his cohorts had targeted palaces rather than the 
Grand Mosque, [in their 1979 uprising] the results of the uprising might have been very 
different.”148    
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IV. CHALLENGES FACING THE HOUSE OF SAUD 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Few can deny that the House of Saud will face increasing challenges as it 
navigates Saudi Arabia further into the twenty-first century.  This chapter focuses 
primarily on the regime’s internal challenges, since the House of Saud is unlikely to give 
up its security relationship with the United States in the foreseeable future and thus will 
not have to worry about external threats.  This chapter examines the political, social, 
religious, and economic problems that the Saudi regime faces in the short- and mid-term 
as they relate to regime stability.  Although the internal problems in Saudi Arabia are 
very diverse, they do share a common thread – they, in some way, affect almost every 
Saudi citizen and are the source of their increasing frustration with the House of Saud.  
The stability and longevity of the House of Saud is directly related to how the regime 
responds to the nearly universal upsurge in frustration that its citizens are experiencing.  
Thus, this chapter opens with a brief discussion of frustration-aggression theory. 
B. FRUSTRATION-AGGRESSION THEORY 
The concept of frustration has been the psychological variable most commonly 
evoked to account for an individual’s participation in political protest and violence.  In 
1939, the father of frustration-aggression theory, J. Dollard, hypothesized that aggression 
always results from frustration.149  Since 1939, dozens of researchers have added various 
nuances to Dollard’s original hypothesis; however, on the point of frustration leading to 
political protest and violence, they all agree that “some psychological variables do appear 
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to have rather strong explanatory power.”150  Ted Gurr identifies three psychological 
variables that predispose individuals to participate in protest and violence: 1) The belief 
in the justifiability of aggressive action on utilitarian grounds, 2) The expectancy that 
aggressive action will be beneficial, 3) The belief in the normative justifiability of 
aggressive action (arising out of broad-based alienation from the political system and 
ideological approval of political aggression).151  Simply put, people rebel when they 
believe it is right to rebel, and when they believe that rebellion will achieve their goals.   
However, there are additional constructs that are important to the explanation of 
protest and violence.  For example, prevailing social norms play a critical role in 
determining if individuals who feel political aggression is justifiable on normative and 
utilitarian grounds will act on their beliefs.  In other words, if most others in a given 
social group or community feel that political aggression is unjustified, deviant individuals 
will be unlikely to go against the grain of the prevailing sentiment.  In this case however, 
Islam is the wild card.  The tenants of Islam are highly debated and interpreted very 
differently from person to person in Saudi Arabia, and hence these tenants are very 
subjective.  Thus, those Islamic fundamentalists who strongly believe that the House of 
Saud is anti-Islamic in its rule are probably more prone to aggressive behavior even if 
their views represent minority ones.  Research has also shown that “the pure availability 
of time for protest and violence afforded by unemployment, by being a student, or by 
being unmarried, plays a role in determining propensity to protest.”152  This last point is a 
powder keg in Saudi Arabia, as will be discussed later. 
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C  INTERNAL FACTORS PROMOTING INSTABILITY IN SAUDI ARABIA 
The internal threats faced by the House of Saud are deeply rooted and very 
complex; they can generally be broken down into four interconnected areas: political, 
social, religious, and economic. 
1. Political Factors 
a. Credibility 
 In addition to being viewed as an ideologically weak regime on moral and 
religious grounds (as discussed in Chapters 2 and 3), the House of Saud is suffering from 
a credibility crisis that if not addressed, will continue to fester and produce unnecessary 
friction between the government and its citizens.  While a relatively small number of 
influential princes occupy the most important ministerial posts,153 some two thousand 
princes play an active role in the economy.  Of these, many have a normal role in 
business.  Others, however, demand special privileges or use their influence in a corrupt 
manner or to violate Saudi Law.  On March 1, 1992 King Fahd issued a royal decree 
establishing a basic law of government.  Article thirty-eight of chapter five on Rights and 
Duties states that “Penalties shall be personal, and there shall be no crime or penalty 
except in accordance with Shari’ ah or organizational law.  There shall be no punishment 
except for acts committed subsequent to the coming into force of the organizational 
law.”154  When the Saudi royal family transgresses Saudi Law and is not held 
accountable, it loses credibility and agitates an already tense relationship with its citizens.  
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Furthermore, this kind of corruption, however limited or widespread, has led to jealousy 
and political friction within Saudi society by undermining the rule of law in the kingdom. 
b. Absolute Monarchy 
 The House of Saud represents one of the world’s last absolute monarchies.  
As such, the king is not constrained by a written constitution, a legislative body, or 
elections.  While King Fahd instituted the formation of the Consultative Council (Majlis 
al-Shura), he made it clear in a decree read on state television in 1993, he made it clear 
that “the role of the Majlis was purely advisory.  He also stated that he was retaining the 
power of the monarchy, and that Saudi Arabia would remain an Islamic state and would 
not become a Western democracy.”155  In the past, the House of Saud has largely been 
able to ignore the last part of the old dictum “with authority comes responsibility and 
with responsibility comes accountability.”  However, two-thirds of the Saudi population 
is under the age of 30156 and has only known Saudi Arabia as a  rentier states.  When the 
rentier payments decrease, there is a proportionate drop in the Saudi standard of living. 
As an absolute monarchy with the authority and responsibility for the Kingdom’s 
economy, under these circumstances the king becomes the target of heavy criticism.  
Thus, with every prolonged dip in the oil market, there is a decrease in the Saudi’s 
standard of living due to governmental cuts in subsidies.157  This naturally increases the 
frustration-level of Saudi society.  At some point, if no reforms are made and the voices 
of the citizens are ignored, frustration will reach a boiling point and give way to increased 
rebelliousness. 
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c. Growth Of The House of Saud 
The rapid growth of the Saudi royal family is the basis for much 
grumbling within the Kingdom.  With little exception, per capita income has been on the 
decline in Saudi Arabia for almost twenty years.  Despite the average citizen’s economic 
troubles, the annual allocation from the treasury to over five thousand Saudi princes was 
$8 billion in 1996.  That figure represented about one fifth of Saudi Arabia’s annual oil 
export revenue during that year.158  Furthermore, it is instructive that during the first half 
of the 1990’s, years in which the House of Saud ran horrible budget deficits, the two 
governmental departments whose budgets continued to increase were the royal household 
and the Ministry of Defense – the ruling family and its protectors.159  This is a source of 
tremendous tension.  Further tension results from the double standard that is applied to 
the royal family regarding King Fahd’s 1982 royal decree.   The decree clearly maintains 
that the state’s wealth will be used for the benefit of the citizens and that state law will 
govern the use of public resources.160   However, the extended royal family and others 
close to it continue to enjoy very high incomes, while many or most Saudis are suffering 
from declining living standards.  The Saudi public cannot reconcile these excesses with 
stated law, and thus view the House of Saud with a jaundiced eye.   
                                                 
158 Eliyahu Kandusky, “The Middle East Economies: The Impact of Domestic and International 
Politics,” Middle East Review of International Affairs, no. 2 (July 1997). Available [Columbia International 
Affairs Online]: https://wwwc.cc.columbia.edu/sec/dlc/caio/olj/meria/meria797_kanovsky.html   
159 Aburish, 3. 
160 The following three articles from chapter four, which deals with economic principles, state that: 1) 
Article Fourteen: All God’s bestowed wealth, be it under the ground, on the surface or in national territorial 
waters, in land or maritime domains under the state’s control, are the property of the state as defined by 
law. The law defines the means of exploiting, protecting and developing such wealth in the interests of the 
state, its security and economy.  2) Article Fifteen: No privilege is to be granted and no public resource is 
to be exploited without a law.  3) Article Sixteen: Public money is sacrosanct.  The state has an obligation 
to protect it and both citizens and residents are to safeguard it.  Jerichow, 12. 
70 
d. Succession 
 The potential for future factional infighting within the Saudi royal family 
is real, and thus is another potential source of instability.  Since the time of Ibn Saud, 
quiet competition over the succession and senior appointments has been a major factor in 
Saudi politics.  The Saudi royal family has historically been able to resolve each 
succession both peacefully and privately.  In the near-term this trend is likely to continue.  
Evidence suggests that the next succession is likely to be determined by internal 
consultation among the ahl-aqd wal hal, or other senior members of the royal family – at 
least until Prince Abdullah and the Sadairi Seven are dead.   
However, with five to ten thousand princes in the royal family, 80 of 
which have significant status as ranking members of the “next generation,” it is not at all 
clear that future transitions will go as smoothly as they have in the past.  Again, it is 
instructive to remember that attempts to disrupt the political and social fabric in the 
Kingdom occurred within a four-year period after each succession.161  Knowing that there 
will soon be both a positional and generational succession occurring in Saudi Arabia, and 
being well aware that any prolonged family squabbling would surely threaten internal 
stability, a full-blown succession struggle that would polarize the House of Saud is 
possible (but not anticipated).  However, if such infighting occurs, the House of Saud 
could to be its own worst enemy.  The Saudi regime has survived and succeeded largely 
due to the success of its divide-and-rule policies.  If Ibn Saud’s grandsons use this policy 
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against other family members at the time of succession, this could serve as a catalyst for 
various fractionalized opposition groups to join forces to rid Saudi Arabia of its 
unpopular royal family. 
2. Social And Religious Factors 
a. Islam And Secularism 
 Another potentially explosive internal threat facing Saudi Arabia is the 
inherent tension between Islam and secularism.  As stated earlier, Saudi Arabia is an 
Islamic Fundamentalist country led by a conservative royal family.  Because the 
mainstream Wahhabi sect, to which the royal family belongs, is so fundamentalist and 
conservative, it is often times difficult to distinguish between fundamentalism and 
Islamic extremism.   
Most of the ulama and many citizens, who occupy the middle ground of 
Saudi society, support the recent Islamic revival in Saudi Arabia.  While these supporters 
may oppose or challenge some aspects of secular changes and Western behavior, they 
neither incite violence nor are in opposition to the Saudi government, but instead simply 
advocate a more strict interpretation of Wahhabi doctrine.  Therefore, these groups pose 
no threat to the regime.     
Conversely, most Islamic extremists are radicals (“Neo-Wahhabis” or 
“Neo-Ikhwan”) who oppose all those who do not subscribe to their Islamic views.  While 
historically such extremist groups have had little organizational unity, with an ailing 
economy and rising unemployment, they have in recent history steadily gathered 
considerable support.  As could be expected, a large percentage of the support has 
historically come from the young, poor, and disenfranchised.  Recently, urbanized Saudis 
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living outside their traditional familial structures have also overwhelmingly joined the 
ranks of extremist organizations.  In fact, a disturbing trend beginning after the Gulf War 
was the previously unheard of public opposition coming from a wide range of Saudi 
citizens.  Participants ranged from “moderate liberal businessmen and intellectuals,” to “a 
broad-based coalition between the different streams in the ranks of the ulama.”162  Thus 
it is ironic that the House of Saud is largely responsible for broadening its opposition’s 
base of support.  Joseph Kostiner explains that “The new fundamentalist opposition’s 
most important characteristic has been its educational and socio-economic base.  Its 
members were neither lower class nor tribally identified.  Instead, the common 
denominator was membership in the new middle class: higher education graduates 
working as professionals or administrators.”163  Thus, these activists were the product of 
the affluent rentier era. 
William Ochsenwald notes that in the 1970’s, as the House of Saud began 
sending greater numbers of students to newly constructed universities, “in their studies, 
young Saudis mixed lay, academic or technical studies with a religious curriculum.”  This 
resulted in a new sort of young ulama, “who mixed traditional tutorials with university 
education, where they were exposed both to a secular education and currents of thought 
popular among foreign Ulama, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and various Islamic 
revivalists.  In addition, many ulama embarked on secular careers.”  Therefore, today 
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Saudi society is mixed with “lay-educated professionals with religious knowledge, and 
ulama interacting with wider elements of society.”164   
The careers and occupations of some of the main activists in the 
fundamentalist opposition reflect these changes.165  The fundamentalist opposition has 
maintained that its resentment of the House of Saud has derived from the regime’s 
“violation of moral and efficient administration and economics, and lack of attention to 
strategic planning.”166  This opposition has focused on discrediting both the ruler’s 
interpretation of the Shari’a and the senior ulama’s authority.  Kostiner notes that the 
House of Saud has benefited from the fact that despite some violent incidents on the part 
of the Saudi Islamist opposition, terrorism has not developed into an organized 
institutionalized activity.  He explains that “The lack of a violent, anti-government 
tradition, typical of Islamist opposition activists in other countries, and particularly their 
tendency to fight the government by religious discourse on the level of moral and 
religious principles, has so far limited the development of a major terrorist course of 
action.”167   
Thus, the extent of the threat of the opposition Saudi Islamist movement to 
the House of Saud will depend on two things: 1) Its ability to draw supporters from the 
educated, professional circles, and 2) The credibility of its criticism of the House of 
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Saud’s leadership and administrative incompetence, and attack against it on moral and 
religious grounds.  While the success of the opposition is possible, it will be difficult 
because currently there is no socio-political order, religious center, or prominent ruling 
figure to replace the House of Saud.168  
Occupying the opposite end of the political spectrum are the Saudi 
technocrats and businessmen.  These more liberal groups denounce the regime’s strict 
interpretation of Wahhabi doctrine and advocate a more moderate approach.  
Furthermore, they openly oppose the royal family’s nepotism, abuse of power, and total 
disregard for Saudi law.  In fact, many technocrats and businessmen support the 
liberalization of Wahhabi restraints on issues such as commerce, the role of women, and 
social customs.  Additionally, these largely Western-educated Saudi’s desire a greater 
voice in Saudi Arabia’s decision-making process, and this brings them in direct conflict 
with the royal family.  Their petitions and protests have resulted in harassment by the 
authorities and many arrests.169   
However, since the liberal opposition’s contempt for the House of Saud is 
not religious (Islamic) in nature, its base of support is extremely small.  Conversely, 
because fundamentalist opposition groups appeal to Koranic teachings, and thus to 
sentiments that cut across the economic spectrum, they potentially could attract a greater 
support base.  Due to the potential of this broad-based support, and to the seriousness of 
their accusations – that the Saudi regime is un-Islamic and thus illegitimate – these 
groups pose a much greater threat to the House of Saud. 
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Thus, when the House of Saud enacts reforms (even if only symbolic 
ones), it assuages the fundamentalist opposition, not the technocrats and businessmen.  
This is probably in part to reinforce its conservative Islamic credentials, but also to atone 
for its willingness to allow vast numbers of “infidel” (United States) soldiers to reside in 
its Kingdom in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War.  Whatever its rationale, the social 
tensions in Saudi Arabia are real and are mounting.     
b. Ethnic, Sectarian, And Regional Tensions 
 Longstanding tensions between ethnic, sectarian, and regional factions 
present still further problems for the House of Saud.  These tensions are particularly acute 
between the Sunni majority and the Shi’ite minority.  This is significant for two reasons.  
First, although Shi’ites comprise only about 5-7 percent of Saudi Arabia’s total 
population, they comprise as much as 40-50 percent of the population of the Eastern 
Province.170   Second, the Eastern Province contains the vast majority of Saudi Arabia’s 
known oil reserves.  While the Eastern Province has received a massive influx of 
government assistance since the 1979 Shi’ite riots, Shi’ite’s still occupy the lowest rung 
of the Saudi socio-economic ladder.  Anti-Shi’ite discrimination is still the norm.  This 
discrimination has been a significant source of social tension in the kingdom, driving 
many Shi’ites to clash with the government.  Realistically, the best result that the Saudi 
regime can hope to achieve in this struggle is an awkward “truce,” since neither group 
trusts the other.  This truce, typical of the regime’s insidious divide-and-rule policies, 
amounts to a campaign of coercion through largesse and, in the past has been quite 
successful.  The regime’s divide-and-rule policies, however, require constant attention 
and updating in order for the regime to maintain social order.                                                    
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However, in addition to the Sunni-Shi’ite tensions, there are numerous 
other regional tensions in Saudi Arabia that could be a source of increased turmoil for the 
House of Saud.  Regionally there is tension between secular moderates in the coastal 
cities and conservative Wahhabis in the Najd, and between the Shafii and Shi’ite 
immigrants in the Hejaz.  Additionally, there has been longstanding tension between the 
Hijazis and Najdis and those from the south, between urban dwellers and those having 
rural and nomadic lifestyles, and between the traditional and the “modern.”  While Saudi 
Arabia is homogeneous in the sense that it is almost entirely made up of Arab Muslims, 
these facts should not lead one to conclude that Saudi Arabia is a society free from 
internal conflict.  This polarity is the source of additional social friction, giving the House 
of Saud little room to maneuver without enraging some segment of its population.  
3. Economic Factors 
a. Introduction 
      The social contract between the Saudi regime and its citizens is 
incompatible with the sporadic nature of the oil market and Saudi Arabia’s demographic 
trends.  This fundamental flaw in the social fabric of the Saudi Kingdom, more so than 
any other, has resulted in growing social tensions.  These, if not addressed, will 
eventually threaten the very existence of the House of Saud.  The House of Saud’s 
presuppositions for governing have not changed since the reign of Ibn Saud, but the 
economic role of the government has changed radically.  As the world’s leading 
autocracy, the House of Saud runs the country as a family fiefdom, so much so that Saudi 
Arabia and the House of Saud are virtually one and the same.  Saudi Arabia’s rentier 
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social contract has facilitated the House of Saud to this end.  Implicit in this social 
contract is the trading of one’s political voice for monetary gain. 
The unprecedented wealth that began pouring into Saudi coffers in the 
1970’s enabled King Faysal to implement many reforms aimed at modernization, 
development, and improving the living conditions of Saudi citizens through an intricate 
network of subsidies, welfare services, and opportunities for advancement.  Furthermore, 
Faysal’s reforms and the expansion of modern education in Saudi Arabia led to rapid 
urbanization, as well as substantial growth in the new middle class and the educated elite.  
Due in no small part to Faysal’s largess, the House of Saud’s paternalistic regime 
continued to enjoy the “loyalty” of the newly urbanized masses and rural population, 
whose allegiance to their traditional institutions began to erode.171  By the early 1980’s, 
Saudi citizens were enjoying their newfound wealth, and the House of Saud enjoyed its 
seemingly firm control of the country.  In short, Saudi Arabia had become a rentier state.   
b. Sporadic Nature Of The Oil Market 
 However, in the mid-1980’s oil prices plummeted almost as quickly as 
they had risen.  Peaking in 1981, oil prices eroded and then fell sharply, especially when 
measured in constant (inflation corrected) dollars.  Oil discoveries outside the Middle 
East raised non-OPEC oil supplies, which served to further depress oil prices.  By 1983, 
Saudi Arabia incurred both budgetary and balance of payments deficits.  However, seeing 
these deficits as a temporary aberration, the Saudi regime did little to cut public spending.  
The Saudi government instead opted to utilize its financial reserves accumulated during 
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the “Years of Plenty.”  But contrary to expectations, deficits persisted through the end of 
the century, and by 1987 most of Saudi Arabia’s financial reserves had been exhausted. 
Eventually the Saudi government began scaling back expenditures in the 
“projects” budget, including cuts in infrastructure, as well as in housing, health, and 
educational facilities.  There were also drastic cuts made in aid to poorer Arab states.  
However, a wide range of expenditures including free health and educational services and 
numerous other subsidies, as well as the burgeoning and bloated civil service, were 
hardly touched for fear of public reaction.172  Nonetheless, despite the regime’s best 
efforts, further cuts were made due to mounting budget deficits.  When the standard of 
living continued to fall, citizens began to view the once generous providers as corrupt and 
inefficient tyrants.173  Thus social contract developed and implemented by the House of 
Saud had fallen prey to the sporadic nature of the oil market.  Saudi Arabia’s persistent 
budget deficits and dependency on volatile oil prices were warning signs of growing 
structural problems in the Saudi economy that persist to this day.  They were also, and 
more importantly, a warning that its past policy of using a large portion of the nation’s oil 
wealth to minimize internal tensions and religious friction could not continue 
indefinitely.174  In short, the Saudi social contract was, and remains, in a state of 
disrepair and in dire need of reform.  
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c. Population Growth, Unemployment, And Employment 
Expectations 
 In addition to the threat posed by a sporadic oil market, one of the greatest 
threats to the House of Saud is its inability to fulfill its end of the social contract due to 
exploding birth rates, employment expectations, and rising unemployment.  The latest 
UN demographic statistics indicate that the birth rate in Saudi Arabia is now the highest 
in the world.  The report states that “At the time when an Egyptian child is born every 
five minutes, a Chinese child every three minutes, an Indian child every two-and-a-half 
minutes, a Saudi child is born every minute.”175  That number equates to a birth rate of 
almost 4percent per annum.176  Saudi Arabia has a fertility rate of 6.48 children per 
woman.  If these trends persist, the population of Saudi Arabia will double (from 20 
million to 40 million) in the next 20 years.177  
This rapid population growth rate has recently become a major economic 
and political issue for the Saudi regime.  Economic growth has not kept pace with 
population growth.  Per capita income in Saudi Arabia has fallen from $19,000 in the first 
half of the 1980’s to about $7,000 at the end of the 1990’s.178   With the 2000-2001 
rebound in oil prices this figure may rise; but Saudi government officials know that 
following every boom there is a bust – it is only a question of time. 
Closely related to the issue of high birth rates is that of increased 
unemployment.  Current figures from the Ministry of Planning suggest that some 46 
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percent of the Saudi population was under 15 years old in 1999, with only 38 percent 
aged 15-39 years, and only 16 percent over 40 years.179   The World Bank and ILO 
estimate that the annual growth rate of the working age population will rise from 3.06 
percent per year in 1960-1975, and 3.51 percent in 1975-1990, to 3.91 percent during 
1990-2010.180  Other sources report the labor force growing at a phenomenal 5.7 
percent.181  This represents the highest growth rate for the working-age population of any 
nation in the Middle East. 
Thus, given the number of new Suadi citizens entering the job market each 
year, the task of generating more jobs for Saudi nationals has become critical.  This is 
especially true in light of the fact that Saudi Arabia’s civil service is already overstaffed 
with graduates who have become accustomed to being provided “cushy” jobs in 
government bureaucracies where little is expected of them.  Until the recent upswing in 
the oil market, Saudi Arabia has experienced large budget deficits since the early-1980’s; 
and with a per capita GDP that has dropped some 3.5percent per year during that same 
period, the regime has recently reneged on its promise to find governmental positions for 
all of its graduates.182  This has served to exacerbate the mounting unemployment crisis 
in Saudi Arabia.  In fact, the situation in Saudi Arabia has become so bad that the director 
of King Abd al-Aziz University in Jeddah estimated in 1999 that unemployment among 
Saudi graduates had risen to 27 percent from 12 percent in 1993.183  According to some 
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estimates, the national unemployment rate among Saudis has reached 20 percent and is 
still climbing while others suggest that as many as one-third of Saudi’s are 
unemployed.184  
In other words, with a strong Western-educated middle-class, with state 
bureaucracies already staffed beyond capacity, with greater numbers of Saudi students 
entering the work force every year, with unemployment on the rise, with explosive birth 
rates expected well into the future, and with declining per capita incomes, the pressure for 
change is mounting, to say the least.  All of these issues considered individually are 
serious, but considered together they represent a growing threat to the House of Saud, if 
they are not effectively dealt with.                  
d. Education 
 The House of Saud is additionally threatened by the very educational 
system that it instituted for its citizens.  The regime’s failure to give direction to the 
educational system in Saudi Arabia, while at the same time vastly expanding the numbers 
of participants in the system, has had extremely detrimental effects on the country.  As 
the Saudi budgetary shackles were unlocked in the aftermath of skyrocketing oil revenue, 
vast sums of money were invested into Saudi Arabia’s higher education system.  During 
the early 1970’s, the only thing on the decline in Saudi Arabia was university entrance 
requirements.  This was done by order of the government in order to “provide higher 
education to more students, who in addition to free education, housing, grants, book 
allowances, subsidized food and other privileges were assured [until recently] of 
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government employment upon graduation.”185  Again, the regime’s actions were 
motivated by many reasons, but chiefly by the need to defuse socio-economic tensions.  
Unrestrained by requirements to enter fields, such as engineering and the sciences which 
were desperately needed in the Kingdom’s developing economy, the majority of students 
opted for the less demanding humanities and social sciences. 
Very small minorities of the university graduates were employed by the 
private sector upon graduation.  The Saudi government employed all of those graduates 
not employed in the private sector.  The vast majority of the latter flocked to the 
ministries and government agencies in Riyadh.  By the early 1980’s, most of the Saudi 
bureaucracies employed three to four Saudis for every legitimate job, and then hired a 
foreigner to do the actual work.  This aspect of Saudi Arabia’s social contract explains 
why the government currently employs 34 percent of the Saudi native labor force.  
However, with little chance for upward mobility, and with the government’s now 
refusing to guarantee employment to university graduates, Saudi citizens’ frustration is 
mounting.  In short, the House of Saud has compromised its end of the social contract and 
thus risks losing what little legitimacy that it still enjoys.    
In addition to the problem of increases in unemployed university 
graduates, university enrolment amongst the “lower class” has been on the rise.  During 
the 1990’s, the relatively small but growing numbers of “lower class” students with 
secondary educations have chosen to attend Islamic universities with their traditional 
character and curriculum, easy admission requirements, and higher stipends.  Unless 
well-connected, these “lower class” graduates rarely get appointed to high administrative 
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posts.  Thus, with no apparent chance of upward mobility, it is not surprising that these 
disenfranchised students, as one senior Saudi government official confirmed, have joined 
Islamic extremist organizations in greater numbers than any other segment of Saudi 
society.186 
There are additional unintended consequences of Saudi Arabia’s 
commitment to increase its number of university graduates.  In an effort to rapidly 
modernize, the Saudi government sent many of its brightest students to Western 
universities.  When these students returned to Saudi Arabia, they were appointed to mid 
or high-level governmental posts, or employed by the private sector.  This segment of the 
population made up a substantial portion of the growing middle-class in Saudi Arabia.  
This is exactly what the Saudi regime had hoped would happen.  What it did not 
anticipate is that these same Western-educated people would become into a powerful 
force within Saudi Arabia and eventually begin to pressure the Saudi regime for a greater 
voice in government.  While the reforms that King Fahd announced on March 17, 1991 
did include the creation of a Council of Saudi Citizens, or Majlis al-Shura, this council is 
purely advisory in nature.  In fact, in a speech given on September 23, 1992, the sixtieth 
anniversary of the founding of the monarchy, King Fahd stated that “The democratic 
systems prevailing in the world are systems which, in their structure, do not suit this 
region and our people…The system of free elections is not part of Islamic theology.”187   
Thus, King Fahd clearly reiterated the notion that Saudi Arabia was and will continue to 
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be an absolute monarchy, much to the chagrin of many of the more progressive, Western-
educated middle-class.  
Furthermore, there is growing friction between graduates from the 
“secular” universities and those from religious universities – and between both of these 
groups and their Western-trained colleagues.  The former two groups are incensed that 
the supposed fundamentalist House of Saud routinely prefers Western-educated Saudi 
students over them, assigning the Western-educated students to fill key positions in the 
central government and its agencies. 
e. Labor Issues 
 The issue of expatriate workers in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is another 
enormous problem for the Saudi regime and, again, one of its own making.  The labor 
problem is multifaceted.  First is the problem of education.188   The existing Saudi 
educational and cultural systems produce workers who are difficult to integrate into the 
private sector.  In fact, the bulk of the graduates of the Saudi educational system do not 
have the skills to operate in a modern economy.  Most Saudis with a secondary education 
attended Koranic schools and colleges whose only success has been in flooding the 
country with PhD’s in Islamic Studies and breeding leaders for Islamic extremist 
movements.  While their education is suitable for government employment, it is of little 
use in the private sector.   
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Second is the problem of culture and motivation.  The generations that 
have grown up since the 1970’s expect to be provided for by the state and are unwilling 
to accept the discipline of a private sector job, a job of low status, or worst of all, a job 
entailing any form of manual labor.189  Sir James Craig, a former British ambassador to 
Saudi Arabia, notes 
[In the Kingdom there is] a disdain for any work which is not noble 
(sharif).  Most people shy away from work which they consider ignoble.  
Not only do they reject all manual and menial work; they are also 
reluctant.to undertake anything which is tedious or humdrum.  Plumbing is 
manual and roadsweeping is menial; for these tasks they employ 
foreigners.  But whereas making decisions is noble, the work of preparing 
to take decisions is ignoble; so the collection of facts, the collation of 
statistics, the checking of refernces, the planning of timetables is skimped.  
The results are sometimes disastrous.190   
 
Thus, with a dearth of technically competent workers or workers willing to perform 
manual labor, the Saudi economy has become increasingly reliant on foreign workers.191  
Third, due to the massive influx of foreign workers in the past 30 years, 
Saudi unemployment has risen dramatically.  According to statistics published by the 
Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency in 1999, the Saudi work force consisted of 7.2 million 
people.  Of these, 2.5 million (34.7 percent) were Saudi citizens, with the remaining 4.7 
million (65.3 percent) foreigners.  Thus with 4.7 million foreigners working in Saudi 
Arabia, it is somewhat mystifying that “unemployment of [Saudi] men is estimated at up 
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to 35 percent,” as recently reported by Susan Sachs of the New York Times.192  
Additionally, according to 1996 statistics, expatriates are employed overwhelmingly by 
the private sector, and despite strong official pressure to hire Saudis, only 7 percent of 
private sector employees are Saudi nationals, which again is due to their lack of training 
and poor work ethic.193        
Fourth is the problem of “hidden” unemployment.  “Hidden” 
unemployment refers to  those who are employed, but whose jobs are unnecessary.  The 
overwhelming majority of Saudi bureaucratic positions meet this criterion.  These are the 
jobs “made up” by the government in order to guarantee university graduates a 
prestigious job with a comfortable salary.  Roger Owen estimates that as many as 90 
percent of these bureaucratic positions are unnecessary.194  If Owen’s statistics are even 
halfway accurate, then very few nationals are productively employed.  With the recent 
upswing in the oil market, this problem is manageable.  However, with a daily increase in 
the number of Saudis entering the work force, an already over-staffed bureaucracy, and a 
cultural aversion to certain jobs, an extended drop in oil prices could prove disastrous for 
the Saudi regime.   
Therefore, the Saudi government must come to grips with its growing 
demographic problems and its over-dependence on foreign labor.  Saudi Arabia’s high 
population growth rate is making the current level of subsidy and welfare too expensive 
for the Saudi government to sustain.  At the same time, Saudi Arabia’s welfare economy 
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has helped create a dependence on foreign labor that is both expensive and counter-
productive to the “Saudiazation” of the labor force and the development of productive 
careers and realistic expectations among Saudi Arabia’s native population.   
Fifth, the Saudi economy is not only hindered by one quarter of its citizens 
being out of work, but also by millions of foreigner workers repatriating between 13 and 
15 billion dollars per year.  Put into context, that number represents approximately 10 
percent of the Saudi GDP.195  Thus, the Saudi government suffers doubly for stubbornly 
clinging to a social contract that it has not been able to afford for almost two decades.      
The combination of population growth and dependence on foreign labor 
may be the greatest threat to Saudi Arabia’s internal stability and possibly to the House of 
Saud’s longevity.  Over-dependence on foreign workers threatens the structure of the 
Saudi economy, and the very fabric of Saudi society, because a rapidly growing citizenry 
and declining real per capita oil revenue both call for major new measures to force 
reliance on native Saudi labor.  Even if the House of Saud had the political resolve to 
enact such measures, the very act of enacting them would destroy Saudi Arabia’s social 
contract.  If the Saudi government pushed forward with these measures, the public outcry 
would be deafening and would almost certainly result in increased problems with Islamic 
extremism and with its Shi’ite minority.  However, if these measures are not enacted, 
then the House of Saud is in danger of doing irreparable harm to its economy.  It is 
therefore not surprising that one of the regime’s favorite ways of dealing with problems is 
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“not to do anything and hope it goes away – sometimes it works, sometimes it 
doesn’t.”196   
4. Globalization 
The Globalization phenomenon may prove to pose the single greatest threat to the 
House of Saud in the short term.  Thomas L. Friedman believes that globalization is not 
just some economic fad or a passing trend, but instead he perceives it to be the dominant 
international system that replaced the Cold War system after the fall of the Berlin Wall.  
Friedman defines globalization as 
The inexorable integration of markets, nation-states and technologies to a 
degree never witnessed before – in a way that is enabling individuals, 
corporations and nation-states to reach around the world farther, faster, 
deeper, and cheaper than ever before, and in a way that is enabling the 
world to reach into individuals, corporations and nation-states farther, 
faster, deeper, cheaper than ever before.197 
 
Thus, globalization poses a tremendous threat to the House of Saud on every front – 
political, social, religious, and economic – largely because it empowers individuals, and it 
does so largely at the expense of the state.  This is especially the case in highly 
authoritarian and repressive societies such as Saudi Arabia.   
Friedman argues that the driving force behind globalization is free-market 
capitalism.  He explains, “the more you let market forces rule and the more you open 
your economy to free trade and competition, the more efficient and flourishing your 
economy will be.”  He further contends that globalization’s economic rules “revolve 
around opening, deregulating and privatizing your economy, in order to make it more 
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attractive to foreign investment.”198  These concepts – deregulating, laissez faire, 
becoming more transparent, essentially giving up control – are very threatening to a 
regime that owes its longevity to its ability to its ability to rule with an iron fist.     
 Additionally, globalization poses a threat to the House of Saud on a social and 
religious plane.  Unlike with the bi-polarity of the Cold War, globalization tends to have 
a homogenizing effect.199  According to Friedman, “Culturally speaking, globalization 
has tended to involve the spread (for better and for worse) of Americanization – from Big 
Macs to iMacs to Mickey Mouse.”200  Globalization technologies have facilitated the 
onslaught of Western culture in Saudi Arabia, creating complex problems for the House 
of Saud.  For example, for the last decade satellite television, and particularly Western 
programming, has become very popular among the Saudi middle-class.  In fact, Daryl 
Chapman contends that satellite television has had an especially large influence on 
“young Saudi males below the age of 20, creating the basis of a generation gap that may 
lead to social dislocation in the future.”201  Thus, under pressure from the ulama, the 
House of Saud banned all satellite dishes in 1994, fearing that “Saudis would be able to 
obtain morally and politically harmful material that avoided state censorship.”202  
However, the Ministry of the Interior, responding to opposition by the prominent middle-
class, has not enforced the ban.  Thus, globalization’s advanced technologies have 
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divided Saudis society and made the House of Saud the center of criticism from both 
sides.  What the House of Saud fears most, however, is the combined influence of culture 
creep, travel abroad, and studies in western countries on its young people.  Champion 
quantifies the regime’s fear stating, “Many of these young people will probably come to 
occupy positions of influence in Saudi society, threatening to challenge the traditional 
perspectives upon which much of the current social system is based, and therefore 
contributing to change from within the society.”203  If Champion’s prediction proves 
accurate, then the House of Saud, as the keeper of the two holy places, may soon have a 
destabilizing social revolution on its hands.     
The way in which the opposition uses globalization’s new technologies poses 
another major threat to the House of Saud.  Central to the Saudi oppositions’ vision is the 
idea that “Islam” and its values are under attack both globally and locally, and that the 
Saudi government has failed to protect Islam and Muslims.  Mamoun Fandy explains 
that, “New communications technologies [have] allowed marginal groups to elaborate a 
new transcript or a cultural paradigm, to construct new identities, and to rewrite the story 
of Saudi Arabia.”204  Globalization’s new technologies – fax machines, videos, 
photocopiers, satellite television, cellular phones, and especially the miracle of real-time 
two-way communications on the World Wide Web – have empowered marginal figures 
to promote their political programs free of risk and without any domestic interference.  
Thus, when CNN or the other major news networks latch onto these figures, 
sensationalize their stories, and beam their messages back to the Middle East via satellite 
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television or the internet, then the opposition gains legitimacy through their apparent 
international credibility.  Therefore, if the Ayatollah Khomeini was able to topple the 
powerful Shah of Iran using cassette tapes passed hand to hand, how much more 
threatening are these new technologies to a regime like the House of Saud?  Thus 
globalization threatens the House of Saud politically by giving the opposition a risk-free 
forum to air their grievances not only to their fellow Saudis, but also to the world.   
D. CONCLUSION 
The internal threats facing Saudi Arabia are much more complex and more 
threatening to the House of Saud that its external threats.  The internal threats facing the 
Saudi regime are multi-dimensional and deeply woven into the fabric of Saudi society 
because they involve almost every aspect – political, social, religious, and economic – of 
Saudi culture.  Saudi Arabia is only as strong as the loyalty of its citizens, and this loyalty 
is ultimately dependent on the Saudi regime’s ability to maintain its legitimacy.  While 
the House of Saud’s legitimacy formula is a complex one, today the dominant ingredient 
is economic in nature.  As stated before, the Saudi regime’s legitimacy is now closely 
associated with its ability to fund Saudi Arabia’s social contract.  However, the House of 
Saud devised its social contract during a decade-long oil boom, when the Saudi 
population was just a fraction of what it is today.  With two-thirds of the Saudi 
population having been reared during the rentier era, Saudis are accustomed to a 
relatively high standard of living.  However, because Saudi Arabia is a rentier state, by 
definition it is almost entirely reliant on its oil revenue to fund its social contract.  
Therefore, because the oil market is sporadic and the length of the booms and busts are 
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unpredictable, the Saudi regime is now stuck with a social contract that is both 
unaffordable and ultimately may prove to be its undoing.    
During the bust economy of the 1980’s and 1990’s, the Saudi regime kept afloat 
by depleting its cash reserves, running large deficits, and (finally) making small annual 
cuts in its subsidies and welfare payments.  However, with the highest birth rate in the 
world and sky rocketing unemployment, this option will only be available to the regime 
for a short time,205 if in fact the time has not already passed.  Although the Saudi 
government has been implementing reforms (see Chapter 5) that are aimed at buttressing 
and slightly altering it’s failing social contract, its actions may not go far enough to fend 
off major economic complications in the future.   
In any event, the clock is ticking.  In twenty years the Saudi population will 
double to 40 million people.  At the rate that the House of Saud is implementing change, 
no matter how high the price of oil gets, it will not be able to fund its end of the social 
contract.  Hence, the question is begged, what happens then? 
Due to Islamic laws and the conservative nature of the Saudi government, its 
options are limited.  While trying to broaden its political base and implement change, it is 
constantly challenged by a fractionalized population, no matter which direction it 
attempts to go.  Anthony Cordesman rightly states that, “Any analysis of the royal 
family’s effort to broaden and restructure its political base must also take account of the 
fact that Saudi Arabia is caught up in a constant struggle between efforts to preserve the 
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Saud a longer amount of time.   
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nation’s character as an Islamic state and the need to adapt religious and social customs 
to modern social and economic needs.”206 
Thus, Saudi Arabia’s diverse population, its oil economy, its social contract, its various 
reforms, and the Koran have all served to back the Saudi regime into a corner.   
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V. REFORM AND THE HOUSE OF SAUD: RHETORIC VS. 
ACTION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
If anything is true of the House of Saud regarding reform, it is that its rhetoric 
rarely matches its actions.  Regardless if one evaluates political, social, religious, or 
economic reforms, the Saudi regime rarely proposes any type of reform unless it believes 
that the stakes are so high that the very continuance of its rule is threatened if changes are 
not made.  Under these extreme conditions, in order to placate the opposition, then and 
only then does the Saudi regime promise to enact new reforms.  Historically a wait-and-
see period then ensues.  If the promise of future reforms suffices to restore a requisite 
degree of civility to the country, then the regime reverts to the status quo, and the 
proposed reforms are shelved until a threat reappears.  If the opposition continues to 
escalate even after the reforms are proposed, then the regime enacts changes that are 
largely symbolic, and but which essentially maintain the status quo.  Thus, in either case, 
there is little deviation from the status quo.  These antics are straight out of the 
omnibalancing tool box, again strengthening the argument that the House of Saud has 
been motivated by narrow self-interest which has expressed itself in the obsessive quest 
to preserve the ruler’s power at all cost.   
This chapter focuses on reforms proposed and enacted by the House of Saud in 
the past decade.  It identifies two major themes regarding reforms proposed by the House 
of Saud.  First, the Saudi regime is bent on preserving the status quo; and second, even 
when the Saudi regime actually wants to implement real changes, it is largely thwarted 
due to obstacles of its own making.  Additionally, the chapter argues that the House of 
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Saud will not be able to maintain the status quo indefinitely due to mounting internal and 
global changes.       
B. DRIVING FORCES BEHIND SAUDI POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC 
REFORM 
That oil has substantially altered the relationship between the state and society in 
Saudi Arabia is indisputable.  However, the effect of this change, especially on the nature 
of political demands emanating from Saudi society, is a more contentious issue.  The 
majority view is that the increased standard of living enjoyed by the populace in 
conjunction with the dominant role of the state in financing this increased standard of 
living has served to reduce demands for political representation and participation.  
Giacomo Luciani, one of the great apologists for the rentier state phenomenon states it 
this way: “The fact is that there is no representation without taxation and there are no 
exceptions to this version of the rule.”207   In other words, oil wealth has lessened the 
need for the House of Saud to include its population in the decision-making process.208  
This paradigm of the relationship between the rentier state and political 
participation was largely accurate through the 1970’s and 1980’s.  During this period the 
people’s lack of a political voice did not affect the stability or legitimacy of the House of 
Saud, despite the social upheaval brought about by massive oil wealth and the political 
pressures of the Iranian Revolution and the Iran-Iraq War.  Generally speaking, the first 
generation of rentier recipients in Saudi Arabia saw vast improvements in their standard 
of living and credited the House of Saud, at least in part, for these changes.   
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However, Saudi Arabia has been a rentier state for some thirty years, and the 
majority of its citizens now view the economic benefits of Saudi Arabia’s oil not as 
largesse on behalf of the ruling family, but as a right of Saudi citizenship.  In Saudi 
Arabia the state has become the generator of economic development, the major employer, 
and the provider of numerous services, and is thus central to the daily lives of its citizens.  
Gause states that 
Much as taxpayers want responsible governments to spend their money, 
the beneficiaries of rentier states want responsible governments to sign 
their checks.  Their financial dealings with the state are as important to 
their daily lives, if not more important, as those of taxpayers in the 
Western democratic countries.  A sudden change in the state policy in the 
Gulf monarchies could mean higher rents, mortgage payments, health care 
costs, food bills, and utility bills; it could mean the loss of one’s job and 
livelihood.209  
 
It is precisely because the state had become so important and so powerful that the Saudi 
citizens began to agitate for a political voice.  Thus, at one time massive oil wealth had 
reduced demands for participation in governmental affairs, or at had given the rulers the 
resources to divert what demands there were.  However, by the 1990’s the process of 
state growth and educational expansion had led to a new wave of participatory demands 
from Saudi citizens.210   
C. POLITICAL REFORM 
Saudi Arabia’s mounting social and economic pressures came to a head during the 
Gulf War.  Facing unprecedented expressions of political disapproval from virtually 
every pocket of Saudi society, the House of Saud was convinced that “now” was the time 
to announce a new round of reforms.  On August 5, 1990, King Fahd reorganized his 
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cabinet and began hinting of future political reforms.  On March 1, 1992 those hints were 
fleshed out when King Fahd announced three royal decrees.  Among the decrees was the 
often-promised (but never enacted) formation of the Council of Saudi Citizens, or 
Consultative Council (Majulis al-Shura).  Additionally, the King announced the 
introduction of a basic body of governing laws and increased autonomy for Saudi 
Arabia’s fourteen provinces.   
1. Petitions, Memorandums, And Political Reform 
a. Secular Petition 
 The King’s rhetoric in 1990 was apparently taken as an indication that the 
House of Saud was at least somewhat open to allowing Saudi citizens to present their 
demands in more organized ways.  Losing no time, the first in a series of petitions was 
drafted by forty-three public figures, mostly from secular backgrounds, and was 
circulated in late 1990.  It became known as the “liberal petition” (see Appendix A).  The 
signators proposed ten reforms with three major themes: 1) recommendations pertaining 
to the issue of representative institutions, 2) the importance of fairness and consistency in 
the application of the rule of law, 3) concern with curbing the arbitrariness in state 
actions, specifically calling for the establishment of a basic system of government, 
investigation and reworking of all aspects of the judicial system, total equality among all 
citizens, comprehensive reform of the Association for the Propagation of Virtue and the 
Deterrence of Vice, changes in laws governing Muslim women, and changes in laws 
governing education.211 
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b. Islamist Petition 
 In February of 1991, shortly after the liberal petition was circulated, over 
400 of Saudi Arabia’s top religious leaders promulgated the more critical “Islamist 
petition” (see Appendix B).  This petition began by castigating the Saudi regime as 
follows: “In this critical period, everybody has recognized the need for change.  We 
therefore find that the most requisite duty is to reform our present conditions that have 
caused us to suffer these tribulations.  Consequently, we ask that the ruler of the nation 
check the deterioration of these conditions, which need reform in the following area...”212 
The petition then went on to make twelve specific points.  Other than being more acrid 
and religious in tone, and addressing domestic and foreign policy issues, it shared all of 
the same themes as the secular petition.  However, what gave this petition devastating 
potency was the fact that Shaykh Abd al-Aziz bin Baz, the most eminent religious figure 
in Saudi Arabia and head of the government-appointed Council of Senior Scholars and 
the Institution of Ifta and Scholarly Research,213 was among its senators.  Directly 
confronted by one of the most important groups in its legitimacy equation – the 
government-appointed ulama – the House of Saud realized that after years of holding out 
the “carrot,” it might finally have to deliver.214      
c. The Shi’ite Petition 
 At the end of 1991 the leaders of Saudi Arabia’s Shi’ite community in the 
Eastern Province delivered yet another petition to King Fahd.  Again this petition 
reiterated the main themes of the previous two petitions.  However, it specifically 
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requested that the King include the Shi’ite community in any future reforms and uphold 
their rights as Saudi citizens.  It raised four Shi’ite-specific issues dealing with: 1) the 
harassment of Shi’a in the performance of their religious rites and lack of financial 
support for the building of Shi’ite mosques and religious institutions, 2) the 
discrimination against Shi’a in hiring practices by the government and state companies, 
3) the “obstacles...being deliberately placed to prevent them [Shi’a] from admission” into 
Saudi universities, and 4) the allegation that the Saudi Armed Forces deliberately blocked 
the Shi’a from “defending the soil of this country.”215   
Thus, it is interesting that of the three petitions, none advocated doing 
away with the Saudi regime.  Instead, these petitions expressed support of the House of 
Saud while at the same time calling for limits on the regime’s power.  The petitions 
represented mainstream opinions coming from every corner of the kingdom, representing 
every strata of Saudi society, and they all had the same request – more involvement in the 
political decision-making process.  Thus, the evidence is quite compelling that while in 
their early years; policies in rentier states may tend to temporarily “depoliticize” citizens.  
However, over the long-term, this is not the case.           
d. The Basic System of Government 
 In March of 1992, in an effort to stifle the unprecedented criticism that the 
Saudi regime was receiving, the King announced the enactment of the Basic System of 
Government and reemphasized his intention to create the Consultative Council.  The 
foundation of the Basic System of Government is the Koran and the sunna (traditions) of 
the Prophet Muhammad.  Although many Westerners refer to this document as the Saudi 
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constitution, the Saudi regime specifically maintains the position that “Saudi Arabia, as 
the Islamic state par excellence, has no need for a formal constitution.”216  However, the 
Basic Laws were intended to demarcate the foundations of the state and the distribution 
of political powers within it.  
The new laws did codify existing legal traditions and constitutional rules 
in Saudi Arabia, thus making it easier for citizens to challenge their validity and appeal 
for their change.  However, the new laws did not break any new ground in providing 
protection for most fundamental human rights.  Actually, in some key areas, such as 
elections and the mandate of the Consultative Council, the new laws amounted to 
backsliding from previous legislation.  Such shortcomings are especially glaring in Saudi 
Arabia where its citizens do not have a bill of rights, where the government has rejected 
most internationally recognized human rights agreements, and where the government has 
historically engaged in the systematic violation of civil and political rights.  Furthermore, 
the need to spell out human rights explicitly is all the more important since there is no 
constitutional court in the country.  Thus, the implementation of the Basic Laws was just 
another example of the Saudi regime’s form-over-substance policies conceived in the 
turmoil that it was designed to dampen.     
e. Memorandum Of Advice 
 The distribution of the Sahykh bin Baz-endorsed Islamist petition 
coincided with the ending of the Persian Gulf War and paved the way for public dissent 
throughout Saudi Arabia.  This was especially true of elements in the Islamic movement 
which pushed against the outer limits of tolerated criticism.  Numerous university 
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lecturers and mosque preachers chastised the House of Saud on a myriad of points.  As 
these groups became increasingly brazen, Shaykh bin Baz publicly condemned the 
religious militants who criticized the regime in December 1991.  In fact, at the end of 
January 1992, King Fahd addressed the Council of Ministers and the senior religious 
officials warning them that “If matters exceed their limit, then for every action there is a 
response.”217  In addition to his warnings, “the stick,” King Fahd announced “ the carrot” 
on March 1, 1992.  He put forth the three royal decrees (previously mentioned) that 
established important changes in the Saudi domestic political system ( a Basic System of 
Government, a Consultative Council, and a system of regional governors).  However, 
these decrees were lost on over 100 members of the ulama who in the summer of 1992 
signed a forty-six page “Memorandum of Advice” (muzakkarat al-nasiha) to the King.  
This document was unique on many points – its tone, bluntness, depth of criticism, 
widespread dissemination, and revolutionary suggestions.218   While it echoed and 
expanded upon many of the same points of the earlier petitions, its authors made a radical 
leap when they advocated making the ulama a separate and coequal branch of 
government.  It was thus unprecedented in its exacting criticisms and radical suggestions.   
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f. Consultative Council (Majulis al-Shura)  
 Having adopted the Basic Laws in March 1992, and with open criticism of 
the House of Saud continuing to increase, King Fahd took an additional step towards 
making the long promised Consultative Council a reality.  On September 23, 1992, the 
sixtieth anniversary of the founding of the monarchy, King Fahd appointed Mohammed 
bin Ibrahim bin Jubair as speaker of the still nonexistent Council.  However, even when 
he did that, it remained unclear as to whether the King would follow through with his 
promise when he delayed appointing the council, stating that, “The democratic systems 
prevailing in the world are systems which, in their structure, do not suit this region and 
our people...The system of free elections is not part of Islamic theology.”219  With dissent 
still widespread, on August 21, 1993, King Fahd conceded, and appointed 60 members to 
the first Council, with the Council’s inaugural meeting occurring in 1994.   
The long evolution in the creation of the Consultative Council exemplified 
both the tenacity with which the House of Saud guards its power as well as the “form 
over substance” policies typical of the Saudi regime.  King Fahd’s words bore this out 
when over state television he read his decree making it painfully clear that the role of the 
Consultative Council was purely advisory.  He also stated that he was retaining all of the 
power of the monarchy, and, again, that Saudi Arabia would remain an Islamic state and 
would not become a Western-style democracy.220  Also, a critical precondition to forming 
the Council was the understanding that the King retained the power to appoint or dismiss 
all Council members.  Therefore, it is ironic that even though the Consultative Council 
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was devoid of any real power, the House of Saud was quick to promise its creation 
during times of trouble, but extremely hesitant in following through with its promise. 
g. System of Regional Government 
 The third decree that King Fahd announced on March 1, 1992 regarded 
reforming the system of regional governance of the Kingdom’s fourteen provinces.  
Again, this decree was largely one of form-over-substance.”  Although the statute was 
advertised as 1) giving provincial governors greater autonomy on spending and 
development priorities in their regions, and 2) authorizing the establishment of provincial 
consultative councils on the model of the national Consultative Council,221 the fact 
remains that to this day all of the governors remain members of the House of Saud.  The 
question thus becomes, will a provincial governor (a prominent member of the royal 
family) take a course of action in his province that is inconsistent with family leaders at 
the national level, especially when he knows that he can be replaced at the whim of the 
King?  Therefore, what was billed by the Saudi regime as a major effort to decentralize 
the authority in the Kingdom was somewhat of a ruse.   
h. Conclusion: Political Reform 
 The royal decrees put forth on March 1, 1992 were an attempt by the 
House of Saud to regain favor with the constituencies that the regime relied on to 
maintain Saudi Arabia’s stability.  The popular indignation that came to a boiling point 
after the Persian Gulf War, depicted by the flood of petitions and memorandums signed 
by literally every constituent in Saudi Arabia, was too great for the King to ignore.  While 
King Fahd’s predecessors had previously committed themselves to these kinds of 
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changes only to indefinitely postpone their implementation, the crisis in which King Fahd 
found himself forced him to act.  Although the petitions shared many of the same themes 
and came from opposite ends of the political spectrum – the liberals and the Islamists – 
the King had to remember his most important constituency, the royal family itself.  Thus, 
in typical fashion, while attempting to bolster support from his liberal and Islamist 
constituencies, the underlying objective of these reforms was to reassure the ruling family 
that its position was not being challenged.  While these reforms did make minute and 
mostly superficial changes to Saudi Arabia’s political system, they surreptitiously 
reconfirmed the absolute authority of the ruling family.   
While these reforms went a long way in smoothing over the fractures 
between the regime and the majority of Saudi citizens, for a time in the mid-1990’s the 
House of Saud appeared headed for a period of acute instability.  Financial crisis had hit 
the country during 1993 and 1994, and 1995 ushered in a cycle of violence that lasted 
until the following summer.222  Concurrently, the House of Saud was feverishly 
repressing opposition movements that had surfaced both inside the country and 
abroad.223  However, Champion notes that by 1997  “it was clear that the political 
opposition had been effectively silenced – domestically, through repression and, 
internationally, through various means of pressure in collusion with Western 
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governments, agencies, and multinational interests, as demonstrated by the two-year 
string of affairs surrounding the CDLR and Mas’ari in the UK.”224   
D. ECONOMIC REFORM 
1. The Saudi Economy  
The Saudi Economy has been in various stages of crisis for the past two decades 
and is unlikely to ever regain the strength that it had during the heady oil boom of the 
1970’s.225  Acknowledging this fact, the Saudi regime has attempted to diversify its 
economy in order to reduce its dependence on the fluctuating oil market.226  To date their 
efforts have largely failed.  As a result, Saudi revenues still are prone to extreme 
fluctuations as evidenced most recently by the near tripling of the price of a barrel of oil 
since January 1999.227  Fiscal planning therefore remains at the mercy of forces largely 
outside the government’s control.  Most would agree that the Saudi regime has faced and 
will continue to face serious economic hardships in the years to come.  
The oil market crash of 1983 brought recession to Saudi Arabia and ushered in an 
era of high budget deficits which persisted through the end of the century.  Exacerbating 
the problem of weak oil prices was the tremendous burden of funding Iraq during its 10-
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year war with Iran.  This cost Riyadh some $26 billion of its $100 billion reserves.228  
Additionally, after the termination of the Iran-Iraq war, the Saudi regime received only a 
short reprieve before it found itself funding yet another major conflict – The Persian Gulf 
War – which in the end cost Saudi Arabia some $65 billion.  This conflagration of events 
almost entirely depleted the House of Saud’s foreign holdings and official reserves.  
Concurrently, domestic frustration was on the rise as Saudi per capita income, which was 
around $14,000 in the early 1980’s, dropped to about $6,000 by 1994.  Although the 
Saudi regime made some cuts in their budget, they did not go far enough; deficits 
persisted, and thus by 1994 “Saudi economic activity gradually ground to a halt.”229   
2. Budget Cuts And Revenue Increases 
Additional measures were taken by the House of Saud to balance its budget.  
First, it canceled numerous high dollar development projects.  Second, the Saudi 
government delayed payments to suppliers and contractors, on many accounts for up to 
three years.  However, these actions seriously affected Saudi entrepreneurs and the 
middle class.  Furthermore, these actions increased the number of unemployed among 
school and university graduates as well as lower class Saudis.  Yet, despite the recession, 
growing unemployment, and the other severe hardships that the Saudi population faced, 
the one area of the budget that was immune from cuts was the stipends received by the 
royal family.  Thus, the House of Saud’s avarice became even more pronounced in the 
eyes of its citizens. 
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Third, the government began to scrutinize applicants to Saudi universities.  Abir 
explains that “Admission to universities, which had been practically automatic and 
entitled students to meaningful remuneration and eventually assured them of respected 
government employment, was made far more difficult.”230  Thus, as educational and 
employment opportunities evaporated, students increasingly disapproved of the regime 
and of the royal family’s excesses. 
By 1995, Saudi Arabia’s economic situation was desperate.  The House of Saud 
had been unwilling to pursue the additional spending cuts and revenue increases required 
to offset the low oil prices of 1995.  Essentially, the Saudi economic plan called for 
austerity without reform, and the IMF indicated that it would take massive reform for 
Saudi Arabia to really come to grips with its problems.231  Although the International 
Monetary Fund’s (IMF) suggested cuts went largely unheeded, from 1995-1997 Saudi 
Arabi’s budget deficits were the smallest that they had been in years, averaging less than 
$5 billion per year.  Once again, strong oil prices, more than anything else, were 
responsible for the improved situation.   
Nevertheless, deficits persisted, but nothing seemed capable of curbing Saudi 
spending habits.  When the Saudi regime ran out of cash reserves to its deficits, they 
began borrowing on the domestic market.232  Again in 1998 Saudi Arabia returned to the 
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precipice of economic disaster when oil prices dropped, and its budget deficit (as a 
percentage of its GDP) reached double digits.  This prompted Crown Prince Abdullah to 
announce at a Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) summit meeting in December of 1998 
that “The age of abundance is over…We must get used to a new lifestyle that does not 
rely entirely on the state.”233  In 1998, despite their financial woes, the Saudi government 
only made half-hearted attempts to reduce government spending and raise revenue.  By 
1999, the House of Saud made another round of politically unpopular reforms; but these 
too were small in scope.234  For example, the Saudi regime increased the prices for 
gasoline, phone services, and visas; yet those increases only generated an estimated $1 
billion in a year in which Saudi Arabia’s deficit was slightly over $9 billion.235  Needless 
to say, more economic reform was needed. 
3. Economic Reform 
a. Privatization 
 Saudi Arabia’s 2000-2005 development plan acknowledges the need to 
reduce state involvement and increase private sector – including foreign – participation 
and investment in the economy.  In a recent speech, Crown Prince Abdullah stated that 
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Economic and Business Affairs U.S. Department of State, March 2000. Available [Online]: 
http://www.state.gov/www/issues/economic/trade_reports/saudi.html 
235 Gause, “Saudi Arabia Over A Barrel,” 84. 
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“The Kingdom has adopted a comprehensive policy for economic reforms.  It has chosen 
the privatization route as a strategic option to augment the role of the private sector and 
increase efficiency and productivity.”236  Although the House of Saud has spoken of 
privatization for years, it has dragged its feet in forcing the issue until recently.  Here 
again omnibalancing possesses significant descriptive powers.  By privatizing the 
economy, the royal family and wealthy merchant class stand to land massive 
windfalls,237 however, at the same time the Saudi regime has feared that the privatization 
of state-run businesses would result in widespread layoffs for Saudi citizens, as well as be 
met with resistance by civil servants, 238 the private sector,239 and some members of the 
royal family.  Although many of these fears are justified, the Saudi regime recently 
privatized its telecommunications sector and is in the process of privatizing its power 
sector and utility services. 
However, privatization may prove more difficult than the House of Saud 
currently acknowledges.  The Saudi government will have a difficult time divesting itself 
of state-owned corporations which are heavily subsidized and that operate at huge losses 
(such as its national airline Saudia).  Additionally, a takeover of major sectors of the 
economy by powerful, capital-rich families, comprising both royalty and merchants,                                                  
236 Available [Online]: http://www.saudinf.com/main/y1572.htm. 
237 Privatization represents a major step in an economic liberalization process that could truly 
revolutionize the Saudi economy.  The privatization of Saudi Arabia’s massive state-run corporations 
requires a massive amount of capital.  Indeed, most of the $50 to $200 billion of Saudi funds overseas, 
which would provide the bulk of these investments, belongs to the House of Saud and a few large merchant 
families.  Such investments would give a few powerful families and princes a controlling stake in the 
economy.  They would wrest the power over the economy from the civil servants who presently control 
SAMA, SABIC, the Ministry of Finance and SIDF.  Jean-Francois Seznec, “The Gulf Capital Markets At 
A Crossroads,” The Columbia Journal Of World Business, (Fall 1995)), 13. 
238 The civil servants in charge of running Saudi Arabia’s economy represent a modern Weberian 
bureaucracy.  They are mostly well-rained and genuinely seek to protect the public interest.  They have 
sought in the past to spread the benefits of industrialization to the public, while limiting the emergence of 
large shareholders and speculative activities.  Ibid. 
239 Private sector fears revolve around the potential for a very small number of phenomenally wealthy 
individuals to buy up these massive corporations and, in so doing, control Saudi Arabia’s economy.  Ibid. 
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could aggravate social tensions and widen the rich-poor gap, thus inciting anti-
government opposition groups.  Thus, even though the Crown Prince endorses 
privatization as the cornerstone of his economic reforms, and many in the royal family 
are positioned to exponentially expand their wealth and power, the word is still out on 
whether the benefits outweigh the risks to this weak regime. 
b. “Saudiization” And Educational Reform 
 In 2000, depending on the source, Saudi Arabia’s population was 
estimated at roughly 22 million, five to seven million of which were foreign workers.  In 
a May 8, 2001 report,  Saudi’s Labor Ministry stated that the foreign work force in Saudi 
Arabia had to be slashed to one million from the current seven million within the next 30 
years in order to make way for Saudi job seekers.  According to ministry statistics, the 
labor market will offer a total of 13.5 million jobs, while the Saudi work force will swell 
from 3.2 million at present to 12.5 million, thus leaving one million jobs for foreigners.  
In order to achieve this goal, the report indicated that the government and private sector 
had to work together to transfer more that 150,000 jobs per year from foreign to Saudi 
hands.240        
To this end, the government’s most recent “Saudiization” plan necessitates 
radically revamping educational and training programs – along with some social 
engineering – to ensure that young Saudi nationals are technically qualified, and willing, 
to take jobs currently filled by expatriates.  Saudiization, however, has been around since 
the early 1980’s and has encountered enormous problems, not the least of which is the 
                                                 
240 Unattributed, “Saudi To Slash Foreign Labor By Six Million,” Riyadh (AFP), May 08, 2001. 
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mudir syndrome241 – which dictates that nothing less than a position of authority, status, 
and respect is honorable.  Another major hurdle Saudiization faces is that “estimates 
indicate that 27.9 percent of new labor market entrants during the Sixth Plan period 
[2000-2005] will be dropouts from elementary level and adult vocational training 
programs.”242  Thus, despite the lofty goals recently articulated by the Ministry of Labor, 
according to Abdullah al-Shidadi, it will likely take at least a decade to counter these 
problems [of training the currently unqualified Saudi nationals for private sector jobs and 
curbing the social stigma associated with technical and vocational jobs] and attain the 
desired economic and social benefits. 243 
The House of Saud has adopted other tactics to facilitate Saudiization.  It 
has established quantitative targets of employment of nationals in certain private 
companies.  It has also provided incentives for hiring and training nationals, and it is 
trying to increase the cost of foreign labor through visa and other fees.  But, according to 
Abdelali Jbili, assistant director of the IMF’s Middle East Department, “these measures 
[government hiring incentives, tariffs, and fees] alone cannot make a dent in the problem 
[of significantly reducing unemployment among nationals].  Even worse, if these targets 
                                                 
241 Coined by Daryl Champion, the mudir syndrome entails the “hierarchical” view of jobs.  Mudir is 
the Arabic word for “director.”  The mudir syndrome stems from a bedouin legacy in which a man’s role is 
seen to be that of a warrior and desert survivalist, and in which manual work is not honorable.  Senior 
Saudis are worried about the “morale” effects of this attitude.  The trait is widely acknowledged and is 
recognized as an obstacle to progress in reducing unemployment and improving the kingdom’s long-term 
economic prospects.  Additionally, Saudi Arabia’s legacy of slavery – in which slaves conducted all 
manual labor -- may also be a contributing factor in the persistence of the syndrome.  Daryl Champion, 
“The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: Elements of Instability Within Stability,” Middle East Review of 
International Affairs, vol. 3, no. 4 (December 1999).  Available [Columbia International Affairs Online]: 
https://wwwc.cc.columbia.edu/sec/dlc/caio/olj/meria/meria99_chd01.html 
242 Ministry of Planning, Sixth Development Plan, 171, Ibid.. 
243 Abdullah al-Shidadi is the General Director of Research, Training, and Research, at the Saudi 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry.  Shidadi has since reaffirmed the 10-year time frame for Saudiization, 
although he said it would be a good result if Saudiization were in fact achieved in 10 years, Ibid. 
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are applied without flexibility, they could hurt private-sector competitiveness.”244  With 
these problems in mind, the IMF made the following recommendations: 1) reducing the 
differential in wages and benefits between the public and private sectors, 2) extending 
social allowances to nationals in the private sector, 3) placing a greater emphasis on 
training and improving educational systems, and 4) introducing unemployment benefits 
and reducing government hiring.245  Therefore, with all of the difficulties that 
Saudiization faces, it is not at all clear that the newest iteration of the Saudiization plan  
will be any more effective than the regime’s 1995 version.246   
  c. New Bureaucracies 
 In order to hasten economic development and the diversification of the 
economic base, in 1999 and 2000 the House of Saud created a number of new 
organizations.  In August 1999,  Crown Prince Abdullah created the Supreme Economic 
Council and charged it with boosting investment, creating jobs for Saudi nationals, and 
promoting Saudi Arabia’s private sector.  In early January 2000, Saudi Arabia announced 
that it was establishing an 11-member Supreme Petroleum Council (SPC) to oversee 
                                                 
244 From a transcript from the Capitol Hill Conferences convened by the Middle East Policy Council 
on February 1, 2000, in the Dirksen Senate Office Building with Chas W. Freeman, Jr., moderating.  
“Joining the Global Rules-based Economy: Challenges and Opportunities for the GCC.”  Available 
[Online]: http://www.mepc.org/forums/chcs/20.htm. 
245 Ibid. 
246 The 1995 Saudiization plan, for example, called for hotels to increase the Saudi portion of their 
labor force by 5 percent per year.  It also established penalties for firms that did not “Saudi-ize,” including 
denial of subsidies and loans, refusal of new applicants to import foreign labor, and being barred from 
competition for government contracts.  Between 1995 and 1999 it was clear that the government was not 
enforcing many of its measures to reduce Saudi Arabia’s dependence on foreign labor.  It also did little to 
address the fact that many of its policies -- its mandated salary scales, welfare charges, and regulations 
requiring the firing of Saudi employees -- acted as deterrents to hiring native labor.  For example, the salary 
scales for unskilled laborers called for a salary of 600-800 Rials for expatriates and 1,500-2,000 for 
nationals.  The scale for skilled laborers was 1,500-2,000 Rials for expatriates and 3,000-4,000 for 
nationals.  The scale for experienced employees was 3,500-4,000 Rials for expatriates and 5,000-7,000 for 
nationals, and the scale for engineers was 3,000-4,000 Rials for expatriates and 6,000-8,000 for nationals.  
Thus there were very few incentives to hiring nationals, especially given the low work ethic and 
productivity of most Saudis.  Cordesman, 72-73. 
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Saudi Arabia’s oil and gas policies.  In October 2000, the Saudi regime gave the SPC 
certain controlling powers over Saudi Aramco.  Optimists hold out hope that the SPC 
could help drive Saudi Arabia’s overall goal of accelerating private sector and foreign 
involvement in the country’s oil sector, although there remains large pockets of 
conservative opposition.  The General Organization for Investment was created to bring 
in foreign investment dollars and to advise the government on legal reform that would 
facilitate this process.  Additionally, the Supreme Commission for Tourism was created 
to promote and oversee tourism in Saudi Arabia.   
While the creation of these new bureaucracies may well fill a much-
needed void, there remains a twinge of irony here.  In an effort to increase the number of 
private sector jobs, the House of Saud has created several large bureaucracies, thus 
adding to the throngs of public sector employees that it desperately needs to reduce.  
While any good businessman knows that “it takes money to make money,” it should also 
be remembered that many time businesses go bankrupt.  Thus, the jury is still out on 
whether the benefit derived by the Saudi government from these new bureaucracies will 
justify their expense.    
d. Legal Reform 
 One area that the Saudi government does seem to be making steady 
progress in is the area of legal reform.  In this regard, numerous laws have been proposed 
and enacted since 1999.  For example, in early 2000 a law was passed in the area 
governing foreign investment which granted the same basic rights to foreign investors as 
to Saudi nationals.  Closely related to the changes made in the Foreign Investment Code 
are the changes being considered in Saudi’s foreign corporate taxation laws, which if 
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passed would result in significant reductions in the amount foreign corporations are 
taxed.  Changes to Saudi Arabia’s tariff structure are also being considered.  
Additionally, a regulation for legal procedures has been passed which regulates litigation 
and dispute settlements.  These and other legal reforms are fundamental for the future 
liberalization of Saudi’s economy.  Regarding legal reform, in 1995, Jean-Francois 
Seznec stated that “The few minute changes that have happened in the past two years are 
only harbingers of future changes.  They are weather balloons testing the public 
reactions.”247  In the absence of public condemnation, and with opportunities both to 
revolutionize the Saudi economy and personal financial gain, the House of Saud has 
pressed ahead with its goal of making Saudi Arabia’s legal code investor-friendly.  
However, it must be remembered that given the right circumstances and right spin, these 
and other economic reforms could be lethal ammunition used against the al-Saud (by 
their opposition) at some future date. 
e. World Trade Organization (WTO) 
 The House of Saud’s quest for WTO membership is the motor behind the 
current and planned economic liberalization in Saudi Arabia.  While Saudi Arabia had 
hoped to be admitted to the WTO by the end of 2000, the most liberal of estimates now 
place potential membership at the end of 2002.248  The delay is due to a number of issues, 
including the degree to which Saudi Arabia is willing to increase market access to its 
banking, finance, and upstream oil sectors.  If the House of Saud does make the reforms 
necessary for WTO membership, this would likely result in significant changes in the 
Saudi economy, which currently is characterized by relatively high tariff rates, subsidies,                                                  
247 Seznec, 13. 
248 Unattributed, “Saudi Membership Of WTO Still At Least Two Years Off”, Abu Dhabi, AFP, (28 
March 2000). 
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and a variety of restrictions on the free market.  According to statements made by Prince 
Saud, Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Minister, the goal of WTO membership is at least partially 
due to the regime’s desire to attract up to $200 billion in foreign investment over the next 
20 years, as well as its desire to push for new markets for the country’s petrochemical 
industry.249  In November 1999, King Fahd stated that “the world is heading 
for...globalization” and that “it is no longer possible [for Saudi Arabia] to make slow 
progress.”250  Along the lines of successfully becoming integrated into the global 
economy, King Fahd also emphasized the importance of regional unity among Gulf 
States – economically, politically, and militarily.  To this end, the GCC countries agreed 
at the December 1999 GCC summit to enact a GCC customs union, which is to be 
established in March of 2005. 
If “The Arabs missed the 19th century capitalist bus which the Japanese 
boarded so successfully,”251 then they certainly do not want to miss the globalization bus 
of the 21st century.   Privatization, WTO membership, and the opening of the Saudi 
economy to free trade and unhindered foreign investment and capital flows, are all 
aspects of economic globalization, whose benefits the House of Saud covets.  However, 
such economic benefits come at a price; although the Saudi regime has started down that 
road, it remains to be seen if they have the endurance to see it through.  These economic 
reforms necessitate greater transparency, and issues of transparency, corruption, “good 
                                                 
249 “Saudi Arabia,” Energy Information Administration, November 2000.  Available [Online]: 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/saudi2.html 
250 King Fahd’s statement was strikingly similar to that of Raul Valdes Vivo, the director of the Cuban 
Communist party’s Nico Lopes school for advanced studies outside of Havana, who when asked about the 
difficulties Castro’s Cuba faced in maintaining socialist principles, even as it was increasingly being forced 
to adopt capitalist means to survive, answered “Cuba is no longer an island...There are no islands anymore.  
There is only one world.”  National Geographic (June 1999), an interview with Raul Valdes Vivo, as cited 
in Friedman, 68. 
251 Charles Issawi, The Middle East Economy: Decline and Recovery (Princeton: Markis Wiener 
Publications, 1995), 181.   
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governance,” and even social and political reform, are now priorities of the IMF, WTO, 
World Bank, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD).252  While the House of Saud appears eager to discuss the Kingdom’s economic 
challenges and somewhat open to receiving advice, other hurdles exist.  Champion states 
that “According to the emerging trends of globalization, the necessary and quite 
substantial economic reforms that are required in many developing countries cannot be 
sustained without accompanying political and social reforms.”253  In an effort not to 
deviate too far from the status quo, however, the House of Saud is trying to pick and 
choose what aspects of globalization that it accepts and rejects in order to enjoy economic 
benefits on its own terms.  But, in reference to Saudi Arabia’s WTO application, Chas 
Freeman asserts, “The decision of Crown Prince Abdullah and others that Saudi Arabia 
must now welcome the world on the world’s terms rather than only on Saudi terms, in the 
interest of Saudi Arabia and in the interest of developing the Saudi economy, is 
historic.”254  In other words, the House of Saud is going to miss the globalization bus if it 
tries to climb on utilizing its own set of rules.   
Regarding Saudi Arabia, Cecilia Klein, a representative of WTO 
Accessions, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, recently noted that “the essence of 
participation in the WTO is compliance: compliance with the rules towards other 
                                                 
252 IMF publications provide a great deal of information on the drive for global economic and political 
reform.  Available [Online]: http://www.imf.org. 
253 Daryl Champion, “The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: Elements of Instability Within Stability”, 
Middle East Review of International Affairs, vol. 3, no. 4 (December 1999).  Available [Columbia 
International Affairs Online]: https://wwwc.cc.columbia.edu/sec/dlc/caio/olj/meria/meria99_chd01.html 
254 From a transcript from the Capitol Hill Conferences convened by the Middle East Policy Council 
on February 1, 2000, in the Dirksen Senate Office Building with Chas W. Freeman, Jr., moderating.  
“Joining the Global Rules-based Economy: Challenges and Opportunities for the GCC.  Available 
[Online]: www.mepc.org/forums/chcs/20.htm. 
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people’s trade so that you can expect the same treatment for your exports.”255  The rules 
of which Klein speaks include greater liberalization, transparency, stability, 
predictability, and application of the rule of law in trade matters.  Thus, while King Fahd 
and Crown Prince Abdullah’s rhetoric is very pro-WTO, senior Saudi industrial and 
commercial officials admit that WTO membership will require extraordinary changes to 
the Kingdom’s economy, trade practices, and regulations – a journey that is wrought with 
pitfalls.  It is therefore not surprising that many predictions are proving prophetic in this 
regard: “implementation of wide-ranging reforms is still expected to be a long 
process...as many of the reforms required for WTO membership, including measures 
such as easing restrictive practices in the banking sector, are likely to be strongly resisted 
by vested interests in the Kingdom.”256   
Thus, WTO membership has tremendous advantages and disadvantages 
for the House of Saud.  As a WTO member, privatization in Saudi Arabia would get a 
boost, foreign investments would pour into the country, momentum toward economic 
reform would be locked into the Saudi’s policy process, and Saudi Arabia would finally 
be freed from its excessive reliance on oil revenues.  However, the costs to the House of 
Saud are potentially equally as great for WTO membership.  If membership requires or 
might incite calls for extensive political and social reform, then it is likely that in the end 
the House of Saud may intentionally miss the globalization bus and continue to put all of 
its trust in oil.  Ultimately it boils down to a threat analysis.  While WTO membership 
                                                 
255 Ibid. 
256 Unattributed, Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU Electronic), “Saudi Arabia Investment -- New 
impetus in privatization”, Country Alert (distributed electronically by Reuters Business Briefing Select, 
August 14, 1997); also see Clement M. Henry, “Guest Editor’s Introduction,” Thunderbird International 
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would help keep the Saudi regime afloat in the long run by diversifying its economy, it 
also has the unfortunate short-term potential of increasing threats to the regime’s rule.  
Furthermore, WTO membership would limit the regime’s flexibility by locking in certain 
reforms.  This in some respects represents a loss of power.  Thus, although WTO 
membership is very attractive from a Western point of view, it would not be surprising if 
Saudi Arabia’s WTO membership date continues to slide. 
f. Conclusion: Economic Reform 
Today, oil revenues make up almost all of Saudi Arabia’s total export 
earnings, over three quarters of all budget revenues, and over one third of the country’s 
GDP.257  Additionally, about one third of Saudi Arabia’s GDP is petroleum oriented with 
over half of Saudi’s capital investment still going to oil and petrochemicals.  In short, oil 
is Saudi Arabia.  
The resilience in world oil prices since early 1999 has improved Saudi 
Arabia’s economic outlook, although the House of Saud continues to face both short- and 
long-term pressures to reform its economy and to open up to increased private 
investment.  For 2000, real GDP was estimated to have grown by about 7.6 percent, and 
the outlook for 2001, assuming relatively strong oil prices continue, is for growth of 
around 4 percent.258  Saudi Arabia needs strong economic growth to keep up with its 
rapidly increasing population, and to face the challenge of finding good private sector 
jobs for those people.  As stated previously, over the past two decades Saudi economic 
growth has fallen far behind its population growth.  This has contributed to reduce per 
                                                 




capita income and increase unemployment.  Additionally, Saudi Arabia still has a high 
level of domestic debt (between 75-100 percent of GDP), which it hopes to pay down 
while concurrently replenishing foreign assets and official reserves, both of which were 
largely depleted by the beginning of 1999.  Moreover, Saudi Arabia’s current five-year 
plan (2000-2005) has the same lofty goal as the one that preceded it – a budget deficit of 
zero.259     
If the House of Saud is serious about fiscal discipline, then it will have to 
take budget cuts and economic reform seriously.  This will entail making difficult and 
unpopular decisions, seeing as though the vast majority of the budget – 65 percent in 
1998 – goes toward paying government salaries and paying off the national debt.260  
Again, the House of Saud now is increasingly constrained by the flawed social contract 
that it instituted in the 1970’s.        
E. CONCLUSION 
The House of Saud is a status quo regime.  It does not make reforms unless it is 
absolutely out of options, and then the policies adopted are largely symbolic.  Even with 
all of their fanfare, the so-called political reforms of the past decade – the Basic Laws, the 
Consultative Council, and the System of Regional Government – did not in any 
meaningful way change the fact that the Guardian of the Two Holy Cities still calls all of 
the shots in Saudi Arabia.  The situation is only slightly different regarding recent 
economic reforms.  It is true that in the four years since King Fahd suffered a stroke and 
relinquished the day-to-day management of Saudi Arabia to Crown Prince Abdullah that 
numerous new economic reforms have been adopted.  But the question is, will they be 
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enforced?  Some significant advances have been made in the area of legal reform in an 
effort to become a member of the WTO.  But, again, will these reforms continue?  Will 
Saudi Arabia become a full-fledged WTO member?  What effects will WTO membership 
have on the Saudi economy?  Will the latest efforts to privatize government-run 
businesses be successful?  Will privatization lead to increased opposition as Saudi 
Princes and wealthy merchants wrest control of Saudi Arabia’s economy form Saudi 
bureaucrats?  Will the House of Saud ever make the fiscally responsible (but politically 
damning) cuts necessary to force its citizens to “…get used to a new lifestyle that does 
not rely entirely on the state,”261 as Abdullah desires?  Can the regime survive if they 
attempt to unilaterally adjust Saudi Arabia’s social contract?  Will admission to the WTO 
transform the Saudi economy to such an extent that Saudi Arabia’s social contract can be 
changed?  These are the numerous questions that have yet to be answered. 
Omnibalancing contends that Third World leaders are self-interested and will take 
whatever actions are necessary to remain in power.  This is certainly the case with the 
House of Saud.  Based on the House of Saud’s track record there are two explanation for 
the regimes apparent decision to enact economic reform 1) the 1998 oil crisis convinced 
the royal family that its future depended on enacting economic reforms now (to attract 
large sums of foreign investment), and 2) that while losing a modicum of control over the 
Saudi economy and possibly provoking opposition, the House of Saud will benefit 
economically from its decisions.  Thus the pressure of the:  
• Two-decade long oil crisis, 
• Two decades of deficit-spending, 
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• Depletion of its foreign reserves, 
• Long-term instability of oil prices, 
• Relative drop in the standard of living, 
• Rising birthrates, 
• Rising unemployment, 
• Rising political demands of its citizens, and 
• Rising frustration over the governments wasteful spending habits 
have all coalesced to such a degree that the House of Saud is now willing to give up some 





To say that the House of Saud currently faces numerous seemingly 
insurmountable problems is to state the obvious.  Yet, since the formation of Saudi 
Arabia, predictions of its imminent demise have continuously been written.  The years of 
infighting between Saud and Faisal, foiled coup attempts, Nasser’s pan-Arabist overtures, 
Khomeini’s Islamic fundamentalist agitation, and Saddam’s thrust into Kuwait all 
seriously have threatened Saudi Arabia’s stability, as well as the continuance of the 
House of Saud.  But in each case the al-Saud have survived and triumphed, a tribute to 
their political skills and acumen.   
B. DEATH OF A CONTRACT 
However, unlike the past problems stated above, today the House of Saud faces 
new problems and challenges, all of which have domestic roots, many of which are 
hopelessly intertwined, and most of which are of the regime’s own making.  As 
evidenced in this thesis’ brief historical review, Saudi Arabia’s transformation into a 
rentier state in the 1970’s radically changed the social contract between the House of 
Saud and society.  The Saudi regime’s cooption tactics, which previously focused on 
Islamic and tribal institutions, were now expanded to every Saudi citizen.  Massive oil 
rents coupled with a small population enabled the House of Saud to liberally spread 
largesse to its very poor population, essentially buying their contentment. 
Although Saudi Arabia’s social contract changed drastically, its government did 
not.  In an era when democracy was emerging as the world’s dominant political system, 
Saudi Arabia remained an absolute monarchy.  In Saudi Arabia, the King rules supreme 
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as the head of the al-Saud family, the Prime Minister and chief executive of the Central 
Government, the Supreme Religious Imam, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed 
Forces and the Chief Justice.  With the King having this type of unchecked control, Saudi 
Arabia’s massive oil revenue remained totally in his hands.262  Apart from the 
perfunctory need to appease the religious leaders, there were no executive, legislative, or 
judicial authorities to officially question his decisions.  Thus, the new rentier-based 
social contract was tailored in such a way as to dispense wealth to Saudi citizens in return 
for their unquestioned devotion and loyalty to the royal family. 
Unfortunately for the House of Saud, Saudi Arabia’s social contract has proven 
very shortsighted.  Although there are many flaws in the social contract, the largest and 
most obvious ones are that Saudi Arabia has the highest population growth rate on the 
planet and that the oil market is highly volatile.  Thus, the House of Saud is always 
reacting as Saudi Arabia’s budget waxes and wanes.  Because the House of Saud depends 
on oil rents to fulfill its end of the social contract, as the oil market drops so does its 
ability to distribute largesse.  While depressed oil market leaches the regime’s reserves 
and eventually leads to deficit spending, that is the lesser of the two problems.  The Saudi 
regime’s long-term conundrum is that if Saudi Arabia’s social contract remains 
unchanged, at some point in the future there will come a day when no matter how high 
the price of oil is, the population will outstrip the regime’s ability to sustain its largesse.  
Thus, the question becomes, what happens then?  When the House of Saud can no longer 
afford to pay its citizens for their political acquiescence, will the regime use coercion to 
maintain its position or will some kind of political compromise result?  
                                                 
262 As compared to King Ibn Saud, consensus building has been more characteristic of King Fahd’s 
rule, but ultimately, Fahd too rules supreme. 
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C. OMNIBALANCING AND THE HOUSE OF SAUD 
While this thesis has asserted many things, the most important is that Stephen 
David’s omnibalancing accurately describes how the House of Saud has operated to date 
and, given the regime’s aversion to change, is the best predictor of the al-Saud’s future 
actions.  If this is true, then the al-Saud: 
• Will align with whatever external power that is most likely to do what is 
necessary to keep it in power,  
• Will protect itself at the expense of promoting the long-term security of 
the state and general welfare of Saudi Arabia, and  
• Will balance against the principal threats that it faces (whether internal or 
external).263    
In other words, regardless of the circumstances the House of Saud is going to act 
pragmatically – doing whatever is necessary to strengthen its political and financial 
situation, while retaining the reins of power. 
In order to accomplish this the al-Saud will continue to depend on its three power 
facilitators: 1) a strong external ally, 2) controlling informal networks within Saudi 
Arabia, and 3) its rentier policies.  The House of Saud will depend on the above power 
facilitators for three reasons.  First, at no time in the future will the House of Saud be 
strong enough to protect itself from Iraq or Iran if hostilities were to break out.  It is 
therefore safe to assume that privately (if not publicly) the House of Saud will continue to 
pursue a close relationship with Washington.  Second, the House of Saud has become 
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very proficient in developing and implementing strategies to control its internal 
security.264  Third, there are no easy ways for the House of Saud to disentangle itself 
from the cumbersome social contract that now causes it so much angst.  However, while 
Saudi Arabia’s social contract may not change in the short- or mid-term, the al-Saud’s 
nearly universal dependence on oil rent to fund its social contract must change.  The 
Saudi population is expected to double in the next twenty years.  While oil rent will 
continue to play a major role in funding the social contract, the Saudi regime will have to 
diversify its economy to attract foreign investment, create more jobs, and create a cushion 
against downturns in the oil market. 
D. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES265 
The better Washington understands specifically how other governments operate, 
the more effective it is when developing foreign policy.  Therefore, that omnibalancing is 
highly descriptive of the House of Saud’s action should be of immense benefit to 
Washington policymakers in their dealings with the al-Saud.  While there are countless 
subtle ways in which this knowledge could be beneficial to policymakers, there are at 
least four major areas.  
First, Washington should be confident, understanding that the House of Saud is 
absolutely dependent on the United States to protect Saudi Arabia from external 
                                                 
264 The House of Saud uses a combination of six tools to insure domestic tranquility.  First, the Saudi 
government has a very large, very strong, multi-dimensional, and multi-layered internal security force.  
Second, the Saudi regime routinely ferrets out and coopts potential dissidents before they can gain 
widespread support.  Third, the Saudi regime has elevated its divide-and-rule strategy to an art form, 
creating divisions within communities and fragmenting any political opposition.  Fourth, the House of Saud 
remains ideologically flexible, shifting between playing its Islamic or Arabic card as circumstances dictate.  
Fifth, the House of Saud has allowed pseudo-participation in government in the form of the Consultative 
Council, which has alleviated much of the criticism over its refusal to grant its citizens a political voice.  
Sixth, the al-Saud use accommodative diplomacy to try to placate potential foreign adversaries with non-
controversial foreign policies and generous aid.    
265 These implications are based on the assumption that Washington desires to maintain a close 
relationship with the House of Saud.   
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aggression.  Second, when devising foreign policy, Washington should consider what 
affect it will have on local populations.  For example, if United States policy incites the 
Saudi public, then the House of Saud is forced to lash out at the United States in order to 
maintain domestic credibility.  This is not to say that Washington should back away from 
any decisions that might incite the Saudi public, only that Saudi public opinion should be 
a policymaking consideration.  When it is in the best interest of the United States to 
pursue policies that will not play well in Saudi Arabia, so be it.  Third, Washington 
should not get anxious if from time to time the Saudi regime publicly chastises the United 
States over various issues.  This is an omnibalancing tactic. When this occurs, the Saudi 
regime senses that its most pressing threats are internal.  The anti-American rhetoric that 
occasionally comes from the House of Saud in these circumstances serves to re-establish 
its Arab or Islamic credentials, thus staving off further internal dissent.  Nothing more 
should be read into Saudi’s rhetoric.  Finally, the United States’ dealings with and 
presence in Saudi Arabia needs to be more incognito.  In the past overt policies such as 
the Eisenhower Doctrine or presidential declarations refusing to allow anyone to topple 
the Gulf governments (like those made by President Reagan) only served to undercut the 
regimes that they were meant to support.  Similarly, the United States’ large military 
footprint in Saudi Arabia since the conclusion of the Gulf War has also antagonized the 
Saudi public.  These policies, declarations, and actions have focused on Saudi Arabia’s 
external threats.  Washington can use diplomatic channels and Aircraft Carrier Battle 
Groups to dissuade potential external aggressors; the real threats remain internal.  The 
United States and the House of Saud are best served by conducting official business out 
of the public eye.  This would have the direct benefit of lessening both the opportunities 
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and validity of the opposition to claim that the House of Saud is merely an American 
puppet regime. 
E. THE FUTURE OF THE HOUSE OF SAUD 
1. What Can Not Be Analyzed 
Because the House of Saud has constantly fabricated ephemeral responses to 
internal, Arab, Muslim, and world pressures, it is difficult (if not impossible) to assess its 
unwieldy policies (in any meaningful way so as to predict the regime’s future responses).  
The pressures that the Saudi regime has faced, and will potentially face, have been both 
very diverse and very expansive, as have its improvised responses.  It is impossible to 
know the vast array of possibilities that might occur in Saudi Arabia and what the al-
Saud’s responses to them would be so as to present some kind of comprehensible 
framework by which to analyze everything by.  To use a plausible example, a simple 
change in the government of a neighboring Arab country could lead to a total change in 
the Saudi approach to Arab and regional affairs.  For example, the emergence of an 
Islamic, radical, and threatening Egypt could lead the House of Saud to befriend once 
again the presently detested Iraqi regime.266   The fact that Iran and the House of Saud are 
now on friendly terms drives home the point that nothing is impossible when a weak 
regime is out for survival and all of its neighbors, as well as its own citizens, are seen as 
potential threats.   
2. What Can Be Analyzed 
The safest assumption about how the Saudi regime has functioned and will 
continue to function is to assume that the House of Saud is totally self-interested.  Much 
                                                 
266 Aburish, 71. 
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can be gleaned by examining how Saudi Arabia has been run under its current and 
previous kings.267  This takes us back to omnibalancing, since it very accurately 
describes Saudi Arabia’s past under the al-Saud.   
Therefore, if one applies omnibalancing to the formidable problems currently 
facing the House of Saud, what are the results?  Unlike the majority of Western 
academics who continue to rewrite the House of Saud’s obituary, it is more logical to 
conclude that the al-Saud, with the subtleness of a chameleon, will continue to make 
whatever adjustments are necessary to remain in power.  For some seventy years the 
House of Saud has focused on this goal with fierce tenacity.  Although the journey has 
frequently been tumultuous, the pragmatic and cunning al-Saud has always found a way 
to weather the storms.  Thus, while the current domestic threats facing the royal family 
have dumbfound even the most skilled advisors and are seemingly insurmountable, no 
one should assume that they will spell the end to this shrewd regime. 





APPENDIX A: THE SECULAR PETITION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
A petition for political reform was drafted in the fall of 1990 and signed in 
December by forty-three public figures from religious and secular trends, among them 
former cabinet ministers, prominent businessmen, writers and university professors.  
According to Middle East Watch the petition was drafted by Abdalla Manna, a doctor 
and a journalist known for voicing critical views of the government, which has led to his 
arrest on a number of occasions.  Seeking no doubt to disassociate themselves from any 
radical political group and attempting to avert retribution, the petitioners went to great 
lengths to demonstrate their loyalty.  In a long preamble, they asserted their devotion to 
the King and their allegiance to “the present system of government, and to preserving the 
cherished royal family.”   
B. THE SECULAR PETITION 
The signatories proposed the following ten reforms: 
1. A systematic framework for fatwa.  It must take into consideration the Shari’s, 
which is infallible and unchangeable, as represented in the unequivocal texts of the 
Qur’an and the Hadith.  But jurisprudence commentaries, Qur’an interpreters’ views and 
the opinions of Shari’a experts that are derived from divergent scholarly doctrines are all 
human attempts to comprehend the Shari’a texts.  These views are affected by their 
authors’ ability to understand, given their level of knowledge and skill.  Shaped by the 
circumstances of time and place, these views are liable to being wrong as well as right, 
and should be subject to debate.  Indeed, there has been a consensus among scholars that 
no one may ever claim the sole right to determine the meaning of the Qur’an or the 
Hadith or monopolize the right to decide Shari’a rules.  It is therefore essential that we 
clearly and forcefully make a distinction between what is divine and what is human.  The 
revealed and unambiguous texts must be accepted and obeyed.  But scholarly opinions 
may be freely examined and questioned without any limit. 
 
2. Consider issuing a basic law of government in light of the statements and 
declarations made by the rulers of the country at various times. 
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3. Formation of a consultative council comprising the elite from among the 
qualified and knowledgeable opinion makers known for their honesty, forthrightness, 
impartiality, mortality and public service representing all regions of the Kingdom.  The 
council must have among its responsibilities the study, development and adoption of laws 
and rules related to all economic scrutiny of all executive agencies. 
 
4. The revival of municipal councils; the implementation of the Law of 
Provinces; and the generalization of the chamber of commerce experience as a model for 
all other trades. 
 
5. The investigation of all aspects of the judicial system, in all its degrees, types 
and areas of competence, for the purpose of modernizing its laws and evaluating the 
process of preparing judges and their assistants.  Every step necessary must be taken to 
guarantee independence of the judiciary, to assure its effectiveness and fairness, spread 
its authority and strengthen its foundations.  Schools that train for this important field 
must be open to all citizens, not reserved to one group over the others in violation of the 
Shari’s-based principle of equality of opportunity. 
 
6. Commitment to total equality among all citizens in all aspects of their life, 
without distinction based on ethnic, tribal, sectarian or social origins.  The principle of 
protecting citizens against interference in their lives except by a court order must be 
firmly established. 
 
7. Media policy must be reviewed and set according to a comprehensive and 
precise law reflecting the most advanced legislation in other countries.  This law must 
enable all Saudi media to exercise their freedom in preaching good over evil, calling for 
virtue and shunning vice, and enriching dialogue in an open Muslim society. 
 
8. Comprehensive reform of the Association for the Propagation of Virtue and 
the Deterrence of Vice (Hai’at al-Amr bi al-Ma’rouf wa al-Nahi ‘an al-Munkar).  A 
precise law must be adopted specifying their functions and the method they must follow, 
and setting strict rules for hiring chiefs and members of precincts, to ensure judicious and 
tactful preaching. 
 
9. Although we believe that nurturing the new generation is the highest duty of 
Muslim women, we nevertheless believe that there are numerous fields of public life 
where women can be allowed to participate – within the scope of the Shari’a – thus 
honoring them and acknowledging their role in building society. 
 
133 
a. God revealed His holy books, and sent His prophets, to educate and nurture 
humanity, proving that education is the foremost important basis for the renaissance and 
progress of nations.  We believe that our country’s educational system is in need of 
comprehensive and fundamental reform to enable it to graduate faithful generations that 
are qualified to contribute positively and effectively in building, the present and the 
future of the country, and to face the challenges of the age, enabling us to catch up with 
the caravan of nations that have vastly surpassed us in every field. 
 
 
Source: Anders Jerichow, The Saudi File: People, Power, Politics, New York: St. 
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APPENDIX B: THE ISLAMIC PETITION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Following the drafting of the so-called Secular Petition, scores of top religious 
leaders in Saudi Arabia signed the following document in February 1991, among them 
Sheikh Abdel-Aziz ibn Baz, the most eminent religious figure in the country and head of 
the government-appointed Council of Senior Scholars and the Institution of Ifta and 
Scholarly Research, the government agency in charge of all religious matters.  Other 
members of the council as well as several judges, university professors and preachers also 
signed the petition.  
B THE ISLAMIC PETITION 
In this critical period everybody has recognized the need for change.  We 
therefore find that the most requisite duty is to reform our present conditions that have 
caused us to suffer these tribulations.  Consequently, we ask that the ruler of the nation 
check the deterioration of these conditions, which need reform in the following areas: 
 
1. The formation of a consultative council to decide internal and external issues 
on the basis of the Shari’a.  Its members must be honest, straightforward and representing 
all fields of expertise.  They must be totally independent and not be subject to any 
pressure that may affect the authority of the council. 
 
2. All laws and regulations of political, economic, administrative or other nature 
must be reconciled with the principles of the Shari’a.  Trusted committees with expertise 
in Shari’a should be authorized to repeal legislation not conforming to Shari’a principles. 
 
3. In addition to possessing specialized expertise, dedication and honesty, 
government officials and their overseas representatives must be unswervingly moral.  
Failing any one of the requirements for any reason is an abuse of public trust and a 
fundamental cause of injury to the national interest and reputation. 
 
4. Justice must be applied, rights granted and duties assigned in full equality 
among all citizens, not favoring the nobles or begrudging the weak.  Abuse of authority 
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by anyone whether by shirking obligations or denying people what is their right is a cause 
for the break-up and annihilation of society. 
 
5. All government officials, especially those occupying the highest positions, 
must be diligently scrutinized and must all be made accountable with no exceptions.  
Government agencies must be cleansed of anyone whose corruption or dereliction is 
proven, regardless of any other considerations.   
 
6.  Public wealth must be distributed fairly among all classes and groups.  Taxes 
must be eliminated and fees that have overburdened citizens must be reduced.  
Government revenues must be protected from exploitation and abuse; priority in 
expenditure must be given to the most urgent necessities.  All forms of monopoly or 
illegitimate ownership must be eliminated.  Restrictions imposed on Islamic banks must 
be lifted.  Public and private banking institutions must be cleansed of usury, which is an 
affront to God and His Prophet, and a cause for stunting the growth of wealth.  
 
7. A strong and fully integrated army must be built and fully equipped with 
weapons of all kinds, from any source.  Attention must be given to manufacturing and 
developing arms.  The goal of the army must be to protect the country and the Holy Sites. 
 
8. Information media must be remodeled according to the adopted media policy 
of the Kingdom.  The goals must be to educate, serve Islam and express the morals of 
society.  The media must be purged of anything conflicting with these objectives.  Its 
freedom to spread awareness through truthful reporting and constructive criticism must 
be safeguarded within the confines of Islam. 
 
9. Foreign policy must be based on national interest without relying on alliances 
not sanctioned by the Shari’a.  It must also embrace Muslim causes.  The Kingdom’s 
embassies must be reformed to enable them to reflect the Islamic nature of the country. 
 
10. Religious and proselytizing institutions must be developed and strengthened 
with financial and human resources.  All obstacles preventing them from fully carrying 
out their objectives must be removed. 
 
11. Judicial institutions must be unified and granted full and effective 
independence.  Juridical authority must apply to all.  It is necessary to establish an 
independent body whose function is to ensure carrying out judicial orders. 
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12. The rights of individuals and society must be guaranteed.  Every restriction on 
people’s rights and their will must be removed, to ensure the enjoyment of human 
dignity, within the acceptable religious safeguards.    
 
 
Source: Jerichow, Anders, The Saudi File: People, Power, Politics, New York: St. 
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Current as of February 2001 
 
Source: World Service Online, Saudi Arabia Country Report, Available [Online]: 
http://www.prsgroup.com/download/worldservice/S_ARABIA.pdf?file=S_ARABIA.pdf 
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APPENDIX F: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL INDICATORS,       
1990-2000 
 




Current as of April 2001 
 





APPENDIX G: WORLD PRODUCTION OF CRUDE OIL,         
1980-1999 
 
World Production Of Crude Oil 1980-1999, (Million Barrels Per Day) 
Country 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Saudi Arabia 1.029 1.027 6.929 5.430 5.033 3.778 5.270 4.698 5.600 5.582
Middle East 19.024 16.417 13.302 12.221 12.021 11.001 13.212 13.709 15.373 16.921
North America 14.761 14.968 15.431 15.465 15.981 16.084 15.565 15.512 15.425 14.839
Central and South 
America 3.848 3.859 3.681 3.676 3.887 3.916 4.159 4.082 4.323 4.375
Western Europe 2.844 3.027 3.379 3.828 4.140 4.345 4.514 4.568 4.573 4.504
Eastern Europe & 
Former U.S.S.R.
12.358 12.520 12.619 12.703 12.581 12.300 12.702 12.834 12.827 12.442
Africa 6.229 4.888 4.882 4.928 5.354 5.615 5.420 5.506 5.842 6.258
Far East and Oceania 5.075 5.066 4.921 5.225 5.673 5.988 6.186 6.206 6.327 6.538
World Total 64.139 60.746 58.215 58.046 59.638 59.249 61.758 62.418 64.690 65.877
Country 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Saudi Arabia 7.045 8.810 9.060 8.917 8.833 8.948 8.930 9.089 9.159 8.514
Middle East 17.528 17.103 18.421 19.355 19.791 20.141 20.310 21.128 22.454 21.704
North America 14.712 15.080 15.045 15.003 14.915 14.940 15.245 15.523 15.494 14.988
Central and South 
America
4.702 4.942 5.019 5.247 5.524 5.958 6.339 6.830 6.974 6.855
Western Europe 4.662 4.893 5.287 5.499 6.227 6.639 7.053 7.025 6.999 7.064
Eastern Europe & 
Former U.S.S.R.
11.664 10.633 9.137 8.159 7.487 7.349 7.256 7.428 7.458 7.842
Africa 6.723 7.032 7.124 7.078 7.111 7.403 7.583 7.867 7.823 0.782
Far East and Oceania 6.752 6.934 6.906 6.993 7.190 7.437 7.611 7.857 7.922 7.913
World Total 66.743 66.617 66.941 67.335 68.460 69.868 71.397 73.658 75.124 74.184  
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APPENDIX H: WORLD OIL PRODUCTION PROJECTIONS, 
1990-2020 
World Oil Production Projections, 1990-2020 (Million Barrels Per Day) 
1990 (est.) 1997 (est.) 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
OPEC
Persian Gulf
Iran 3.2 3.9 4 4.3 4.5 4.9 5.5
Iraq 2.2 1.6 2.8 3.2 3.8 4.7 5.9
Kuwait 1.7 2.6 2.7 3.1 3.2 4.3 5.2
Qatar 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7
Saudi Arabia 8.6 11.4 11.1 13.7 14.1 16.2 20
United Arab Emirates 2.5 2.7 2.8 3.2 3.4 4.2 4.9
Total Persian Gulf 18.7 22.8 23.9 28.1 29.6 34.9 42.2
Other OPEC
Algeria 1.3 1.4 1.6 2 2.2 2.1 2
Indonesia 1.5 1.7 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.3
Libya 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.6 1.5
Nigeria 1.8 2.2 2.5 2.9 3.2 3.3 3.1
Venezuela 2.4 3.4 3.8 4.6 5.1 5.4 5.8
Total Other OPEC 8.5 10.2 10.9 12.6 13.7 13.8 13.7
Total OPEC 27.2 33 34.8 40.7 43.3 48.7 55.9
Non-OPEC
Industrialized
United States 9.7 9.5 9.1 9 9 8.9 8.7
Canada 2 2.6 2.8 3 3.2 3.4 3.4
Mexico 3 3.4 3.7 3.7 4 3.9 3.9
Australia 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7
North Sea 4.2 6.3 6.9 7.2 7 6.4 5.9
Other 0.5 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7
Total Industrialized 20.1 23.4 24.1 24.5 24.8 24.1 23.3
Eurasia
China 2.8 3.2 3.2 3.3 3.5 3.6 3.6
Former Soviet Union 11.4 7.1 7.3 7.6 10.1 12.1 13.1
Eastern Europe 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5
Total Eurasia 14.5 10.6 10.8 11.2 14 16.1 17.2
Other Non-OPEC
Central and South 
America 2.4 3.4 3.8 4 4.4 4.8 5
Middle East 1.4 1.9 2 2.1 2.2 2.1 2
Africa 2.2 2.6 2.6 2.7 3.3 4.5 5.5
Asia 1.7 2.2 2.3 2.4 3 3.2 3.3
Total Other Non-
OPEC 7.7 10.1 10.7 11.2 12.9 14.6 15.8
Total Non-OPEC 42.3 44.1 45.6 46.9 51.7 54.8 56.3
Total World 69.5 77.1 80.4 87.6 95 103.5 112.2  
 


























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
151 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Abir, Mordechai, Saudi Arabia in the Oil Era: Regime and Elites; Conflict and 
Collaboration, Boulder: Westview Press, 1988. 
 
“Saudi Arabia in the 1990s: Stability and Foreign Policy,” The Jerusalem Center 
for Public Affairs, September 1997. 
 
Aburish, Said K., The Rise, Corruption and Coming Fall of the House of Saud, New 
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994. 
 
Al-Yassini, Ayman, Religion and State in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1985. 
 
Beblawi, Hazem, “The Rentier State in the Arab World,” Hazem Beblawi and Giacomo 
Luciani (ed.), The Rentier State, New York: Croom Helm, 1987. 
 
Becker, David, “Bonanza Development and the New Bourgeoisie: Peru Under Military 
Rule,” In Postimperialism: International Capitalism and Development, David 
Becker, Jeff Frieden, Sayre Schatz, and Richard Sklar (ed.), Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner, 1987. 
 
Bill, James, “Resurgent Islam in the Persian Gulf,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 63, no. 1, Fall 
1984. 
 
Byman, Daniel L. and Green, Jerrold D, “The Enigma of Stability in the Persian Gulf 
Monarchies,” Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA), vol. 3, no.3, 
September 1999. 
 
Champion, Daryl, “The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: Elements of Instability Within 
Stability,” Middle East Review of International Affairs, vol. 3, no. 4, December 
1999. 
 
Cordesman, Anthony H., Saudi Arabia: Guarding the Desert Kingdom, Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1997. 
 
152 
David, Steven R., Choosing Sides: Alignment and Realignment in the Third World, 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991. 
 
Davis, Eric, “Theorizing Statecraft and Social Change in Arab Oil Producing Countries,” 
in Eric Davis and Nicolas Gavrielides, (ed.), Statecraft in the Middle East: Oil, 
Historical Memory and Popular Culture, Miami: Florida International University 
Press, 1991. 
 
Denoeux, Guilain, Urban Unrest In The Middle East: A Comparative Study Of Informal 
Networks In Egypt, Iran, And Lebanon, Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 1993. 
 
Dollard, J., Doob, L. W., Miller, N. E., Mowrer, O. H., and Sears, R. R., Frustration and 
Aggression, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1939. 
 
Eickelman, Dale F., Muslim Politics, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996. 
 
Fandy, Mamoun, Saudi Arabia and the Politics of Dissent, New York: St. Martin’s Press,  
1999. 
 
Gause, F. Gregory III, Oil Monarchies, New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 
1994. 
 
“Saudi Arabia Over A Barrel,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2000. 
 
Guralnik, David B. (ed.), Webster’s New World Dictionary Of The American Language: 
Second College Edition, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1989. 
 
Gurr, Ted Robert, Handbook of Political Conflict: Theory and Research, New York: The 
Free Press, 1980. 
 
Issawi, Charles, The Middle East Economy: Decline and Recovery, Princeton: Markis 
Wiener Publications, 1995. 
 
Jerichow, Anders, The Saudi File: People, Power, Politics, New York: St. Martins Press, 
1998. 
153 
Kandusky, Eliyahu, “The Middle East Economies: The Impact of Domestic and 
International Politics,” Middle East Review of International Affairs, no. 2, July 
1997. 
 
Karshenas, Mossoud, Oil, State and Industrialization in Iran, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990. 
 
Kemp, Geoffrey and Harkavy, Robert E., Strategic Geography and the Changing Middle 
East, Washington D.C.: Brookings Institute Press, 1997. 
 
Kechichian, Joseph A., Succession In Saudi Arabia, Not Published. 
 
Kostiner, Joseph, “Transforming Dualities: Tribe and State Formation in Saudi Arabia,” 
in Philip Khoury and Joseph Kostiner, (eds.), Tribes and State Formation in the 
Middle East, Berkley: University of California Press, 1990. 
 
“State, Islam and Opposition in Saudi Arabia: The Post Desert-Storm Phase,” 
Middle East Review Of International Affairs, Issue no. 2, July, 1997. 
 
Kuznets, Simon, Modern Economic Growth, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966. 
 
Lacey, Robert, The Kingdom: Arabia and the House of Saud, London: Hutchinson, 1981. 
 
Long, David E. and Reich, Bernard, The Government and Politics of the Middle East and 
North Africa, Oxford: Westview Press, 1995. 
 
Luciani, Giacomo, “Allocation v. Production States: A Theoretical Framework,” in 
Luciani, (ed.), The Arab State, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990. 
 
Metz, Helen Chapin, Saudi Arabia: A Country Study, Washington, D. C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1993. 
 
Midkiff, James R., Saudi Arabia: A Kingdom in Decline, (M.A. Thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, California), 1995. 
 
154 
Sachs, Susan, “Saudi Prince Urges Reform, and a Move From Shadow,” New York 
Times, 4 December 2000. 
 
Seznec, Jean-Francois, “The Gulf Capital Markets At A Crossroads,” The Columbia 
Journal Of World Business, Fall 1995. 
 
Vandewalle, Dirk, Libya Since Independence: Oil and State-Building, Cornell: Cornell 
University Press, 1998. 
 
Wilson, Peter W. and Graham, Douglas F., Saudi Arabia: The Coming Storm, New York: 
M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1994. 
155 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
 
1. Defense Technical Information Center....................................................................2 
8725 John J. Kingman Road, Suite 0944 
Ft. Belvoir, VA  22060-6218 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library...............................................................................................2 
Naval Postgraduate School 
411 Dyer Road 
Monterey, CA  93943-5101 
 
3. Professor Robert Looney, Code NS/LX ..................................................................1 
Naval Postgraduate School 
1411 Cunningham Road 
Monterey, CA  93943-5218 
 
4. Professor Ahmad Ghoreishi, Code NS/GA .............................................................1 
Naval Postgraduate School 
1411 Cunningham Road 
Monterey, CA  93943-5218 
 
5. Professor F. Gregory Gause, III ...............................................................................1 
 Dept. of Political Science 
University of Vermont 
 P.O. Box 54110 
Burlington, VT 05405-4110 
 
6. Professor Steven R. David .......................................................................................1 
Dept. of Political Science 
Johns Hopkins University 
Baltimore, MD 21218 
 
7. Central Intelligence Agency ....................................................................................1 
 DI-NESAF 
Room 6P-37 NHB 
Washington, D.C. 20505 





 Washington, D.C. 20301-2400 




9. Office of Naval Intelligence.....................................................................................1 
 4251 Suitland Road 
Washington, DC 20395-5720 
 Attn: Middle East Desk 
 
10. Chief of Naval Operations .......................................................................................1 
Plans, Policy, and Operations (N3/N5) 
 2000 Navy Pentagon 
 Washington, DC 20350-2000 
Attn: Middle East Desk 
 
11. Commander and Chief Central Command...............................................................1 
United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) 
Joint Operations Directorate (J3) 
 7115 South Boundary Boulevard 
MacDill Air Force Base 
Tampa, FL 33621-5101 
 
12. Mr. E. John Reinhold...............................................................................................1 
4047 Snowy Egret Drive 
 Melbourne, FL 32904 
 
13. LCDR Baron V. Reinhold........................................................................................1 
4047 Snowy Egret Drive 
 Melbourne, FL 32904 
 
 
 
 
